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ABSTRACT 
This study is an attempt at determining the normative legitimacy of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). At its core, it scrutinizes the current 
mandate of the organization following the layering of economic integration objectives with 
human rights protection, sustenance of democracy, and the rule of law. The study discusses 
the elements of legitimacy across disciplines mainly, international law, international relations 
and political science. Legitimacy is eventually split along two divides, the normative and 
descriptive/sociological aspects. The study traces the normative content (shared/common 
values) underlying integration in Africa, concluding that integration has been born on new 
ideals such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. Expectedly, Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) as building blocks of the prospective African Economic Community 
(AEC) under the African Union (AU) regime are mandated to play a vital role in moving the 
continent forward upon these values. The inquiry is extended to the institutions of ECOWAS 
to determine their capacity to effectively implement the new mandate of the organization and 
operate supranationally. In the process, key legal and institutional shortcomings are 
discussed, particularly in relation to national institutions. It is argued that while human rights 
protection enhances the normative legitimacy of ECOWAS, it must not be pursued in 
isolation. Economic integration and protection of citizens’ rights are co-terminus and 
mutually reinforcing. Hence, community institutions must reflect this link if they are to be 
effective. The study concludes on the note that, while ECOWAS possesses layers of 
legitimacy, and have carried out legitimation steps, it cannot be considered a legitimate 
organization if Member States continue to be non-compliant with community objectives and 
if key legal questions remain unaddressed. It is submitted that ECOWAS is merely 
undergoing legitimation, whether it can eventually be considered a legitimate organization is 
dependent on addressing the identified challenges. 
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CHAPTER 1 
                                                                 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The inauguration of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
1
 in 
Lagos, Nigeria on 28 May 1975 was greeted as ‘a critical breakthrough in efforts to 
institute a framework for economic co-operation and integration that embraced the entire 
sub-region’.2 38 years down the line, two treaties in, and several reforms to the 
institutional structure of the organization, question marks still hang over the relevance of 
the institution to the teeming population of the West African Sub-region. Most observers 
have raised doubts over the success of ECOWAS as an economic organization due to the 
slow pace of integration,
3
 which is the primary goal of the organization.
4
 Despite these 
concerns, the organization has continued to make strides in other areas of integration, 
seeking to further solidify its crucial role in the sub-region and also fulfil its mandate as 
one of the recognized pillars of the African Economic Community (AEC)
5
 under the 
framework of the African Union (AU).  
 
Numerous problems plagued the first regime of the organization.
6
 Some of these 
problems include inadequacy of the legal framework, failure to meet objectives of the 
community such as the Trade Liberalization Scheme (TLS), non-ratification of 
community protocols and a general sense of distrust towards the intentions of the regional 
hegemon, Nigeria.
7
 In essence, ECOWAS under the first regime was nothing short of an 
agora, or a platform for discussion, ‘where things cannot just get done, and just cannot get 
                                                          
1
 The fifteen signatories of the Treaty of Lagos were: Cote d’Ivoire, Dahomey (now Benin), Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo and Upper Volta (now 
Burkina Faso). The island of Cape Verde became a member of the Community in 1997. Mauritania withdrew 
from ECOWAS in 2000. 
2
 S. Bah, ‘ECOWAS and the Legitimacy Question: A Normative and Institutional Approach’ in D. Zaum (Ed), 
Legitimating International Organizations, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p.90. 
3
See latest statistics on the low level of intra-African trade in, UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa 
ARIA V: Towards an African Continental Free Trade Area (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2012), pp.19-20. 
4
 See K. O Kufour, The Institutional Transformation of the Economic Community of West African States, 
(Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p.127.  
5
 See, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community adopted June 3, 1991 available at 
http://au.int/en/treaties (Accessed 15 April 2014). 
6
 Here, the first regime refers to the period which the 1975 treaty was in operation until its revision in 1993. 
7
 Kufour (2006), pp. 21-34. 
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done’.8  The emergence of violent conflicts in the early 90s changed the trajectory of the 
community’s objectives culminating in the revision of its treaty and giving it a human 
rights overlay. The intervention of ECOWAS in troubled Member States notably Liberia 
and Sierra Leone triggered legal and political debates not just on the role of the 
ECOWAS in peace and security but also culminated in greater emphasis on protecting 
universal values such as human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 
 
Economic integration still remains one of the key objectives of the Community and the 
general continent. The benefits of economic integration are not in dispute.
9
 The urgency 
with which it should be pursued is expressed in the following words of the United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA); 
 
This shift [the global move to integrate economies] is nowhere more urgent than in Africa, where the 
combined impact of relatively small economies, international terms of trade, and the legacy of 
colonialism, mis-rule, and conflict has meant that we have not yet assumed our global market share-
despite our significant market size.
10
 
 
It is envisaged that uniting African economies will permit exploitation of economies of 
scale, ensure competitive markets, provide access to wider trading and investment 
environments, promote exports to regional markets, provide the requisite experience to 
compete in the multilateral trade system, and to provide a framework for them to co-
operate in developing common services for finance, transportation and communication.
11
  
 
However, the limited progress in economic integration and the pre-occupation of the 
organization with human rights protection, peace and security has drawn the attention of 
scholars to the legitimacy of ECOWAS. The emergent norms in the practice of the 
organization since its intervention in troubled Member States has also raised important 
questions about the limits an organization originally dedicated to economic integration, 
                                                          
8
 J. Klabbers, ‘Two Concepts of International Organization’ 2 International Organization (2005), p.282. 
9
 See, R. Fernandez & J. Portes, ‘Return to Regionalism: An analysis of non-traditional gains from Regional 
Trading Arrangements’,  12 World Bank Economic Review (1998), 197; T. Mulat, ‘Multilateralism and Africa’s 
Regional Economic  Communities’ 32 Journal of World Trade(1998) , 115. 
10
  Assessing Regional Economic Integration in Africa (Addis Ababa: UNECA, 2004), p.ix. See also, United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Development in Africa Report 2009: Strengthening 
Regional Economic Integration for Africa’s Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2009). 
11
 R.F Oppong, Relational Issues of Law and Economic Integration in Africa, Doctoral thesis (University of British 
Columbia, 2009), p.2. 
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but whose mandate has extended to peace and security, and human rights spheres. The 
legitimation practices of ECOWAS as an international organization is where the inquest 
of this study lies. It is argued that the capacity of community institutions to deliver the 
vast mandate in human rights protection, peace and security, and the rule of law in line 
with a paradigm shift in regional integration in the continent is fundamental to the long 
term success of the organization. 
 
This study joins a pool of emerging works that examine the legal aspects of economic 
integration in Africa,
12
 albeit with a special focus on human rights and the rule of law. 
Kiplagat bemoans the ‘lack of meaningful institutional analysis and excessive emphasis 
on economic inquiry’.13 He argues that since economic integration has been seen as the 
answer to the plight of developing countries, the success or failure of integration attempts 
has depended upon and is gauged by economic outcomes.
14
 His argument appears to be 
valid, although both disciplines (economics and law) are increasingly becoming co-
terminus.
15
 Hence, it is understandable that scholars of regional integration organizations 
depend largely on economic inquiry for answers. This study does not attempt to provide 
definite solutions to the lack of progress on economic integration neither does it reject 
alternative constructs on the way forward. It merely examines the normative and 
institutional practice of ECOWAS in human rights under the new treaty regime, in an 
attempt to ascertain the possible impact on the future success of the community and its 
peoples. Admittedly, it is at most an ambitious attempt at deciphering the possible 
destination of the organization. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
12
 Notable recent works on the legal aspects of integration in Africa include, R.F Oppong, Legal Aspects of 
Economic Integration in Africa, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); J.T Gathi, African Regional 
Trade Agreements as Legal Regimes, (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
13
 P.K Kiplagat, ‘An Institutional and Structural Model for Successful Economic Integration in Developing 
Countries’, 29 Texas International Law Journal (1994), p.50.  
14
 Ibid. 
15
 On the relationship between legal institutions and economics, see, K.N Llewellyn, ‘The Effect of Legal 
Institutions upon Economics’, 15 The American Economic Review (1925), 665. 
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1.2 STATEMENT OF RESEARCH PROBLEM & RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
ECOWAS, like most international organizations, is faced with the challenge of 
establishing its legitimacy, especially when it concerns delivering on its human rights 
mandate. Under the first regime, the legitimacy of ECOWAS was hardly contested, 
perhaps due to Cold War and the limitations it imposed on the organization’s role.16 It 
was viewed by both its members and other states as focused on, and established primarily 
for economic integration. Hence it lacked the mandate to interfere in the internal affairs of 
its members. However, the emergence of violent domestic conflicts which has had lasting 
repercussions on the role of ECOWAS in member states has expanded the understanding 
of peace and security and human rights in the organization. More importantly, the 
legitimacy question was brought to the fore primarily due to the military interventions in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone. 
 
From an international law perspective, debates about the legitimacy of international 
organizations has gained traction over the last two decades due to the growing scope of 
international organization’s practice to regulate actions of states (and increasingly 
individuals), and the intrusiveness of some organizations such as ECOWAS into areas 
traditionally considered to be within the sovereign domain of States.
17
 The debate spurred 
has cast the searchlight on the institutions and decision-making processes of international 
organizations. For example, an extensive literature has emerged on the challenge that the 
European Union’s ‘democratic deficit’ poses to the organization’s 
legitimacy.
18
Additionally, these debates about the roles of international organizations 
have also raised questions concerning the character of legitimacy in international society 
more generally, and the function of international organizations as ‘collective 
legitimizers’19 of state conduct at international level.  
 
                                                          
16
 Bah (2013), p.90. 
17
 J.C Coicaud & V. Heiskanen (eds.), The Legitimacy of International Organizations (Tokyo: United Nations 
University Press, 2001); B. Cronin & I. Hurd, The UN Security Council and the Politics of International Authority 
(Abindon: Routledge, 2008). 
18
 V. Schmidt, ‘The European Deficit: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?’ 42 Journal of Common 
Market Studies (2004), pp. 975-97; T. Pogge, ‘Creating Supra-National Institutions Democratically: Reflections 
on the European Union’s “Democratic Deficit”’, 5 Journal of Political Philosophy (1997), pp. 163 – 82. 
19
 See, I. L Claude, ‘Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations’, 20 International 
Organizations (1966), 367.  
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However, legitimacy is an ‘extremely slippery concept’ for various reasons.20 First, 
legitimacy is slippery because it is historically contingent and dynamic.
21
As Hurrell 
observes, legitimacy is ‘quite literally meaningless outside of a particular historical 
context and outside of a particular set of linguistic conventions and justificatory 
structures.’22 As a result, notions of legitimacy as well as definitions of practices that 
qualify as legitimate are altered as normative and political contexts change. It is also 
slippery because ideas of legitimacy vary with the social terrain under examination.
23
 As 
Ian Clarke observes, since ‘legitimacy possesses no independent normative content of its 
own [….] it is always mediated through a composite of other norms’24 be they legal, 
moral, political or constitutional. A third reason why legitimacy is an evasive concept is 
its subjectivity.  Consequently, legitimacy belongs to groups/societies which cannot be 
controlled unilaterally. Put differently, legitimacy is for collectivities to judge not just for 
scholars to control.
25
 In other words, legitimacy is centrally concerned with those 
elements that explain why certain actors and activities generate normative compliance, i.e 
compliance pull without co-ercion – amongst relevant audiences.26     
 
Despite the conceptual variations in the study of legitimacy, scholars of international law 
seem to agree on one common factor.  This common denominator is the right of a 
legitimate institution to rule. Under this disciplinary approach, a wide variety of factors 
might give an actor the right to rule: democratic accountability, legality, preservation of 
order, respect for human rights and so forth.
27
 These factors of legitimacy under the 
disciplinary approach were all given consideration in this study. This brings us to the 
questions that form the nucleus of this study. 
 
                                                          
20
 A. Hurrell, ‘Legitimacy and the use of force: can the circle be squared?’ 31 Review of International Studies, 
(2005), p.17. 
21
 P. Williams, ‘Regional and Global Legitimacy Dynamics: The United Nations and Regional Arrangements’ in 
Zaum (2013), p.43. 
22
 Hurrell (2005), p.29. 
23
 Williams (2013), p.44. 
24
 I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p.207 
25
 Williams (2013), p.44. 
26
 T.M Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), p.6; See also 
T.M Franck, ‘Legitimacy in the International System’ 82 American Journal of International Law (1988), p.712. 
27
 D. Bodansky, ‘Legitimacy in International Law and International Relations’ in J.L Dunoff & M.A Pollack (Eds), 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013),p.324. 
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I) The first question considered in this study is the normative content of African 
integration. What are the shared norms or values on which integration in Africa is 
based? It is fundamental for the purpose of the inquiry of this study that the 
component values of African integration are evinced to assess the legitimacy or lack 
of, of the ECOWAS regime. ECOWAS is instrumental to the greater integration 
agenda at continental level due to its position as a Regional Economic Community 
(REC) which is a pillar of the African integration system. Hence any examination of 
its legitimacy ought to start at the top. 
 
II) Having already indicated the role of ECOWAS as a building block for continental 
integration, the study moves on to examine the role of ECOWAS in human rights 
protection. This is a direct result of the fact that human rights has been established as 
a central norm in Africa, a constituent value of the notion of Pan-Africanism which 
holds all African states together. The old wave of regionalism
28
, in Africa embodied 
the values that reflected the colonial past of the continent. The zeitgeist of African 
states at the time hinged upon sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs of 
the newly emergent states. With civil unrests and conflicts slowly beginning to dot the 
landscape of the continent in the early 90s, a shift in paradigm occurred. In 
ECOWAS, this resulted in the development of a strong ‘interventionist norm’.29 This 
precipitated the restructuring of community institutions into ‘supranational-like’ 
entities with the mandate to act independently in areas decided upon by Member 
States under community law. Therefore, the second research question is, what are the 
dimensions to the human rights framework of the current ECOWAS regime bearing in 
mind the troubled past of the region and the continent? 
 
III) Since the main thrust of this study is the legitimacy of ECOWAS, the next line of 
inquiry is the capacity of community organs, particularly the ECOWAS Community 
Court of Justice (ECCJ) which is clearly mandated to protect human rights by an 
enabling protocol. It is accepted in legitimacy studies that International Courts (ICs) 
‘have the unique capacity to confer legitimacy on other institutions’30 of a regime, on 
the norms they apply and through the fairness of their decisions. Consequently, the 
                                                          
28
 Here old wave of regionalism refers to the period under the leadership of the OAU. New wave of regionalism 
therefore connotes the new regime under the African Union. 
29
 Bah (2013), p.89. 
30
 Y. Shany, Assessing the Effectiveness of International Courts, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p.137.   
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question is asked, what role does the ECCJ play in the legitimation of the ECOWAS 
regime? To what extent has the Court successfully carried out its mandate as a 
supranational court with human rights competence (halo effect)
31
 and an enforcer of 
community law in general? The ECCJ is but one of the organs of the community. 
Therefore, the roles of other organs are also examined. Here, I argue that the 
Authority of Heads of State has overbearing influence on other community organs and 
that the lack of full legislative powers for the ECOWAS parliament is one 
manifestation of this gap. It is also argued that this incompetence of the parliament 
further erodes the democratic legitimacy of the organization. 
 
 
 
1.3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The main approach to this work was doctrinal. Analysis of existing literatures on the practice 
of legitimacy and human rights protection in regional organizations were undertaken. This 
was primarily based on library and desktop research. 
 
Primary and secondary sources of data were consulted. The primary sources here include 
official documents of the ECOWAS, the AU, UNECA, and jurisprudence of national and 
regional courts. Other primary documents utilized include those of the United Nations and its 
institutions, the European Union (EU) and other relevant international organizations. 
References were made to official papers and reports of ECOWAS, particularly as it relates to 
the official version of protocols in force. Where formal documents were unavailable, resort 
was made to working papers and other informal documents of ECOWAS organs and 
institutions available on the internet. The textual analysis undertaken in this study adopts a 
critical approach to avoid description. The main secondary sources consulted will be 
published works of scholarship in the relevant areas. These include books, journals, articles, 
working papers, dissertations, newspapers and magazines as well as relevant internet sources. 
 
                                                          
31
 Shany speaks of a ‘halo effect’ through which ICs may derive initial legitimacy capital. This term refers to the 
efforts of an IC to tackle serious problems of considerable importance in the eyes of the public, such as human 
rights violations, international criminality, and international conflicts among others. Ibid., p.146. 
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This research also adopts a multi-disciplinary approach. Thus, materials from international 
law, international relations, political science and economics which shed light on the legal 
analysis were routinely consulted. The aim of this multi-disciplinary approach is to better 
understand the discourse of legitimacy and the legal and institutional make-up of ECOWAS 
as an international organization in human rights protection. 
 
In addition to the desk and library research undertaken, field visits were made at different 
stages of this study. Field visits made included visits to the ECOWAS Commission, the 
ECOWAS Parliament and the ECOWAS Community Court of Justice (ECCJ). During these 
visits, some community documents were sourced from the respective libraries of community 
institutions, informal interviews were also conducted with a few community officials. These 
interviews do not indicate a methodological approach; rather they were conducted to improve 
my understanding and appreciation of the ECOWAS institutional framework. Thus, these 
interviews are not reflected in my footnotes or in the bibliography.  The field visits and 
interviews contributed immensely to my understanding of ECOWAS and provided a glimpse 
into the institutional workings of ECOWAS in some respect. 
 
 
1.4 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
There are limitations on the methodology and scope of this study which should be 
immediately noted. Firstly, legitimacy of international organizations largely depend on norms 
but it also has an ‘intrinsically social quality and depends on people’s beliefs’.32 Thus, one of 
the limitations of this study was the inability to conduct empirical research to determine the 
sociological legitimacy of ECOWAS. Due to limited resources and time constraint, a survey 
of the magnitude that would seek feedbacks on the acceptability of ECOWAS from 
community citizens could not be carried out.  An empirical study on the legitimacy of an 
international organization would determine the key factors that contribute to its perceived 
legitimacy and those factors related to effectiveness. That does not diminish the value of this 
research to the discourse on legitimacy of regional organizations because it examines the 
normative aspects of ECOWAS’s legitimacy. This study contributes to the understanding of 
                                                          
32
 Bodansky (2013), p.327. 
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the subject of legitimacy of regional organizations which is still considered to be in its 
infancy. 
 
Another limitation of this study is the sheer make up of international organizations. 
International organizations are amalgamations of state governments and supranational 
institutions that have many moving parts which do not always interact in a uniform or 
transparent manner. Thus understanding of the inner workings of many international 
organizations, especially in Africa is often problematic for outside observers. This is evident 
in the difficulty experienced in getting access to some key documents of community 
institutions. The ECOWAS website is not updated in time with decisions of the Court, which 
makes it a challenge to access some of the ECCJ’s recent jurisprudence for research 
purposes.   
 
 
1.5 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter one provides the general introduction on which 
the thesis is based. It sets out the statement of research problem and research questions. It 
also highlights the research methodology and the limitations of the research. It also contains a 
multidisciplinary examination of key concepts such as Legitimacy, Regionalism/Regional 
Integration and Supranationalism. 
 
Chapter two contains the background of regional integration in Africa discussing the 
ideological foundations of regionalism. The chapter also discusses the evolution of the OAU 
and the movement to the AU. On the part of ECOWAS, the chapter demonstrates the 
evolution of the organization from the first regime to the second regime. The chapter ends by 
examining the centrality of human rights and humanitarian intervention in regional 
integration as well the AU institutions for human rights protection. 
 
Chapter three examines the normative framework for human rights protection in ECOWAS. 
Sources and structures of human rights in the sub-region are also examined. The essence is to 
establish the shared valued and norms that make-up the ECOWAS human rights framework. 
This would establish the legitimacy or not of the ECOWAS human rights system as well 
identify possible weaknesses in the normative framework of ECOWAS. Such concepts as 
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Traditional human rights, democracy, good governance and the rule of law, peace and 
security and the right to development are all examined. To aid the understanding of the topic 
in this regard, international standards and instruments are discussed. 
 
Chapter 4 moves the inquiry to the practice of human rights protection to the institutions of 
the community, starting with the ECCJ. The ECCJ is given priority because it is the only 
community institution with a clear human rights mandate to protect individual rights. The 
importance of the Court as a judicial entity to the legitimization efforts of the community and 
the general human rights obligations of the organization cannot be overemphasized. The 
jurisdictional problems in the human rights mandate of the Court are examined. The 
relationship of the Court with national courts are discussed with a view to establishing 
possible ‘impact’ of the Court in standard setting in human rights. Overall, the role of the 
Court in the African human rights system and the economic integration objectives of the 
community are discussed. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the human rights mandate of other community institutions. The 
Assembly of Heads of States of Government (AHSG), the ECOWAS Council of Ministers, 
the ECOWAS Parliament, the ECOWAS Commission and other community institutions are 
all examined. The essence is to establish the effectiveness of these institutions in human 
rights protection on the one hand, and also investigate the democratic legitimacy in the inter-
institutional relations.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the study and recommends possible solutions towards the practice of 
human rights and rule of law in ECOWAS. This Chapter also addresses potential concepts 
that may be explored to further legitimize ECOWAS in its quest to deliver on its regional 
integration promises. It is envisaged that these recommendations can apply to other RECs in 
the continent. 
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1.6 CLARIFICATION OF KEY CONCEPTS 
 
1.6.1 LEGITIMACY: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY DISCOURSE 
 
Several substantive changes in the international system have sparked the interest of scholars 
in legitimacy. Bodansky attributes this shift in thinking to three factors. First, international 
governance is increasing both in depth and breadth. Second international governance 
increasingly affects not only states but also individuals and other non-state actors. Finally, he 
says, international governance is increasingly being exercised by private and public-private 
institutions, as well as by intergovernmental institutions.
33
 The focus on legitimacy in 
contemporary studies appear to be one of the several responses to the trend towards greater 
international governance which has found expression in other related concepts as good 
governance, constitutionalism, accountability, human rights,
34
 and the nascent global 
administrative law (GAL).
35
 Kingsbury and Casini add that increasing concern on legitimacy 
of international organizations lies in the fact that the emerging field of international 
institutional law has begun to confront the demands for deeper conceptual foundations and 
more expansive and theoretical and policy understanding.
36
 
 
Historically, neither international law (IL) nor international relations (IR) had paid much 
attention to the issue of legitimacy.
37
 International lawyers tended to focus on legality rather 
than legitimacy. They question if there is any real distinction between the two terms.
38
 Franck 
for example focuses on the legitimacy of rules rather than institutions.
39
 Like many other 
international lawyers he looks at a specific theory of legal legitimacy based on the Fullerian 
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 Bodansky (2013),  p.321. 
34
 For a philosophical enquiry on human rights as a moral foundation of international law, see, A. Buchanan, 
Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for International Law, ( Oxford: OUP, 2004). 
35
 See, B.Kigsbury, N. Kirsch & R.B Stewart, ‘The Emergence of Global Administrative Law’, 68 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2005), 16; C. Harlow, ‘Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and Values’ 
17 European Journal of International Law (2006), 187; N. Kirsch & B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global 
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ 17 European Journal of 
International Law (2006), 1. 
36
 B. Kingsbury & L. Casini, ‘Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organizations Law’ Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper series, Working Paper No. 10-04 (2010), p.6. 
37
 Bodansky, (2013), p.321. 
38
 See, I. Clark, Legitimacy in International Society, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
39
 Franck identifies determinacy, symbolic validation, rule coherence, and adherence as the elements of 
legitimacy in the international legal order. See, Franck (1998), pp. 705-759. 
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approach which considers the internal qualities of the legal system
40
 (for example, whether 
rules are clear, prospective, and public, and whether they were adopted in conformity with a 
legal system’s secondary rules about norm creation) as opposed to the political process by 
which the rules were produced or the rules were produced. 
 
Bodansky observes that most studies on legitimacy assume that normative standards of 
legitimacy such as transparency, participation and representativeness, are, in fact widely 
shared; that actors use these standards to assess the legitimacy of international institutions 
and make them more effective.
41
 Hence, there is little empirical work on the legitimacy of 
international institutions per se. Instead there is only a study on the legitimacy of 
international law. Here, he believes international relation scholars take a different 
perspective. International relation scholars, he argues, focus on the legitimacy of international 
institutions rather than of international law although he admits that international lawyers have 
been the more theoretically active of the two disciplines. International law scholars have 
developed theories of legitimacy on a variety of approaches, including “interactional law”,42 
constitutionalism
43
 and GAL. 
 
From a mainstream IR perspective, legitimacy is normally associated with relationships of 
authority, with hierarchical relationships between rulers and ruled.
44
 Contemporary IR 
scholars, recognizing the increasing importance of this relationship in international 
institutions have devoted more attention to ‘governance’.45 Although there is no widely 
accepted definition of governance, the essence remains the same, irrespective of approach. 
Governance at all levels, involves making decisions for a collective- decisions that not merely 
affect other, but are in fact, directed at them with the intention to constrain behaviour. The 
decisions may be general rules in intended to guide behaviour or more specific decisions 
                                                          
40
 Fuller originated the “internal morality of law”. He identifies eight criteria of generality, publicity, non-
retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, constancy and congruity as the requisite conditions which the 
lawmaker must fulfil to appeal to the practical reasoning of citizens. See, L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, (New 
haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1964). 
41
Bodansky (2013), p.323. 
42
See, J. Brunnée & S. J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
43
 See, J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G. Ulstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
44
 H. Arendt, ‘What is Authority’, in H Arendt, Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought 
(New York: Viking Press, 1954), pp. 91-141. 
45
 S. Bernstein, ‘When is Non-state Global Governance Really Governance?’ 1 Utah Law Review (2010), 91. 
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related to a specific issue.
46
 But, in either case, they have a social implication, aiming to 
substitute the ruler’s judgement for that of its subjects. A wide variety of actors exercise 
governance authority, thus they raise questions of legitimacy, including governments, IOs, 
expert groups, market actors, and civil society groups.
47
 IR scholarships have explored 
private and public-private governance regimes.
48
 It is in this aspect of legitimacy that political 
scientists have been most visible in the discourse of legitimacy in recent years.
49
 The 
legitimacy of some private governance arrangements (such as the World Commission on 
Dams, the Forest Stewardship Council, or the supply-chain authority of Wal-Mart) than on 
public (binding) regimes such as the WTO, the Security Council, or the ICC), where the 
interest of international lawyers lie.
50
  
 
Legitimacy may also be understood in international law literature, by comparing two other 
bases of influence: rational persuasion and power. Rational persuasion depends on 
convincing another that a decision is the right one. If an institution exercises influence 
through rational persuasion, then issues of legitimacy might not arise, because the audience 
has been convinced. In contrast, when an institution governs, it limits its judgement to the 
will of those subject to its authority. Thus, a decision influences behaviour not exactly 
because it persuades its addressees that it is the ‘right rule’, but because the institution has a 
‘right to rule.’  
 
For example two different reasons might justify why the U.S Supreme Court might obey a 
decision of the ICJ. First it might be persuaded by the ICJ’s ratio decidendi; second it might 
comply because it perceives the ICJ as an authoritative source. The second reason would 
often raise questions of legitimacy. Does the ICJ have the right to govern a national Supreme 
Court? In general, judges often attempt to convince others that their decisions are correct are 
correct by writing lengthy decisions, but their decisions remain authoritative even where they 
fail to convince.
51
 Along these lines, a legitimate decision or norm isn’t necessarily one that 
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 Bodansky (2013), p.325. 
47
 As this study demonstrates in subsequent chapters, civil society groups have been instrumental catalysts in 
the transformation and legitimation of ECOWAS, particularly under the new treaty regime. 
48
 See, M.Hlavac, ‘A Developmental Approach to the Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions’, in D. A 
Reidy & W.J Riker (eds.), Coercion and the State (New York: Springer, 2008). 
49
 Bodansky argues that political science as a discipline are consumers of other theories produced by other 
disciplines, such as sociology and psychology , and is yet to develop its own theory of legitimacy. See, Bodansky 
(2013), p.324. 
50
 Ibid., p.326. 
51
 Ibid. 
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may be correct as a matter of substance – for example because it is just. Instead, it is one 
which emanates from the authors right to rule. It is a legitimate authority, whose decisions are 
entitled to respect.
52
 
 
The above paragraphs have highlighted a variety of approaches about legitimacy. The 
discourse of legitimacy is very vast, even within disciplines there are different approaches. It 
is no surprise that the concept is termed a ‘slippery’ one.53  However, the next paragraphs 
attempt to sift out what appear to be, arguably, reconcilable variables, at least in the minds of 
a few scholars. Legitimacy would be discussed along the normative and descriptive axis.  
 
 
1.6.2 NORMATIVE AND DESCRIPTIVE ASPECTS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
International Organizations are ‘Janus faced’54 entities which makes them even more difficult 
to frame conceptually. However, questions may be continuously asked about their role and 
the legitimacy of their activities. Why do we care so much about the legitimacy of 
international organizations? Bodansky puts this inquiry down to two factors. The first is to 
determine whether ‘an institution is worthy of our support’.55 Do we think the Security 
Council, ECOWAS, or the ICC has the right to rule in a given domain? Is its exercise of 
authority grounded in moral or normative reason? Secondly, we might care about legitimacy 
because we think that a legitimate institution is more likely to succeed. The first issue relates 
to an institution’s normative legitimacy – with whether it has a right to rule as a matter of 
moral theory. The second issue is the basis for an institution’s descriptive or sociological 
legitimacy – a widely held belief in the right to rule, determined by the relevant audiences 
such as states and civil society groups. Whether it enjoys a reservoir of support so strong that 
people are willing to sanction even its unpopular decisions, and help sustain it despite 
difficult times.
56
  
The relationship between normative and descriptive legitimacy can be problematic. There 
appears to be some uncertainty and links between both concepts are not as lucid. On the one 
hand, descriptive legitimacy seems to depend on normative legitimacy since beliefs about 
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legitimacy are usually based on whether an institution, as a normative matter has the right to 
rule.
57
 On the other hand, an opposite argument is put forward that normative legitimacy is 
conceptually tied to descriptive legitimacy. It has an underlying social quality based on 
people’s beliefs. An institution would not be normatively legitimate if no one thought so of 
it.
58
   
 
Other than the search for a connection in both concepts, normative and descriptive legitimacy 
are quite clear when considered independently. Perhaps this confusion is a result of 
description, ‘legitimacy is one of the few words that refer both to beliefs and to the thing 
about which beliefs are held’.59 This confusion could be avoided if different terms were used 
to refer to normative and descriptive legitimacy. Clearly, normative legitimacy depends on 
whether an institution objectively has a right to rule while descriptive legitimacy concerns 
whether actors subjectively accept an institution’s right to rule. Descriptive legitimacy 
reflects ‘not the truth of the philosopher but the belief of the people’.60 
 
Another confusion plaguing the proper definition of normative and descriptive legitimacy is 
the difficulty in identifying where international law scholarship stands. The common interest 
of international lawyers and IR scholars in legitimacy as the basis for compliance and 
effectiveness suggests that both disciplines are interested primarily in descriptive 
legitimacy.
61
 Both disciplines lay emphasis on the lack of institutions at the international 
level that can compel obedience with international norms.
62
 On whether people think an 
institution is legitimate- since that affects their behaviour towards the institution. The same is 
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 This line of thought tallies with Steffek’s observation that both Weber and Habermas viewed legitimacy as 
the “conceptual place where facts and norms merge, where de facto validity (Geltung) of a social order springs 
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true of other perceived benefits of legitimacy such as effectiveness and compliance; they are 
a function of an institution’s descriptive rather than normative legitimacy.63 
 
Despite this general assumption by IL/IR scholars that normative and descriptive legitimacy 
go hand in hand, recent scholarship across the IL/IR fields have articulated less demanding 
normative standards for legitimacy. Taking the increasing governance role of international 
organizations into cognizance, international lawyers and political scientists have sought to 
articulate less demanding normative standards that might be appropriate for international 
organizations. This has stemmed in part from the preconceived unattainability of global 
democracy as a precondition for the legitimacy of international organizations,
64
 due to the 
lack of global demos – a community that is a prerequisite for democracy in the classical 
sense.
65
   Their functions are more akin to administrative agency – hence the recent focus by 
a section of international lawyers on the administrative aspect of international governance.
66
 
 
Some authors have advanced a wide array of procedural and substantive factors that 
contribute to normative legitimacy. This group occupy the middle space between global 
democracy and the state system. Worthy of mention is the approach of Buchanan and 
Keohane who put forward what they refer to as a “complex standard of legitimacy”, that 
combines a wide variety of factors, including substantive elements such as minimal moral 
acceptability and comparative benefit, procedural elements such as transparency, institutional 
integrity, as well as a variety of factors such as channels of accountability to civil society, on-
going consent by democratic states and other “epistemic virtues”.67 
 
Powerful arguments have emerged that international law should escape from the limits of a 
view of normative legitimacy of the international legal system based on state consent and, 
instead, seek to build legitimacy around a shared conception of substantive justice. A strong 
account of this position is given by Allen Buchanan who argues that the international legal 
system should bear a natural duty of justice and that there should be a ‘limited moral 
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obligation to contribute to ensuring that all persons have access to just institutions (including 
legal institutions)’ where this implies primarily institutions that protect human rights.68 This 
is the view that this study supports. The movement from economic integration to greater 
political integration in Africa has shifted the attention from market aspect of regional 
organizations to the emergent practice in human rights, democracy and good governance. 
This study attempts to show that the layering of economic integration with human rights need 
not deter regional organizations from pursuing both goals with equal effort. At the same time, 
this study also assesses the normative and descriptive legitimacy of ECOWAS predominantly 
on the human rights mandate of the new ECOWAS regime while also suggesting practical 
ways on equally strengthening the organization as an economic union.  
 
Proponents of GAL have also drawn on specifically legal constructs in developing a more 
general theory of international legitimacy. GAL combines input and output based elements.
69
 
Input legitimacy in the GAL sense includes procedural requirements such as notice and 
comment, reason-giving, and review, whereas output legitimacy is provided by technical 
expertise.
70
 International lawyers have also proposed that constitutionalism may provide a 
basis for input and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy by delineating the procedures for how 
authority may be exercised, and output legitimacy by restraining institutional activities 
substantively.
71
  
 
The normative content of the legitimacy of international institutions may not be strictly 
definable, but there are values that appear consistent when all definitions are closely 
examined. Much of the works thus far, appears to be on assumptions, rather than on the 
actual practice of international institutions. Hlavac argues that institutions vary in their 
‘capacities and functions, and as they do what legitimacy demands of them may change 
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too.’72 Hence, Bodansky has advised that normative legitimacy of a particular institution may 
be determined by a contextual approach which takes into cognizance; the kind of authority an 
institution is exercising, the issue area or domain, and how much authority an institution is 
exercising.
73
 This is the approach adopted by the study in determining the legitimacy of 
ECOWAS and its continued existence. All three factors mentioned above are taken into 
cognizance in this study. 
 
A crucial aspect of legitimacy is the social practice of legitimation. Legitimacy as an attribute 
of an international organization needs to be claimed, sustained and recognized.
 74
 This 
practice involves the rulers from above and the ruled from below, and can be exercised by 
both groups.
75
 It is these practices of legitimation by ECOWAS and its Member States, the 
ways in which they have communicated and justified their right to rule in agreed areas, and 
the effect of this authority on community citizens that are at the heart of this study. Incidental 
to this exercise is the potential impact of this new found authority on the practice of 
international organizations and its impact on the future of the organization.  
 
1.6.3 REGIONALISM, REGIONAL INTEGRATION & CO-OPERATION 
 
Conventionally speaking, regional integration is often associated with a union or perceived as 
a prelude to unification. In this wise, regional integration represents the existence of a 
uniform set of rules and principles governing behaviour in a given spatial area.
76
 This notion 
of regional integration isn’t exactly correct as examples of regional groupings such as the 
Association of South-East Asian nations (ASEAN) shows, integration may not automatically 
progress to a union
77
. Union in this sense refers to a product of a region with similar outcome 
as that of Europe bearing some political and economic resemblance to the EU. Conversely, a 
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union can exist without integration as early colonial unions in Africa suggest.
78
 The colonial 
unions that existed in West Africa and other parts of Africa were a product of binding the 
colonies together under a common umbrella to preserve colonial interests, rather than being a 
result of an integrative process by willing member states. 
 
A key problem area often experienced by scholars of regional integration across various 
fields remains the definitional clarity hanging over the word ‘region’. The meaning of a 
region cannot be stipulated. Stipulated definitions would not only stir intellectual confusion 
but would invite faulty parameters of comparison. Nye defines a region as “a limited number 
of states linked by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence, 
and could be differentiated according to the level and scope of exchange”79 (emphasis mine). 
This definition would not by the least solve the theoretical problem of regions the world over. 
The flaw of this definition by Nye would lie in what a particular regionalising enterprise is 
based on.  Each regional endeavour must be determined on a case by case basis considering 
the fact that all have unique historical roots, even if they may produce similar results. 
 
To give further clarity to the concept it is important to distinguish the notion of integration 
from cooperation. These two concepts are commonly juxtaposed with cooperation often seen 
as a means of reaching eventual integration. However, cooperation is not a means to 
achieving integration and both concepts have different rationales behind them. Cooperation 
implies a collaborative venture between two or more partners with common interests in a 
given issue.
80
 Co-operation ranges from, but is not limited to, a single issue, field of activity, 
or a particular sector. It is contractual in nature meaning that they are time bound, and 
reversible. Arrangements such as the Economic partnership Agreement (EPA) between the 
European Union and some ACP countries is an example of such agreement. 
 
Integration is more closely related to the sense of community and community building. This 
sense of community as would be demonstrated at a later stage in this study, formed a crucial 
part of other regional arrangements other than the EU, especially in Africa. Professor Chigara 
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simplifies this further by explaining the presence of Humwe/Ubuntu in pre-colonial Africa.
81
 
Integration reflects collectiveness and an irreversible willingness by partners to share a 
common destiny in a politico-institutional framework pre-established via negotiation, based 
on a strategic vision of their common future. Integration and cooperation can both take place 
without members being contiguous or share the same geographical boundaries. 
 
Regional Integration and economic integration are also often used interchangeably but differ. 
Economic integration implies integration which primarily concerns economic activities or the 
pursuit of economic advantage of some sort by members. Free Trade Areas (FTAs) are a 
good example of economic integration as constituent member countries seek economic 
advantage of some sort over non-participants and are not necessarily located in the same 
geographic location. Economic integration may also be referred to as ‘Regionalization’ 
because it describes the intensity of economic interdependence and can be exclusively market 
driven rather than political/institutional.
82
 Regional Integration is co-terminus with spatial 
specificity; it cannot be detached from a given geographic and physical space. Hence, it 
becomes a determining factor around which a sense of community, cultural and political 
marriage and a shared vision for a future of a defined group may be founded upon. It is a 
process in which units (often represented as states) move from a condition of total or partial 
isolation towards a complete or partial unification.
83
 
 
Acharya has suggested the use of a more rounded term ‘regionalism’ in the stead of regional 
integration. He argues that ‘integration studies have always been heavily influenced by the 
EU’s history and experience’.84 The founding theories of integration studies were heavily 
drawn from the early life of what we call the EU today. By contrast, regionalism has a much 
more diverse beginning and a global heritage than regional integration and comparative 
regional integration studies.  For him, regionalism has a much older origin and the 
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theorization of regionalism have been endowed by contributions from other regions, 
including Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Middle East.
85
 
 
Van Langenhove a leading proponent of ‘comparative regionalism’86 defines regional 
integration as the formation of supranational spaces of co-operation between states. He goes 
further to ‘unpack’ the concept of regions according to three dimensions namely; 
 
1) Economic single space; 
2) Provision of public goods; 
3) State actorness and Sovereignty 
 
In essence, for complete integration to occur in regions, the three teloi above must be present 
in all ramifications in the right proportion.
87
 Development in this regard would depend on 
level of comprehensiveness (competence), capacity and autonomy from the nation state. Most 
scholars of integration would accept without much resistance that regional integration 
encompasses interactions among non-state actors and also between states and non-state actors 
in a given policy area. In essence integration cannot be manifested through a linear process – 
excluding the dictates of national (state actorness) and economic forces. This would be 
tantamount to ignoring the realities of the state-centric global framework.  
 
Overall, the concept of regional integration would be for the purpose of this study, defined 
along three lines:  
a) It is voluntary;  
b) It is collectively undertaken, bringing into play the concept of community-building (in 
contrast to the contractual and temporary nature of regional co-operation); 
c) It is geographically defined (in contrast to the notion of economic integration in the 
generic sense of the term).
88
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ECOWAS falls into the category described above and it is only apt that these three 
parameters are most suitable to the integration arrangement in West Africa under the 
framework of ECOWAS. This definition is in the light that elements of the wider discourse of 
regionalism are left out due to its discursive and often contentious nature in comparative 
research. 
 
 
1.6.4 ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
 
The Bela Belassian model breaks economic integration into five stages, namely: ‘a free trade 
area, a customs union, a common market, an economic union, and complete economic 
integration.
89
 In a free trade area members agree to eliminate import tariffs and quotas 
between themselves. However, each country maintains its own tariff rate against non-
members. FTAs can include formal mechanisms to resolve trade disputes. A customs union 
requires, other than removal of internal barriers to trade, harmonization of external trade 
policy by member countries. This includes establishing a common external tariff (CET) and 
import quotas on products coming into the region from third-party countries, as well 
establishing common trade remedy policies such as anti-dumping and countervailing 
measures. A common market represents a significant step towards achieving complete 
economic integration. In a common market, all barriers as to mobility of people, capital and 
other resources within the area in question are removed. A common market is typically 
associated with a broad convergence of fiscal and monetary policies as a result of increased 
economic interdependence with the region.   
 
An economic union is the deepest form of economic integration. An economic union requires 
some degree of harmonization of national economic policies since it would be counter-
productive to operate divergent policies, because all countries would share the same 
economic space. Total economic integration presupposes the unification of monetary, fiscal, 
social and countercyclical policies and requires the setting up of a supranational authority, the 
decisions of which are binding on member countries.
90
 The table below culled from the 
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United Nations economic commission for Africa (ECA) report lists political union as the last 
stage of regional integration. 
 
Table 2.2: Forms/stages of economic integration 
Preferential Trade Area An arrangement in which members apply lower tariffs to 
imports produced by other members than to imports 
produced by non-members. Members can determine tariffs 
on import from non-members. 
Free Trade Area A preferential trade area with no tariffs on imports from 
other members. As in preferential trade areas, members 
can determine tariffs on import from non-members. 
Customs Union A free trade area in which members impose common 
tariffs on non-members. Members may also cede 
sovereignty to a single custom administration. 
Common Market A customs union that allows free movement of factors of 
production (such as capital and labour) across the national 
borders within the integration area. 
Economic Union A common market with unified monetary and fiscal 
policies including common currency. 
Political Union The ultimate stage of integration, in which members 
become one nation. National governments cede 
sovereignty over economic and social policies to a 
supranational authority, establishing common institutions 
and judicial and legislative processes including a common 
parliament. 
 
Source: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa (ARIA I), (Addis Ababa: UNECA 2004), p.10. 
 
Caproso & Choi writing on the stages of economic integration note that, at best, what is 
obtainable is a set of tags that may be useful for categorising the path of members undergoing 
integration, rather than that a natural sequence which all integrating states must undergo.
91
 
This is understandable, due to the fact that every regional integration process is peculiar to 
the region, states involved, as well as the public and private participants. 
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1.6.5 LEGAL INTEGRATION   
 
Weiler narrates the process of integration as being determined by law (constitutionalism).In 
recounting the process of European integration, he states that the process of constitutionalism 
is the most important of every concept of European integration. For him, constitutionalism is 
the ‘meeting ground’ of various disciplines chiefly political science, international relations, 
political economy, law and more recently sociology that seek to theorize and conceptualize 
about integration.
92
 Law it is, that houses these other disciplines as member countries in an 
integration process seek to create a legal order. Member states usually start off the integration 
process by agreeing on legal instruments which unambiguously state the rights and 
obligations of all parties involved, it also outlines their programmes and actions.
93
 Weiler 
makes a case for the legal analysts of integration when he avered thus: 
 
“Political theories of…integration [are] largely wedded to a certain notion about the outcome of the 
process and embodies a certain predictive element about continued progress. In addition, political 
theory laid great emphasis on the social, political and economic substantive achievements and less 
emphasis on the ways and means.”
94
 
 
Rather than regard on assumptions, legal analysts `investigate the evolution and step-by-step 
implications of the integration process. Hence, legal theories of integration are based on the 
‘continuous process of integration’95, the interpretation and effect of treaty provisions on 
integration, the position of regional bodies as international organisations under international 
law and the effects of such laws emanating from regional bodies in the municipal realm of 
member states. 
 
In an attempt to explain integration or the legal control of politics academic lawyers have had 
to grapple with the recurring theme of ‘constitutionalization of international law’ or the 
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internationalization of constitutional law’.96 These two concepts have often been in the mix, 
with some scholars claiming that both concepts are not so much a creation of academic 
imagination rather that these concepts actually exist, especially the former.
97
 The former 
denotes the changing structure of the international legal system and its increased focus on the 
rights of individuals
98
, while the latter refers to the transfer of constitutional functions from 
the national to the international level (by virtue regional bodies and international 
organizations generally).
99
  
 
However, the result of both concepts is one and the same; they paint exhaustively a picture of 
the growing influence of international organizations and the existence of an overarching 
framework by which domestic constitutions are measured. As Werner aptly notes, these 
concepts under the term constitutionalism is “an attempt to explain existing developments in 
international law in terms borrowed from domestic constitutionalism, with the aim of 
furthering a normative agenda of internationalism, integration and legal control of 
politics.”100 
 
One of the central concepts of legal integration is ‘Supranationalism’. Supranationalism 
would help clarify the role of institutions that operate in ECOWAS as an international 
organization, which are expected to act independently of member states.  Supranationalism is 
an often contested concept, and by Weiler’s philosophy is an ideal or the result of an ideal.101 
Supranationalism is a ‘politically descriptive’102 concept but certainly made up of legal 
components. What then in ‘legal terms’ could be said to be the key components of 
                                                          
96
  See, T. Cottier & M.Hertig, ‘The prospect of 21
st
 century constitutionalism’ 7 Max Planck Yearbook of United 
Nations Law (2003), 261. 
97
J. Klabbers, A. Peters & G.Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2009), p.5. 
98
 Cottier & Hertig (2003), p.271. 
99
 Originally the term ‘Constitutionalization’ was introduced in the context of the European experience 
referring to the “process by which the European court of Justice (ECJ) transformed treaty into constitution, 
mainly by attributing direct effect and supremacy to community law and in the process developing a 
fundamental rights doctrine for the European Union”. See F. Synder ‘General course on constitutional law of 
the European Union: Principles, Processes and Culture’ in Academy of European Law (ed.),  Collected Courses 
of the Academy of European Law 1995 Vol. VI, No.1, (Deventer: Kluwer, 1998), p.56. 
100
 W. Werner ‘The Never-ending Closure: Constitutionalism and International Law’ in N. Tsagourias (ed.) 
Transnational Constitutionalism: International and European Perspectives, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007), p. 330. 
101
 Weiler (1999), p.246. 
102
 P. Hay, Federalism and Supranational Organisation: Patterns of a new legal structure, (Urbana: university of 
Illinois, 1966), p.69 
26 | P a g e  
 
Supranationalism? Hay postulates that Supranationalism is made up of four key elements, 
namely: 
 institutional autonomy of an organisation from member states 
 ability of an organisation to bind its member states by a majority of weighted majority 
vote 
 direct binding effect of law emanating from the organisation on natural and legal 
persons 
 attribution of powers which differ markedly from powers bestowed on other 
organisations
103
 
 
Weiler goes ahead to class Supranationalism along the axis of norm creation (normative 
Supranationalism) and decision making (decisional supranationalism). Normative 
Supranationalism connotes that the laws of an international organisation should possess 
the following features:
104
 
 have direct effect in member states 
 are superior to the laws of member states 
 member states are pre-empted from enacting contradictory legislation 
 
Decisional Supranationalism refers to the institutional framework and decision-making 
processes by which community policies are initiated, debated and formulated before eventual 
promulgation and execution.
105
 Weiler also adds nationhood and statehood as parameters to 
Supranationalism.
106
 By this, he was referring to the notion of nationhood which replaces the 
international society with a community one.  
 
The renowned European jusrist Pescatore identified three elements of Supranationalism as: 
the recognition of common values and interests; the creation of an effective power, and the 
autonomy of powers.  The failure of an organisation to meet with the aforementioned 
requirements means that such organisation is an intergovernmental organisation.
107
 While 
Supranationalism emphasizes on the role of non-national actors in the integration process, 
Intergovernmentalism focuses on the role of the state as the key actors and negotiators in the 
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international arena. However, Supranationalism ideally thrives on the interplay between 
member states and supranational institutions as it eliminates the excesses of narrow “national 
interest”108 
 
 
1.6.6   SOVEREIGNTY AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION 
 
Traditional public international law is premised on the theory that the nation state is the basic 
entity of the international order. Thus, any assertion that non-state actors/entity should share 
state-centric features seeks to expand the conceptual focus of international law on state 
sovereignty.  The increasing clout of non-state actors such as international organizations is 
indicative of a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of sovereignty.
109
 What then makes up 
the concept of sovereignty and what are the elements of sovereignty that make it difficult for 
states to balance the protection of their sovereignty with their roles as central actors in the 
operation of supranational organizations? 
 
Sovereignty in the traditional form can be divided into two: internal and external sovereignty. 
Internal sovereignty refers to the ‘exercise of supreme authority by states within their 
individual territories’.110 Jean Bodin describes this aspect of sovereignty as the exclusive 
right ‘to give laws unto all and every one of its […] subjects and to receive none from 
them.
111
 Internal sovereignty is also known as ‘legal sovereignty’112 due its ‘dependence on 
constitutional independence’.113 Thus, a state still under colonial control cannot lay claim to 
sovereignty because such right resides with the colonial administration. External sovereignty 
or ‘Westphalian sovereignty’114 on the other hand connotes the arrangement of the 
international political arena based on the division of the world into territorially exclusive 
units and includes the right to exclude external actors from interfering in domestic political 
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structures.
115
  External sovereignty therefore implies the equality of nation states, regardless 
of differences in capacities, in the international community. The inclusion of the term 
‘sovereign equality’116 in the United Nations Charter further reinforced the sanctity of 
statehood in international law.
117
 
 
The discourse of integration, the level of which most regional organizations seek, oft involves 
ceding some sovereignty to supranational institutions. The degree of such transfer of 
sovereignty may determine the level of integration and the effectiveness of the institutions.
 118
 
Since regional integration involves multi-level governance, then the notion of divisibility of 
sovereignty becomes inevitable. Hartog argues that ‘as a matter of fact, integration is usually 
connected with the transfer of national sovereignty to supranational agencies’.119 To address 
the issue of divisibility, parallels have been drawn between the devolution of powers under a 
federal system of government and the transfer of powers to regional organizations.
120
 Hay has 
pointed out that a state owns the totality of sovereign rights and has the prerogative to share 
such bundle of rights with other states or institutions.
121
 Hay’s formulation regards external 
sovereignty as a direct output of internal sovereignty. In essence, when a state transfers part 
of its legal sovereignty for example in relation to certain aspects of human rights, to an 
international organization, there is also a corollary understanding that the organization will 
have the powers to represent such state in the agreed area when dealing with third states.
122
 
 
In agreement with Hay’s postulations on the original sovereign powers of states, Lauterpacht 
adds that such powers terminate where international obligation starts.
123
  In line with this 
reasoning, states may for example, enact legislations, as long as it does not conflict with their 
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obligations under international law.
124
 Mitrany is more cautious, urging that it would be wiser 
to speak of a ‘sharing of sovereignty’,125 rather than a total vesting of legal sovereignty in an 
international organization in agreed areas. Mitrany, a functionalist, sees sovereignty as a 
functional concept, which implies that states may pool sovereignty authority for the joint 
performance of a particular function.
126
 
The concept of absolute sovereignty has undergone several changes over the years. The 
advent of globalization and the development of human rights law mean that the absoluteness 
of sovereignty has arguably diminished. States are continuously probed about the treatment 
of their citizens, natural resources and the environment.
127
 Even when states have not 
explicitly or impliedly limited their sovereignty, their actions are increasingly being judged 
by ‘universal or community values’.128 The increasing competence of the EU, the influence 
of Bretton Wood institutions (International Monetary Fund and the World Bank) on the 
monetary and fiscal policies of developing countries, the UN and the AU’s right of military 
intervention in member states are some of the obvious pointers to the continuous evolution of 
sovereignty in international law.
129
 As Jackson aptly notes ‘there is no teleological terminus, 
no determinate and final destination, and no end of history in the evolution of sovereignty’.130 
The rules are clearly changing, and states continue to compromise in the face of global 
change.                
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                                                              CHAPTER 2 
 
BACKGROUND OF REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN WEST AFRICA 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The African integration process borrows considerably from the European experience, not just 
by way of institutional design, but also in terms of the ideologies and theories that have 
formed the foundation of most arrangements.
131
 This is understandable given the colonial 
history between African countries and the European powers. The advent of globalization, the 
evolution of the multilateral trading system, the regulation of state affairs through 
international organizations led to the inevitability of African integration arrangements bearing 
close semblance to other regional organizations around the world. Expectedly, a proper 
analysis of regional integration in West Africa the greater continent ought to pay considerable 
attention to the historical and ideological foundations that precipitated the eventual 
establishment of institutions for integration. This is fundamental in identifying the goals of 
integration and whether they have so far been achieved on the one hand. Determining the first 
question helps answer the other, which is whether these lofty goals can be reconsidered, 
processes reformulated, and potential matched by realistic expectations? These are salient 
questions in African integration study and this study seeks to find potential solutions. 
 
The objective of this Chapter is to place integration in West Africa in perspective by 
sketching its origins, ideological contributions to the idea, and the possible benefits of 
integration for the sub-region and the continent. Thus, this Chapter would also take a close 
look at the framework for integration under the first ECOWAS regime and the problem that 
plagued its institutions. The essence here is also to identify the variables, if any, that could be 
said to form a characteristic part of integration at the sub-regional and the continental levels.  
 
Since Africa does not exist in isolation, the recent global shift from economic integration to 
greater protection of human rights is bound to manifest in African integration arrangements at 
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all levels. Hence, it is important to examine if there has been an ideological shift from non-
intervention to greater emphasis on human protection in the form of human rights and human 
security. Has this shift in paradigm affected in anyway the institutional design of sub-regional 
and continental institutions? Has this idea always formed a part of integration arrangements 
in Africa or is it a recent enterprise sparked by external factors? Is it necessitated by events in 
the continent?  As Pannikar suggested;  
  
The conditions of different regions in the world differ so much that promotion of higher standards of 
living, for example, has a different meaning in relation to the people of South-East Asia to what it has 
in European countries. The programme of any action to give effect to this object has to be worked out 
in terms of particular regions. Similar is the case with conditions of social progress…Besides, from the 
point of view of standards of living, social and economic progress, and the observance of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, it is the regions further away from Europe and America that require urgent 
attention.
132
 
 
Overall, the content of this Chapter is crucial in determining the normative content of 
integration in Africa. This is imperative to ascertain the normative aspects of legitimacy 
which is the central focus of this study. Since legitimacy cannot be considered outside a 
particular justificatory structures,
133
 and since legitimacy possesses no independent normative 
content of its own,
134
 history can help explain the shared substantive values and goals upon 
which the legitimacy claims may be made. 
 
 
2.2 PAN-AFRICANISM 
  
Any narration of the history of integration in Africa is incomplete without the discussion of 
the root ideology of Pan-Africanism. In fact, interstate cooperation in Africa is believed to be 
the offspring of the concept of African unity. This ideal of African unity culminated in Pan-
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Africanism which originated in the Americas and Europe.
135
 The chronological events in 
Africa’s history, slavery and the balkanisation of its territories by European superpowers 
provided the impetus for rallying all Africans towards a common purpose of seeking a united 
people.
136
 Pan-Africanism has defied any generally accepted definition. Legum refers to the 
concept as’ a movement of ideas and emotions’.137 At best, Pan-Africanism could be 
described as a multi-dimensional concept, which culturally refers to the ‘common ancestry’ 
of people with a black skin and politically as a means to encourage the unification of African 
states.
138
 In line with Legum’s definition of Pan-Africanism as a movement of emotions, 
Murithi refers to Pan-Africanism as a recognition that there were unwarranted divisions 
among Africans and in that context, an invitation to all Africans to look inwards for 
strength.
139
 Despite the variation in definitions of Pan-Africanism, what is certain is that the 
movement ‘stands as the precursor to unity, co-operation and integration in Africa’.140 
 
Pan-Africanism has undergone several modifications in various forms over the years to 
emerge in its present guise as institutionalised in continental organizations. The founding 
fathers of the movement such as WEB Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, George Padmore and 
Sylvester Williams, all of which are Africans in diaspora, originally intended the movement 
as a rallying call for the idea of unity of black people on the basis of a common ancestry in 
Africa. It was a medium for resistance against the oppression of black people.
141
 However, 
during the pre- independence struggle, native Africans such as Kwame Nkrumah and Jomo 
Kenyatta adopted pan-Africanism as an emotive tool for political mobilisation to fend off the 
colonialist.
142
 Recognizing that a successful struggle against colonialism was only possible by 
collective action on the basis of unity and cooperation, African elites leveraged pan-
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Africanism as a platform for political action.  Consequently, the independence struggle 
coincided with initial attempts at collective and economic arrangements.
143
 
 
The earliest manifestation of Pan-Africanism as an integrative agenda dates back to the 
1920s.
144
 At the time, a group of intellectuals from four British colonies in West Africa 
namely; Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Gambia and Ghana (then Gold Coast) called for closer 
cooperation and integration of the West African region.
145
 In pursuit of this ideal, John 
Casely Hayford (Ghana) sent a request to the colonial office in London for the establishment 
of a West African Court of Appeal and a West African University.
146
 Initially, the request 
was dismissed by colonial authorities as premature, but it eventually laid the foundation for 
nationalist movements of the 1940s, with Nkrumah at the forefront. The 40s and 50s marked 
the era of bridging the colonial divide between Francophone and Anglophone West Africa 
(the ‘integrative agenda’).147 The West African National Secretariat led by Nkrumah was an 
offshoot of the 1945 Fifth Pan-African congress in Manchester. Here, the necessity for well-
organized, firmly knit movements as a primary condition for the success of the national 
liberation struggle in Africa was stressed.
148
 In 1946 Nkrumah resolved along with his peers 
to use the idea of a West African Federation as an indispensable platform for the ultimate 
realisation of a United States of Africa.
149
 From this point on, the consciousness of 
continental integration became inevitably aroused in the corpus of the Pan-Africanism 
narrative, laying the foundation for regional integration in Africa. 
 
The independence of Ghana in 1957 provided Nkrumah with further impetus to vigorously 
agitate for the African unity project. Nkrumah was bold to assert that Ghana’s independence 
was inconsequential without the total independence of other African states. This statement 
indicated not only the readiness of African elites to pursue the Pan-Africanist cause but also 
demonstrated the readiness to give practical effect to the integrative agenda. Consolidating on 
the momentum of the 1945 Fifth Pan-African congress, and the 1946 West African National 
                                                          
143
 S.C Saxena, ‘The African Union: Africa’s giant step toward continental unity’ in J. M Mbaku & S. C Saxena 
(eds.), Africa at the crossroads: Between regionalism and globalization, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
2004), p.165. 
144
 Fagbayinbo (2010), p.39. 
145
 Thompson (1969), p.28. 
146
 Ibid. 
147
 A crucial step at the time was Nkrumah’s trip to France to consult with African intellectuals of francophone 
extraction. Notable among them were Leopold Sedar Senghor, Houphouet-Boigny, Lamin Gueye and Sourou-
Migan Apithy to mention a few. See Ibid. 
148
 Nkrumah (1963), p.132. 
149
 A. Ajala, Pan-Africanism: Evolution, progress and prospects, (St Martin Press: London, 1973) p.12. 
34 | P a g e  
 
congress, Nkrumah convened the first conference of independent African states in 1958. In 
attendance were the eight already independent African states- Ethiopia, Libya, Liberia, 
Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, the United Arab Republic and Ghana. The participating states 
agreed to establish a Joint Economic Research Committee, charged with the promotion of 
trade amongst African countries, coordinating economic planning and investigating the 
feasibility of an African common market. 
 
The Second Conference of Independent African States (CISA) was held in Addis Ababa in 
1960. In addition to the eleven independent states,
150
 invitations were extended to the yet to 
be independent African states such as Nigeria, Mali Federation, Congo Kinshasa, Madagascar 
and Somalia.
151
 The conference recommended, amongst other provisions, the establishment 
of a joint African Commercial Bank and a preferential trade area.
152
 The Ghanaian 
delegation, supported by their Guinean counterpart, advocated a political union and 
immediate unification of the African states. The Nigerian delegation and their Liberian 
counterpart (who had not yet attained independence) felt such calls were premature. This 
ideological deadlock culminated in the emergence of two groups – Casablanca and Monrovia 
– with differing views on the appropriate method for African integration. The Casablanca 
group was a juxtaposition of two elements: an immediate political union and functional 
cooperation.
153
 On the other hand, the Monrovia group found common ground in their call for 
functional cooperation at regional levels as the best approach.
154
 
 
The creation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 was the climax of decades 
of efforts aimed at giving the debate on unity a practical manifestation.  Although the OAU 
charter as would be discussed below represented a triumph of state-centric functional 
approach as canvassed by the Monrovia group, it was able to unite the differing ideologies 
under one banner. The idea of pan-Africanism started as a sentimental attachment to a 
common heritage which eventually culminated in the actualization of realistic and practical 
objectives in the form of institutions. As would be demonstrated later, the creation of various 
institutions such as the Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the New Partnership for Africa’s 
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Development or the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACPHR) are all expressions of Pan-Africanism. At the sub-
regional level organizations like ECOWAS are nuanced and adaptative forms of Pan-
Africanism.  
  
Thomas Franck argues that symbolic validation, ritual and pedigree provide the cultural and 
anthropological dimension of legitimacy. He argues further that these three elements are part 
of the legitimation strategy of all communities, all compliance-inducing rule systems.
155
 The 
notion of Pan-Africanism and a united Africa are integral to the African integration order. It 
is the symbol and foundation of integration in the continent. 
 
Thus, Pan-Africanism can be considered as the mainstay of integration arrangements over the 
various regimes in Africa, irrespective of the specific institutional objectives of regional 
organizations. It is against this backdrop, that the origins and evolution of ECOWAS would 
be discussed below, to establish whether Pan-Africanism has influenced policy making of the 
respective ECOWAS regimes and most importantly if it has served to enhance the 
compliance pull of integration arrangements. This analysis is important for the greater goal of 
the study to assess the legitimacy of the ECOWAS regime. 
 
 
2.3 THE EVOLUTION OF WEST AFRICAN INTEGRATION AND THE BIRTH OF 
ECOWAS 
The earliest inspiration for West African integration can be traced to the middle of the 19
th
 
century. From that era to present times, various institutional arrangements for regional co-
operation in West Africa have swung from being driven by non-state actors, keen to secure 
greater economic opportunities and also to champion a sense of West African nationalism on 
the one hand, to the unification of post-colonial states into a single political entity on the 
other hand. As Kufour explains, the origins of West African economic integration in 
individuals and non-state actors are eventually manifested in subsequent regimes. He further 
argues that the integration process is driven by individual motives and decisions.
156
 
 
                                                          
155
 Franck (1988), p.727. 
156
 Kufour (2006), p.20. 
36 | P a g e  
 
The first ideas for economic co-operation in West Africa were private ones which began in 
the 19
th
 century. Two West Africans most celebrated for pioneering integration in the sub-
region were the Sierra Leonean, Africanus Beale Horton and the Liberian of West Indian 
heritage Edwort Wilmot Blyden. Like on their Pan-Africanist contemporaries, they premised 
their arguments for regional co-operation mainly on the notion of cultural solidarity. But they 
were visionaries in their quest for integration on the basis of economic necessity. Horton for 
example argued for the establishment of a “University for West Africa” based in Freetown, 
Sierra Leone.
157
 Blyden on the other hand, had as his ultimate aspiration a single West 
African state with Liberia as its centre.
158
  
 
The idea of West African unity remained just an idea until the formation of the National 
Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA) during the colonial era. The NCBWA operated as 
a conduit through which Britain maintained control of its estate in West Africa. This was 
reflected in its constitution, and also in a speech by its founder, Joseph Casely-Hayford.
159
 
However, the organisation sought the representation of the natives in the affairs of the 
respective colonies. Therefore, for the NCWBA this objective was most realisable through an 
organized platform that unified all of Britain’s colonies in West Africa. In furtherance of this 
objective, the NCBWA adopted a constitution for British West Africa complete with an 
Executive Council, Legislative Council, and a House of Assembly.
160
  
 
The NCBWA folded in the 1940s due to concerns that it was an elite organisation.
161
 The 
NCBWA was criticized for only being critical for what it argued were flaws in the colonial 
system. It only sought the application of democracy to British West Africa. This was to 
enable the social classes behind the NCBWA to capture the economic benefits of colonial 
rule. Thus the NCBWA’s failure to advocate the end of colonial rule cast it as a conservative 
institution that would eventually fall to the ideologies of the post-World War II era.
162
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The movement for decolonization in the late 1950s and 1960s also bore other co-operation 
arrangements aimed at political and economic integration in West Africa. Some resulted in 
meaningful co-operation between participants, others did not. The Mali Federation was an 
example of the former category and the Ghana-Guinea-Mali tripartite union was an example 
of the latter. The Ghana-Guinea-Mali Union began by decreeing the existence of a single 
country although a few structures were created to merge these three independent states 
together.
163
 The Ghana-Guinea-Mali had no impact on efforts at regional integration and 
eventually wound-up.  The Mali Federation was a more serious attempt at creating structures 
for integration but was met with challenges that proved it was too ambitious.
164
 The 
federation was an attempt to merge Mali and Senegal into a federation. It failed to succeed 
because Mali was the less prosperous of the two states and was viewed by the leadership 
class of Senegal as an economic burden.
165
  The Senegambia federation was a similar scheme 
to the Mali Federation. The Senegambia Confederation put Senegal and Gambia together in 
1982. It eventually collapsed in 1989 after the Gambia refused to continue under the union. 
Other regional integration arrangements of note in the sub-region include the Mano River 
Union and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU).  
 
 
2.3.1 THE 1975 ECOWAS TREATY 
 
In 1973 Nigeria and Togo at a conference held in Lome presented a draft treaty titled “The 
Evolution of a West African Economic Community”.166 The document was the subject of a 
meeting of experts and jurists in 1974 and after consultations, the ECOWAS treaty was 
signed in Lagos, Nigeria on May 28, 1975. The treaty
167
 was signed by the Heads of States 
and Government of 14 West African nations, namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
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Gambia, Ghana Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo.
168
 
The 1975 treaty describes the aim of the community as follows: “... to promote co-operation 
and development in all fields of industry, transport, telecommunications, energy, agriculture, 
natural resources, commerce, monetary and financial questions and in social and cultural 
matters for the purpose of raising the standard of living of its peoples, of increasing and 
maintaining economic, stability, of fostering closer relations among its members and of 
contributing to the progress and development of the African continent”.169 The treaty in 
Article 2(2) explains that the community shall by stages realise its principal objectives by: 
(a) The establishment of a customs union through the creation of a free trade area and the 
adoption of a common external tariff by gradually abolishing all custom duties and 
taxes of equivalent effect and quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade 
among the Member states as well as all other obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and personnel; 
(b) The harmonisation of policies and promotion of Community projects in all the main 
socio-economic sectors, including transport, communications, agriculture, industry, 
natural resources, energy, social and cultural matters; and 
(c) The harmonisation of monetary and financial policies of member states. 
To achieve the afore-mentioned objectives of the Community the treaty provided five 
principal organs namely: 
i) The Authority of Heads of State and Government (the Authority), the principal 
governing institution of the Community whose decisions and directives shall be 
binding on all Community Institutions
170
 
ii) The Council of Ministers consisting of two representatives of each Member state 
and subordinate only to the Authority. The mandate of the Council is to keep 
under review the functioning and development of the Community and to make 
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recommendations to the Authority on matters of policy aimed at the efficient and 
harmonious functioning and development of the Community.
171
 
iii) The Executive secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary who acts as the 
principal executive officer of the Community. The Executive secretary and other 
officers of the Secretariat, in the discharge of their duties, are to the act in the best 
interest of the community which they owe their loyalty to.
172
 
To play a supportive role in terms of policy formulation and implementation the 1975 
treaty also established four technical and specialized commissions in the fields of: Trade, 
Customs, Immigration, monetary and payments; Industry, agriculture and natural 
resources; Transport, telecommunications and energy and Social and cultural affairs.
173
 
Each of the Commission shall have a representative nominated by each member state and 
to be assisted by advisors.
174
  The revised treaty also granted judicial power to a Tribunal. 
The Tribunal was mandated to interpret Treaty provisions
175
 and to settle disputes 
referred to it under Article 56 of the Treaty.
176
 
Other key provisions of the 1975 Treaty were contained in protocols and decisions. One 
of such key legislations was the Protocol Relating to Free Movement of Persons, 
Residence and Establishment.
177
 It provides for the establishment of the right of entry, 
residence and establishment over a fifteen-year period from its entry into force.  Another 
major legislation under the 1975 Treaty was the Protocol on Non-Aggression (NAP).
178
 
The NAP was to guarantee regional peace and stability, seen as essential for rapid 
integration and development. Under the NAP, ECOWAS Member States were to refrain 
from the threat or use of force or aggression in their relations with one another
179
 or 
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allowing its territory to be used as a base from which other Member States can be 
destabilized.
180
 
The Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence (PMAD)
181
 is another key 
legislation under the 1975 Treaty regime. The PMAD deepened military relations within 
the Community by creating specialized military institutions and reaffirming the 
commitment of Member States.
182
 The PMAD established the ECOWAS Defence 
Council
183
 and the Defence Commission.
184
 In case of armed intervention, the Defence 
Council assisted by the Defence Commission was to supervise with the authority of the 
State or States concerned, all measures taken by the ECOWAS Force Commander and 
ensure that all necessary means for the intervention are reported to him. The Force 
Commander was to act strictly under orders from Member States or States concerned.
185
 
For the first time, ECOWAS Member States outlined conditions for intervention in times 
of conflict requiring assistance. Under Article 16, intervention was allowed when there 
was an external armed threat of aggression against a Member State. Intervention was also 
allowed when there was a conflict between two Member States of the Community.
186
 The 
Community was also empowered to intervene when, as defined under Article 18, there 
was an internal conflict in a Member State of the Community that was actively 
maintained and sustained from outside. Community forces were prevented from 
intervening in purely internal conflicts.
187
 
The 1975 treaty covered every aspect of the socio-economic life of member states. The 
treaty envisaged that the integration process of the community ranged from the 
establishment of a free trade area, to a customs union, to a common market involving the 
integration of infrastructural bases, production systems and the domestic markets of 
member states. The 1975 treaty regime was undermined by various legal, political, 
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institutional and political obstacles. The treaty was eventually revised in 1993 to address 
some of the weaknesses and omissions in the treaty as well as restructure the institutions 
of the community. 
 
2.3.2 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 1975 TREATY REGIME 
A) INADEQUATE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
One of the key shortcomings of the 1975 treaty was the lack of clarity of the role of 
community organs. Article 5(2) of the 1975 Treaty stipulates in relation to the powers of 
the Authority, that ‘The Authority shall be responsible for, and have the general direction 
and control of the performance of the executive functions of the community and 
achievement of its aims’. Under Article 5(3) the decisions and directions of the Authority 
shall be binding on all institutions of the Community.  While the decisions of Authority 
are binding on institutions of the community, it is not clear if it is equally binding on 
member states. This style of language arguably represented the cautious approach of 
ECOWAS Member States at the time. The provision of Article 5(3) represents an attempt 
to bind community institutions that were under the control of the Authority and no 
provision was made under the treaty as to the level of effect that community law had in 
member states. This simply meant that the member states did not intend that the 
provisions of the treaty and community law in general would be binding on them.  
The Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP) established to review the 1975 ECOWAS 
regime produced a report which elaborated further on the non-binding nature of the 1975 
treaty.
188
 The CEP faulted the vagueness of the mandate of the Authority to determine the 
general direction and control of the executive functions of the Community under Article 
5(2).
189
 The imprecision of the powers and mandate of the Authority was evident with 
regards to appointment of other community organs. For example, the Council of 
Ministers’ powers were restricted and thus it had no original or delegated powers. The 
Council could not give directions to Member States and the Authority had no such clear 
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powers to entrust such responsibility to it.
190
 In this regard, the CEP recommended that 
the new Treaty should empower the Authority to delegate responsibility to the Council of 
Ministers especially in the key areas of harmonisation and co-ordination of Member 
States’ policies.191 
Additionally, there was no parliament to exercise advisory and supervisory powers over 
the Authority and the Council. However, the 1975 treaty established an Executive 
Secretariat mandated with servicing and assisting the institutions of the community in the 
performance of their functions; keeping the functioning of the community under 
continuous examination; and submitting a report of the activities to all sessions of the 
Council of Ministers and all meetings of the Authority. It was also to undertake work and 
studies and perform such services relating to the aims of the community as assigned to it 
by the Council.
192
 The Executive Secretariat had little impact on the integration process as 
a whole. Judicial power in the community was vested in a community Tribunal under 
Article 11 of the treaty. The tribunal was charged with ensuring the observance of law 
and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.
193
  
The CEP also suggested that ECOWAS make the transition from an inter-govermental 
organization to a supranational one. Under the 1975 Treaty, sovereignty of the Member 
States was sacrosanct and non-interference was the guiding principle. As a result, there 
was only a general undertaking in the Treaty to the effect that Member States would plan 
and direct their national policies with the aims of ECOWAS in mind.
194
  
 
B) TRADE LIBERALISATION UNDER THE 1975 TREATY REGIME 
The Trade liberalisation scheme of the community was one of the important objectives of 
the community in the quest to integrate the economies of member states for the prosperity 
of community citizens.  The treaty aimed to establish within fifteen years a customs union 
among member states; eliminate tariffs and custom duties within the union; remove 
quantitative restrictions and administrative obstacles to trade and adopt a common custom 
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tariff against third countries.
195
 No concrete action was taken by the community until 
1978 when the Authority met in Dakar, Senegal and adopted a two-tier tariff and non-
tariff barrier consolidation scheme which is still in place.
196
 In 1980 the Authority fully 
adopted the TLS aimed at the total removal of tariffs on all unprocessed goods and 
handicrafts, to be followed by a progressive elimination of tariffs on all industrial 
products from 1981 to 1989.
197
  
The failure of TLS remains one of the major causes of the collapse of the first regime of 
integration under ECOWAS.  A few economic and political calculations were responsible 
for this setback coupled with clash of interests and dwindle in fortunes of the regional 
hegemons at the time. 
Firstly, there was the problem of over-reliance of ECOWAs members on trade taxes as a 
source of government revenue. Just after the 1975 treaty was adopted, trade taxes 
collected in member states amounted to 47% of government revenue. This raised the 
suspicion of national policy-makers about any programme that would threaten their 
interests, eventually leading to a lessened enthusiasm for and compliance with the TLS.
198
 
At the heart of the political haze obscuring the TLS was the question of who exactly the 
TLS is designed to profit? The economic indigenization programmes of Ghana and 
Nigeria coincided with the emergence of ECOWAS. The implication of this clash of 
historical events was that the government of both countries were bound to support their 
respective commercial and industrial classes.
199
 These two Members of ECOWAS were 
apprehensive of the influence of French firms that had bases in West Africa- especially in 
Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire.200   
                                                          
195
 Article 12. 
196
 ‘Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): Summit Conference (Lagos)’, 15 Africa Research 
Bulletin, Financial and Technical Series (May 1978). pp. 4666-7. 
197
 Y. Omorogbe, ‘The Legal Framework for Economic Integration in the ECOWAS Region: An Analysis of the 
Trade Liberalisation Scheme’, in, Spring Communications (ed), The Trade Liberalisation Scheme of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Papers Presented at the 2
nd
 National Seminar on TLS, 
(1992) Kano: Kaduna Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, pp. 20-32. 
198
 C.E Adibe, ‘ECOWAS in Comparative Perspective’, in T.M Shaw and J.E Okolo (eds.) The Political Economy of 
Foreign Policy in ECOWAS (1994), St. Martin’s: New York, pp. 187-217, p.206. 
199
 Ibid p.207. For a discussion of the economic nationalism in Ghana during this epoch, see S. Adei, The 
Growth of Foreign Investment and Economic Nationalism in Post-Independence Ghana: 1957-1975, (1980) 
University of Sydney Department of Economics Working Paper no.34, University of Sydney, Australia. 
200
 Ibid. 
44 | P a g e  
 
Any treaty or economic arrangement that mandated the reduction of tariffs would most 
likely profit the multinational firms in Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire. The relatively small 
companies in Nigeria and Ghana that were still in their embryonic stages would not pull 
much weight in same market as the French firms in these two countries. Bearing this in 
mind, Nigeria convinced the rest of the community to adopt a set of conditions for firms 
that wished to benefit from the TLS. These conditions were outlined in the Community’s 
rules of origin (ROO).
201
 At the 1989 summit of the community the Council of Ministers 
submitted a list of regional businesses that met the eligibility criteria set out in the ROO, 
only 17 manufacturing firms made the cut under the listed conditions.
202
 Applying Stigler 
and Olson’s institutional theory, Kufour argued that the failure of the TLS boiled down to 
import-competing domestic forces, benefitting from their ability to lobby effectively, 
hence securing favourable legislation through restrictive rules of origin.
203
 
Article 52 of the 1975 treaty established a fund to compensate member states whose 
markets are adversely affected  either due to loss of revenue to tariff reduction or 
otherwise.
204
 One of the attractions of regional integration is the fact that smaller markets 
can feed off the larger markets, but for African countries, majority of who are under-
industrialized, customs duties is a major source of revenue. Therefore, any compensation 
mechanism for the loss of tariff revenues should be meaningful enough to guarantee the 
success of the TLS. The ECOWAS fund like majority of the arrangements under the 1975 
treaty, failed due to inaction on the part of member states. Member states failed to make 
regular contributions to the Fund’s budget as stipulated. By 1990 only 7 member states 
had agreed to contribute about 1.3 million West African Units of Account (WAUA) and 
only Nigeria, Mali and Burkina Faso had actually done so.
205
 In addition, a major stop 
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gap in the institutional design of the 1975 treaty contributed to the collapse of the fund. 
The Secretariat’s lack of enforcement powers led to the non-payment of the ECOWAS 
fund. 
C) NON-PARTICIPATION OF COMMUNITY CITIZENS 
Another key omission in the 1975 treaty was the failure to provide for popular 
participation. There was hardly any provision in the ECOWAS Treaty that allowed 
national interest groups to participate in the decision-making process at the Community 
level. Asante described this omission as a result of the ‘elite-mass gap’ that plagued 
African regionalism.
206
 He criticizes the defiance of neo-functionalist logic evident in the 
failure to enlist the interests and energies of non-governmental organizations. He tagged 
the institutional structure of ECOWAS as being ‘the brain-child of the elite’, with no 
‘popular roots’.207  
In recent times, international society has been characterized by value pluralism and a 
demand for inclusion by the diverse range of actors (both states and non-state actors). 
International organizations seeking legitimacy are charged with addressing a range of 
distinct audiences with different interests, expectations, and normative reference points.
208
 
NGOs and civil society groups are arguably the most scrupulous audience in demanding 
legitimacy from international organizations. The failure to accommodate their populist 
influence and ‘norm-diffusion’ function,209 by creating institutional space, denied the 
regime vital input in sound policymaking. However the focus of most African regional 
organizations at the time was solidarity and sovereignty for the purpose of banishing the 
remaining vestiges of colonialism on the continent.  This meant that little attention was 
paid towards an all-inclusive integration process. Later on in this study, the role of NGOs 
and civil society in expanding the mandate of the second ECOWAS regime into human 
rights would be revealed.  
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In this regard, the CEP reminded Member States that one of the ultimate objectives of the 
regional grouping was to raise the standard of living of the Community’s peoples.210 
Hence, it was important that ordinary citizens and non-state actors be involved in policy 
formulation and implementation in the community. The CEP cited the strong appeal 
which popular participation has gained at the time within Member States and advocated 
provisions for similar consultations at regional level. 
The CEP therefore recommended the creation of two new community organs to carry the 
mandate of ensuring popular participation in the integration process: the ECOWAS 
Economic and Social council (ECOSOC), to be composed of representatives of socio-
economic organizations and the ECOWAS Parliament. ECOSOC’s role was to serve as 
the primary consultative forum. Community organs should be made to consult the 
ECOSOC on all proposals that have implications for regional interest groups. The 
ECOWAS Parliament was to have a wider remit than the ECOSOC. The CEP envisaged 
that the Parliament would have the power to make proposals for legislation on its own 
initiative; it was to be given supervisory power over the activities of the Community; and 
it would be authorized to scrutinize the manner in which Community organs function 
through written and oral questions.
211
 
 
D) OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE 1975 TREATY REGIME 
The CEP also identified other institutional weaknesses that hampered the 1975 ECOWAS 
regime. The non-binding nature of the decisions of community institutions as earlier 
highlighted, served as a fundamental weakness of the 1975 Treaty regime. Excluding 
sanctions for the non-payment of budgetary contributions no other community institutions, be 
it the Authority, the Council or the Executive Secretariat could make binding decisions on the 
Member states. As Bankole Thompson observed: 
“Since the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) the status of 
ratification of its Treaty and Protocols has been a nagging problem. Between 1978 and 1989 the Authority … 
adopted and signed a total of 21 protocols. Up to the time of this writing, only one protocol had been ratified by 
all 16 of the member States. Only 10 have been ratified by more than half of the ECOWAS membership. 
Viewed from a less positive perspective, it is a fact that no Member State has ratified all 21 protocols. Nigeria 
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and Togo show the best ratification record. Each has ratified 19 protocols. Some Member States have bot 
ratified more than 3 or 4 since the creation of the community.”212 
This attitude of non-ratification of protocols by Member States and the loose wordedness of 
the 1975 treaty on the binding nature of community decisions led to a call by the CEP for a 
transition from an exclusively inter-governmental organisation to a supranational one. As this 
study reveals the transition to supranationalism has led to layering of economic integration 
objectives with human rights and security, although both objectives can be pursued 
simultaneously with greater compliance and a change in political will.  
Another point highlighted by the CEP as a major cause of organizational paralysis within 
ECOWAS was the issue of voting. There seemed to be no laid down procedure for voting 
within the community. Hence, in practise, it was presumed that decisions were to be arrived 
at by unanimity.
213
 The ECOWAS fund was the only protocol that provided for a means of 
voting. It provides in Article 27 of its protocol that decision making was to be by a simple 
majority.
214
 Some observers argue however, that under Article 6 (6) decisions of the Council 
of Ministers were to be by unanimity.
215
 With regard to the AHSG, there was no express 
Treaty provision as to how it should make decisions although practically, the AHSG adopted 
its decisions by unanimity and consensus. The result of this approach was slow decision 
making that plagued that regime. A fallout of this lack of clarity in decision-making as 
Kufour points out culminated in the inability of the Council of Ministers to solve problems 
and constantly referred technical issues to the AHSG.
216
 This frustrated decision making and 
delayed speedy policy making as the AHSG were unable to comprehend such technical issues 
it was confronted with. 
Though not considered by the CEP, the decline in the fortunes of the regional hegemon 
Nigeria was also partly responsible for the failure of the 1975 regime.
217
  Nigeria is 
considered a hegemon because it is considered a powerful state willing and capable to act as 
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“regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of 
integration”.218 The sheer size of the Nigerian population and the boom in oil resources in the 
1970s convinced Nigeria that she could shoulder the cost of integration in the sub-continent. 
This led the Nigerian government to persuade other Member states about the success of 
regional integration in the sub-region.
219
 The decline in Nigeria’s economic fortunes starting 
in 1983 triggered by the collapse in world oil prices and general economic mismanagement 
led to an economic crisis in that country. Frustration grew amongst the Nigerian populace and 
her government, leading to a general loss of enthusiasm in the ECOWAS project. Nigeria was 
no longer willing to bear the costs of economic integration and this led to wholesale 
expulsion of Community nationals in 1983.
220
 Despite the strict provisions of the Community 
protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, and the Right of Residence permitting citizens to 
live in any Member. 
 
The 1975 treaty regime reflected not only the experimental nature of sub-regional 
arrangements at the time, but also the unreadiness of African states to build regional 
groupings around norms such as democracy, peace and security and human rights that help 
guarantee the protection and empowerment of the individual. Although the legitimacy of the 
1975 regime was hardly contested,
221
 the absence of these universal norms renders any 
attempt at examining regime-legitimacy effete. It would be recalled that these values have 
been described as constitutive elements of normative legitimacy, especially in a continent 
whose past has been riddled with internecine war.   
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2.4 THE NEW ECOWAS REGIME 
 
Amongst the conclusions reached by the CEP, Member States were advised that for 
ECOWAS to be meaningful and effective the new treaty must represent a shift from 
exclusive focus on government by states, to government involving individuals, NGO’s and 
the private sector. Member States were also advised to improve upon decision-making 
processes and procedures so as to make its decisions binding and automatically enforceable 
in Member States; to pay greater attention to promoting and sustaining internal peace, 
stability and security in Member States for the continued survival and success of 
ECOWAS.
222
 
 
The Revised Treaty in its fundamental principles reflects the values advised by the CEP. In 
the fundamental principles, Member States declared to adhere to principles such as equality 
and inter-dependence of Member States; non-aggression between Member States, 
maintenance of regional peace, stability and security; peaceful settlement of disputes among 
Member States, recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights; 
accountability, economic and social justice and popular participation in development; 
promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance in each Member State; 
and equitable and just distribution of the costs and benefits of economic co-operation and 
integration.
223
 
 
The main aim of the community under the new regime is to promote co-operation and 
integration, leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to 
raise the living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability, 
foster relations-among Member States and contribute to the progress and development of the 
African continent.  To achieve this aim, the Community shall, most importantly, ensure the 
harmonisation and co-ordination of national policies and the promotion of integration 
programmes; the establishment of a common market; the establishment of an economic union 
through the adoption of common policies in the economic, financial, social and cultural 
sectors, and the creation of a monetary union; the establishment of an enabling legal 
environment to mention a few.
224
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These principles represent a significant change from those under 1975 treaty regime. It also 
opened up the areas of activity of ECOWAS in the new regime. Therefore, it became 
imperative on Member States to create supranational institutions to implement community 
policies and enforce laws in agreed areas. The revised treaty made provision for the following 
institutions:   
 
I) the Authority of Heads of States and Government;  
II) the Council of Ministers; the Community Parliament;  
III) the Community Court of Justice;  
IV) the Executive Secretariat (now the Commission);225  
V) the Fund for Co-operation, Compensation and Development; and 
VI) Specialised Technical Commissions; and any other institutions that may be 
established by the Authority. 
 
Consequently, the new regime introduced new organs to concretize the move towards 
supranationalism as advised by the CEP. The revised treaty also introduced more robust laws 
guiding these institutions. But the question that comes to mind is what factors that actually 
acted as catalysts for the move to supranationalism? 
 
Kufour reveals that a combination of factors led to the move towards greater supranational 
institutions. He identifies the need for institutional efficiency, the search for political 
legitimacy by ECOWAS leaders, a change of ideology in the sub-region, the need for 
stronger regional security architecture, and the need to be a major player in international trade 
as the trigger for supranational institution building. While these factors are all salient, it is the 
history of armed conflicts across the sub-region that has been most influential in the 
institutional transformation of the community. The operationalization of a supranational 
security mechanism has further legitimized the ECOWAS regime and institutionalized the 
protection of universal norms that ensures the protection of the individual.  
 
                                                          
225
As part of reforms underscoring the mission to transform community institutions into supranational entities, 
the Authority, in June 2006, approved the transformation of the Executive Secretariat into a nine-member 
Commission with a President, a Vice-President and seven Commissioners. See, Decision A/DEC.1/06/06 
Relating to the Commission of the Economic Community of West African States, (2006) Vol. 49 ECOWAS Official 
Journal.   
51 | P a g e  
 
 The ECOWAS security mechanism is the most effective supranational organ in the 
community, granting it the statue as the best on the continent,
226
 and considered by some as 
modernizing international law by  setting the pace for the institutionalization of humanitarian 
intervention (HI) at regional level in Africa. This feat is hardly acknowledged in academic 
circles outside the continent. The community has successfully intervened in hot-spots such as 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea Bissau. Learning from past mistakes of interventions in the 
continent such as Rwanda, ECOWAS has established an overarching, all-inclusive security 
mechanism
227
  which consists of Mediation and Security Council,
228
 Defence and Security 
Commission, and a Council of Elders.
229
 The Mediation and Security Council is made up of 
ten members, and decisions are made by a two-thirds majority of six members. Civil society 
plays an important role in this new all-inclusive institutional arrangement as part of the 
ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN).
230
  
 
Despite the widening of institutional capacity and the establishment of supranational organs, 
impediments, the type which stalled integration under the first regime, still persist. There is a 
general lack of political will to domestically implement international law in the form of 
integration programmes such as elimination of tariffs and free movement of persons. This is 
manifested in problems such as bureaucratic procedures pertaining to rules-of-origin, 
discordant customs systems and procedures, difficulties with insurance and bond guarantees 
for transit cargo, and other non-tariff barriers involving roadblocks and demands for informal 
payments continue to obstruct integration across ECOWAS frontiers.
231
 Recently, the 
Ghanaian government implemented a law
232
 on the request of Ghana Union Traders 
Association protesting the economic activities of Nigerian Traders. The GUTA sought greater 
implementation of the law which reserved economic activity for Ghanaians.
233
 This law was 
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in violation of ECOWAS law
234
 which grants all citizens of ECOWAS the right to set up and 
mange enterprises, and in particular companies, under the same conditions as defined by the 
legislation of the host member state for its own nationals. The Protocol further states that in 
matters of establishment and services, the members of ECOWAS undertake to accord non-
discriminatory treatment to nationals and companies of other member states.
235
 
 
While it is evident that Pan-Africanism continues to sustain the sentimental value of African 
integration to Member States, it has not been sufficient in compelling obedience or 
compliance with integration objectives. The non-implementation of community law is partly 
attributable to weak institutional arrangements at national and regional level, but more so a 
lack of political will to vigorously pursue integration which appears to be far from the desired 
level.  However, ECOWAS continues to legitimate the current regime by placing economic 
integration at the centre of its long-term vision. ECOWAS has abolished the visa 
requirements for citizens of member states by the introduction of a Brown Card, the 
equivalent of a sub-regional passport. ECOWAS has also embarked on mammoth 
infrastructural programmes such as the trans-ECOWAS highway
236
 and the West African 
Power Pool (WAPP).
237
 
 
At the continental level, economic integration has not met expectations.
238
 A number of 
African countries have attempted to enhance their regional groupings but figures of intra-
African trade remain lower than expected.  The lack of success in economic integration is 
equally attributable to slow implementation of regional integration arrangements designed to 
eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers, even though a number of trade agreements have been 
signed among member states.
239
 While countries that have managed to intensify their trade 
relations with the global economy through trade and investment have grown more rapidly 
over a sustained period and have consequently experienced larger reductions in poverty, the 
overall picture still remains uncertain.  
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Intra-regional trade flows in Africa have been generally low compared with other regions, 
primarily because of poor infrastructure development, maintenance and connectivity, 
conflicts and security issues among the regions and the presence of trade barriers.
240
 The 
table below demonstrates the low level of intra-regional trade in recent years 
 
 
Table 2.1 Destination of African REC exports and imports 2000-2009. 
Exports    
 US China EU Africa Rest of the 
World 
CEMAC 32.0 0.1 26.7 3.4 34.5 
CEN-SAD 17.3 0.1 42.8 9.1 26.3 
COMESA 5.3 0.1 50.2 9.1 32.8 
EAC 3.8 0.9 30.2 33.6 29.4 
ECCAS 29.0 0.2 22.2 3.9 43.0 
ECOWAS 28.7 0.1 29.3 13.7 22.2 
IGAD 2.4 0.4 17.6 19.4 53.1 
SADC 13.7 1.0 26.3 13.5 41.1 
Source: UNECA (2012) pp.19-20. 
 
Another major hindrance to the realization of economic integration is the crowded integration 
landscape. For political, economic and strategic reasons many countries belong to more than 
one REC. The multiplicity of RECs and the concomitant multiple state memberships have 
created a complex patchwork that complicates decision–making for states, community 
officials, individuals and businesses.
241
  Studies have revealed that the twin phenomena of 
many Recs and multiple memberships impact adversely on the achievement of goals of the 
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AEC.
242
 The greater effect is the inability of RECs to operate as supranational entities 
frustrating the economic integration initiative at all levels. The phenomena also negatively 
affect Africa’s international trade relations.243  The overlapping nature of the African 
integration landscape is described in the following words of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa:  
 
Even though the African Union recognizes only eight [regional economic communities], the continent 
currently has fourteen inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), working on regional integration issues, 
with numerous treaties and protocols governing relations among them, and between them and the 
Member States. This proliferation of institutions and protocols means that out of the 53 Member States 
of the African Union (AU), 26 belong to two of the fourteen IGOs, 20 belong to three of them, and one 
country belongs to four.
244
 
 
 
Despite the prominence of the ‘spaghetti bowl’245 phenomena in Africa, suggestions that the 
level of intra-African trade is low should be approached with caution. Official national trade 
statistics in Africa are often difficult to access, and the level of unrecorded trans-border trade 
is estimated to be high, if not higher than recorded trade.
246
 In addition to the above, there are 
other socio-economic and political factors that challenge economic integration and can 
undermine its effectiveness as this study will further reveal. These include the absence of 
mutual trust, diversity in political ideology and political systems, lack of homogeneity in the 
level of economic development, the issue of skewed distribution of benefits of integration, 
and, hegemonic threats.
247
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2.5 ECOWAS IN THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (AEC) 
 
It is important for the purposes of this study, to state that ECOWAS is part of a continental 
infrastructure. It is envisaged that RECs eventually stabilise to form the African Economic 
Community, as a result there is a symbiotic relationship between ECOWAS and other 
recognized RECs as  part of a continent-wide regional economic bloc known as the African 
Economic Community (AEC). ECOWAS and seven other RECs form the building blocks of 
the AEC and are vital components of the AU regime. The AU recognizes the Arab Maghreb 
Union (AMU), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the South African Development 
Community (SADC), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and 
ECOWAS as the officially recognized RECs under its regime. It is expected that these RECs 
also co-ordinate and harmonize their policies among themselves and with the AU 
Commission with a view to accelerating Africa’s integration process.248 Hence, the success of 
ECOWAS is not only crucial in the achieving a continent-wide market, but is also directly 
linked to the economic development of other sub-regional blocs. 
 
The AEC was born on June 3 1991, when 49 out of 51 African states signed the Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community into law in Abuja, Nigeria. This singular 
event was celebrated as ‘a new chapter in the history of African integration’ and also ‘firmly 
committed the continent along the path of economic integration and collective 
development’.249 The Abuja treaty was a result of the earlier held Lagos Plan of Action 
(LPA)
250
 which institutionalised the continental blue print for economic integration and 
development.
251
 Though the Abuja treaty was created under the institutional framework of 
the OAU, it represented ‘Africa’s boldest attempt at any sort of concrete integration for the 
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entire continent. It also represented a tilt towards the creation of supranational institutions and 
organs for the achievement of set objectives. The Abuja Treaty entered into force on 12 May 
1994. 
 
The Abuja treaty reflects some of the key values and ideologies which were beginning to gain 
prominence among African states at the time. Member States declared to adhere to principles 
such as the ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and peoples’ rights; and 
‘accountability, economic justice and popular participation in development’.252 African States 
also agree to ‘create favourable conditions for the development of the Community and the 
attainment of its objectives’ and also ‘take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment 
and dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of the 
provisions of this Treaty’. This approach hint at a realisation that economic integration can 
only flourish in the midst of stable environment which can only be guaranteed by protection 
of human rights and empowerment of the individual through political and social participation 
in the decision-making process. Ebobrah states that this new approach under the AEC Treaty 
is advantageous to the actualization of human rights in the continent. He argues that ‘there is 
arguably a sense that African States are more willing to relax attachment to economic 
integration’ which is ‘more favourable for human rights realization’.253   
 
The Abuja treaty pays considerable attention to means of implementation or ensuring greater 
compliance. Under the Article 5(3) any Member State, which persistently fails to honour its 
general undertakings or fails to abide by the decisions or regulations of the Community, may 
be subjected to sanctions. Such sanctions may include the suspension of the rights and 
privileges of membership. Along these lines, decisions of the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government (the highest decision-making organ of the Community) binding on member 
states, other organs of the community and RECs. By making the decisions of Community 
institutions binding on Member States, the Abuja treaty prioritizes implementation of 
proceeds of decision-making. The decisional autonomy also reflects a key element of 
supranationalism as highlighted in the preceding chapter. But as would be argued 
subsequently in this study, by placing overarching powers on Assembly of Heads of States 
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and government, the Abuja treaty follows a pattern of institutional design which unbalances 
most regional organizations in the long run. 
 
The AEC is expected to be established progressively over a transitional period not exceeding 
forty years, from the entry into force of the treaty. In this regards, the AEC would be 
achieved in six stages which include; strengthening existing RECS and establishment of new 
ones, freezing trade barriers within each REC, transformation of all RECs into FTAs then 
into Customs Unions (CU), coordination and harmonisation of the regional CUs and the 
African CU, establishment of a common market and, the establishment of the Pan-African 
economic and monetary union respectively.
254
 The Abuja Treaty also envisages coordination, 
harmonisation and gradual integration of the activities of the REC’s into its framework.255   
This recognition arguably permits RECs to pursue objectives at a sub-regional level but 
which are not too dissimilar with the economic integration roadmap for the continent 
envisaged under the treaty.  
 
In reality, the AEC is a distant reality and almost a chimera with the under-performance of 
RECs for reasons already mentioned above. The greatest challenge towards meeting the AEC 
is the issue of implementation which is often reflected in the constant push-backs of set 
targets. It is imperative that RECs such as ECOWAS are formidable as single economic 
groupings before the AEC can be a reality. The new ECOWAS regime appears to have made 
a transition from economic integration to human rights which may distract from the 
realisation of economic integration and its benefit towards Member State economies. 
However, this shift is not limited to ECOWAS but is a result of a greater movement by the 
entirety of African States. This is evident in the legal framework of the African Union (AU) 
which is continental leviathan. Expectedly, the values which emanates from the AU, like the 
OAU its predecessor, dissipates towards other regional arrangements in the continent. These 
values become shared ones, charged by the notion of Pan-Africanism which holds African 
people and institutions together. The next section discusses the AU regime and its key 
principles. 
 
 
 
                                                          
254
 Article 6 of the Abuja treaty. 
255
 Article 4(2) and 6 of the Abuja treaty. 
58 | P a g e  
 
2.6 THE AFRICAN UNION 
 
 After years of operating the OAU, an organization focused solely on banishing colonialism 
on the continent and securing the new found sovereignty of nascent African states, African 
leaders recognized the need to move unto a stronger organization.  The defunct OAU was 
incapacitated by constraints imposed on action under the charter. The OAU also faced 
competition from sub-regional organizations which were more effective at securing public 
goods for their members.
256
 This eventually led to the dissolution of the continental leviathan 
which failed to match expectations of African states in an evolving world.  
 
The successor organization was therefore expected to cope with the socio-economic 
challenges within the continent. Consequently, the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government of the OAU unanimously adopted the Constitutive Act of the AU (the 
Constitutive Act)
257
 in its thirty-sixth ordinary session in Lomé, Togo, on 11 July 2000. 
Subsequently, at its fifth extraordinary session held in Sirte, Libya on 2 March 2001, the 
Assembly declared the establishment of the AU. The Constitutive Act entered into force on 
26 May 2001, following its ratification by two-thirds of the Member States of the OAU, as 
provided for in its Article 28.
258
 The adoption of the Constitutive Act was the final outcome 
of the process that effectively began with the adoption of the Sirte Declaration of 1999.
259
 
The adoption of the Constitutive Act marked ‘a significant milestone in the history of the 
African integration’,260 but like the pre-OAU era is a diluted version of the more radical pan-
Africanist integration attempts sought by past African leaders.
261
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The AU compared to its predecessor, creates more robust institutions and organs aimed at 
achieving a range of economic, social and political objectives.
262
 The Constitutive Act is 
considered a major improvement over the OAU Charter in terms of providing an 
organizational framework for the political integration of the continent.
263
 However, the 
adoption of the Constitutive Act gave rise to many questions, relating to the substantive 
aspects of the proclaimed objectives of the AU, particularly the project of African integration, 
and to the modalities and processes for carrying them out. Some of the questions revolved 
around the following issue: first the extent to which the new AU regime would offer 
substantive and qualitative difference from the institutional framework of its predecessor, 
whether it was not just ‘old wine in new bottle’; and second, the extent to which it represents 
the readiness of African leaders to collectively respond to the twin-challenges of 
globalization and the new wave of regionalism.
264
  
 
The Constitutive Act enumerates an expansive list of 14 objectives and principles
265
 that go 
well beyond those enshrined in the OAU Charter.
266
  For a change, the objectives of the AU 
go beyond the rather limited objectives found in Article II of the OAU Charter. The objective 
of the OAU was primarily limited to the promotion and achievement of the unity and 
solidarity of African states and the defence of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
independence of African States. The Constitutive Act on the other hand upholds such values 
as the promotion of peace, security and stability of the continent; the promotion of 
democratic principles and institutions; popular participation and good governance; the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other relevant instruments; the promotion of 
sustainable development at the economic, social and cultural levels to mention a few.
267
 
 
The added value of the long catalogue of principles of the Constitutive Act supremely reflects 
a major shift in the economic integration agenda in the continent. Reference to human rights 
related values consistently appear throughout the Constitutive Act (the preamble, objectives 
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and principles of the AU).
268
 This has led to conclusions that by including a wide human right 
framework in the Constitutive Act, ‘the AU regime mainstreams human rights in the 
continental scheme of things and installs the AU as some kind of specialised international 
human rights organisation in Africa’.269 In addition to the commitment to democracy, respect 
for human rights and the rule of law established in the Constitutive Act, the New Partnership 
for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) a continental framework for development also upholds 
these values.
270
  
 
Also worthy of note is that there is no provision in the Constitutive Act that suggests any 
cession or surrender of sovereignty to the AU by its members. This is a clear indication that 
the AU regime is ‘predicated on Intergovernmentalism, and is not conceived as a 
neofunctionalist supranational institution’.271 However, Article 5 of the Abuja treaty lays 
down provisions that are arguably tantamount to a partial surrender of sovereignty for the 
implementation of the treaty. Along these lines, it could be argued that the Abuja treaty 
contained strict provisions on implementation because it was recognized as an economic 
integration agreement, which requires partial surrender of sovereignty strictly for the purpose 
law and policy-making in the economic aspect.  In terms of sanctions for non-compliance, 
Article 23(2) of the Constitutive Act provides for sanctions to be imposed on member states 
for failure to comply with decisions and policies of the Union. But this is insufficient in 
comparison to the Abuja treaty which defines in specific details the punishment that states 
face if they fail to fulfil their obligations under the treaty. 
 
From a human rights perspective, the Constitutive Act fails to make any reference to any of 
the human supervisory bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, although it recognizes the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). While this omission can possibly 
be construed as a lack of commitment to these institutions under the AU regime,
272
 the 
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Constitutive Act still ‘represents a serious commitment to the promotion and protection of 
human rights, at least in comparison to the Charter of the OAU’.273  
 
Generally, the AU is supposed to represent a new political, legal and institutional order for 
Africa, and not a case of old wine in new bottles. The AU provides a framework within 
which to pursue the decades-old project of deepening the unity and cohesion of the continent, 
and improve in the economic, political and social spheres of the African continent.  The AU 
framework based on the shared vision encapsulated in the objectives and principles 
enumerated in the Constitutive Act, provides a new beginning for Africa. However the 
success which this new beginning promises is heavily reliant on the political will and 
commitment of African states to implement these objectives faithfully. 
 
It is also noteworthy that the AU is expected to thrive on the success of sub-regional 
organizations as foundations. The OAU at its 2001 Summit in Lusaka, Zambia reaffirmed the 
role of REC’s as building blocks for the proposed AEC. The OAU expressed the need for a 
closer involvement of RECs in the formulation and implementation of all programmes of the 
AU.
274
  The additional recognition of RECs as building blocks for non-economic integration 
has been confirmed in the role allocated to these regional organizations in the AU initiatives 
that were introduced after the 2001 Lusaka Summit.  At its 5
th
 meeting held in Abuja on 3 
November 2002, the NEPAD Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee 
(HSIC) observed that, in line with the Constitutive Act of the AU, the RECs are essential 
building blocks for the integration and economic development of Africa. Along these lines, it 
is recognized that RECs are instrumental to the implementation of NEPAD programmes and 
projects.
275
 
 
With regards to the proposed AEC, the Abuja treaty aims to strengthen existing RECs and 
establish new ones where they do not exist as the first target on the six-stage implementation 
framework.
276
 In addition, the Protocol to the Treaty establishing the African Economic 
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Community relating to the Pan-African Parliament (PAP Protocol),
277
 also emphasize the role 
of RECs in the integration objectives under the Abuja treaty. Also worthy of note is Article 
16 of the Peace and Security Protocol
278
 which recognizes regional mechanisms are 
recognized as part of the overall security architecture of the AU. The PSC is required to 
coordinate and harmonize the activities of subregional security mechanism towards 
strengthening the continental security architecture. All these point to the centrality of RECs to 
the integration objective of the AU. They represent molecular parts of the overall architecture 
of the AU and the AEC in all aspects of integration.  
 
 
2.7 EXPLAINING THE TRANSITION FROM ECONOMIC INTEGRATION TO GREATER 
POLITICAL INTEGRATION. 
 
As mentioned above the continental Leviathan generates norms that always have implications 
on sub-regional organizations. There appears to be a layering of economic integration with 
greater focus on political integration. This transition potentially tips institutional activities in 
favour of the latter sphere. This is evident in the change in legal framework of both the AU 
and RECs. Is this change in focus the result of a demand for greater political co-operation in 
the aftermath of the de-colonization of the continent? Is it borne out of the need to hold 
African states together to solve common challenges brought about by the global market? Is 
there a legitimate attempt by African States to legitimize their regimes and ensure a 
politically stable environment upon which economic integration can now thrive? Better yet, is 
spillover a natural progression from economic integration to a political union as exemplified 
by the EU? 
 
Theoretically speaking, economic integration and political integration occupy two extremes 
in integration studies. Whereas economic integration prima facie involves ‘non-controversial’ 
and largely technical issues requiring total surrender of a state’s law-making power in the 
field of economics in exchange for a right to participate in collective law-making for the 
interest of the wider area, political integration often involves the partial surrender of 
sovereignty in exchange for security and conflict resolution which require authoritative 
                                                          
277
 Adopted 2 March 2001 and entered into force in March 2004, available at http://www.au.int/en/ (accessed 
15 April, 2014). 
278
 Adopted 10 July 2002 and entered into force 26 December 2003, available at http://www.au.int/en/ 
(accessed 15 April 2014).  
63 | P a g e  
 
decision-making.
279
  It appears African leaders have always preferred to ‘embrace initiatives 
that left controversial issues to domestic control in accordance with the spirit of domestic 
jurisdiction’.280 However, regional organizations in Africa appear to have taken complex 
institutional paths, converging goals in otherwise distinct fields and compressing them into 
common organizational goals.  The gradual transition into peace and security, democracy and 
the rule of law is indicative of the gradual move towards non-economic aspects of integration 
stricto sensu. 
 
It is trite that there is a link between economic integration and political integration. One may 
not totally be distinguishable from the other. For instance, it is unlikely that economic allies 
would be at war with each other. Also, political instability suggests that governments 
committed to the course of integration may agree readily to community policies to avert the 
risk of the rejection of the policies when there is the possibility of a change of government.
281
 
In international organizations, this may explain the convergence of the economy and polity as 
distinct subsystems. In terms of the development goals of the African RECs, one can argue 
that limiting the modes of operation to exclusively economic and socio-economic aspects can 
deny them important benefits of development accruable through political integration.
282
 
 
Some European integration scholars have argued that integration initiatives in developed 
societies do not pursue integration in distinct different fields. Rather they engage in a sort of 
straightforward path of integration that follows a clockwise sequence proceeding from the 
adaptive sectors (economic) to the goal-attainment (political) to the integrative and pattern-
maintaining sectors.
283
 This is the classical integration trajectory associated with Jacob Viner. 
It is worth emphasizing that the Vinerian model was developed in an industrial context, while 
many developing countries are agrarian and raw materials producing.
 284
 With political 
integration always placed at the end of the spectrum, the assumption is that non-
political/economic aspects of integration enhance trust and experience amongst participating 
states. From the trust and experience member states build dealing economically, a wider net 
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of institutional agreements whose agreements would usurp the political eventually emanates. 
This relationship naturally progresses into a ‘community in which interest and activity are 
congruent and in which politics is replaced by problem-solving’.285  This assumption must be 
approached with caution when examining the African situation as the socio-economic 
conditions in Europe are a far-cry from the African condition. However, what is certain, as 
the African experience suggests is that economic integration can only succeed if political 
stability is guaranteed. 
 
As earlier discussed, the emergence of the concept of Supranationalism has given integration 
studies a different angle from the Vinerian model, and the role of international organizations. 
Attainment of Supranationalism has been described by some as the ‘highest level of 
integration’.286 Although supranationalism is usually associated with EU studies, it provides 
an interesting analytical perspective on integration studies the world over. Supranationalism 
implies the level and depth of integration activities assigned to community institutions can be 
embarked upon independently of government input in designated areas. Supranationalism is a 
product of the new wave of regionalism which is a ‘multidimensional, plural and 
comprehensive regionalization process.
287
 In essence, Supranationalism represents the move 
from strictly economic integration towards higher aspects of integration. The movement from 
old regionalism, which is marked by ‘strict compartmentalization’288, to new regionalism 
appears to be taking place in Africa. Accordingly, African RECs are experiencing ‘deeper 
levels of integration’ in the economic field and are expected to contribute to’ the welfare of 
their members… as insurance against future global political or economic dislocations’.289 
 
 Theories of regional integration are divided over supranationalism. The pessimists (realist, 
state centrists) argue that Supranationalism is not necessarily an attainable height given the 
preponderance of states in international relations. The optimists (functionalists, neo-
functionalists, federalists) on the other hand, believe that regional organizations are capable 
of attaining a supranational status through different means such as spill over and the activities 
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of transnational forces.
290
 The concept of spillover is essential in explaining the transition 
from economic integration to political integration, a trait often present in supranationalism. 
Furthermore, it offers a theoretical interpretation of the transition rules through which 
integration moves from economic to the political’.291  
 
Schmitter describes spillover as: 
 
the process whereby members of an integration scheme agreed on some collective goals for a variety of 
motives but unequally satisfied with their attainment of these goals – attempt to resolve their 
dissatisfaction either by resorting to collaboration in another, related sector expanding the scope of the 
mutual commitment) or by intensifying their commitment to the original sector (increasing the level of 
mutual commitment), or both.
292
 
 
Spillover could also be sectoral (scope) or boundary. Sectoral spillover refers to the 
‘expansion of integrative habits from one sector to another’. Boundary spillover, on the other 
hand, refers to the occurrence of a ‘spread of integrative habits from one analytically distinct 
part of a sector to another analytical part of the same sector’.293  Hence sectoral spillover may 
for example be from banking to investment while boundary spillover could be from economic 
to political sphere.  Schmitter’s analogy of spillover implies the presence of the following 
factors in the integration process: 
 A defined policy area or transaction (Scope) 
 Collective agreement from members (level) 
 Play of interests/disagreements/conflict 
 Issue density 
 Unintended consequences 
 Role of regional political elite 294 
 
A deeper reading of the neo-functionalist conception of spillover suggests that ‘institutions 
develop a life of their own’ at a later stage.295 But this institutional autonomy is the product of 
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states being in a trapped situation as integration progresses. According to Nye, spillover 
occurs as a result of a ‘reduction of alternatives open to decision–makers once the integrative 
process is in motion’.296 Along these lines, when states raise the ‘level’ of integration, ‘more 
tasks become interrelated through inherent links or package deals’ and ‘the cost of 
disintegrative actions becomes greater because there is the danger of pulling the whole house 
down’.297 In essence, spillover is a kind of safety net available to states who have committed 
themselves to an integration initiative to the extent that pulling out of the process would 
inflict greater damage. 
 
It is noteworthy that spillover is not a certain phenomenon. The whole purpose of the neo-
functional approach is precisely to relate existing national and emerging regional 
characteristics in something approximating a probabilistic model of international system 
transformation.
298
 Hence, international organizations created for integration purposes do not 
always evolve along lines set by their founders, and contained in their constitutive 
instruments. Instead, such institutions may be prodded by a combination of ‘propulsive and 
directive impulses of trends running through the political context and of purposes injected by 
participants in their operations’, which is dynamic to each institution.299 The reaction to 
stimuli by the international organization, in this case, may also be due to a combination of 
external (international environment outside the region) and internal political or social forces 
which impact on the initiative after it has commenced and either deflects or strengthens the 
process even if not envisaged by the initial agreement. The resultant effect of the distraction 
is the decision to expand the scope of the integrative process to respond to new institutional 
challenges. 
 
It would be recalled that supranationalism and spillover are neo-functionalist concepts 
emanating from European integration. The European experience gives validity to these 
theories.  The transition of European Communities (EC) which was collective initiative in 
coal production to the European Union (EU) which is a political union explains these 
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principles. However, this gradual transition was unintended as decisions were made 
incrementally by actors. Along this continuum, Sweet and Sandholtz argue that European 
integration is ‘provoked and sustained by the development of casual connections between 
three factors: transnational exchange, supranational organization, and European Community 
(EC) rule making’.300 The transition from economic integration (as agreed by governments) 
to supranational governance which occur as a result of greater social demands for EC rules 
and regulations regulated by cross border transactions and communications pressures may 
spark advanced forms of integration. 
 
These transnational exchanges led to an extension of the principle of democratic governance 
present in municipal states to the community level, eventually leading to a shift from the 
otherwise economic nature of integration. Thus, admission into the EU became dependent on 
the quality of the domestic political landscape and the political orientation of the state. It 
could be argued thus, that the willingness of states to commit to economic integration and the 
maximization of spillover became the vehicle for introduction of non-economic issues such 
as greater democratic governance and human rights into states that would have been reluctant 
to submit to external scrutiny even where they are signatories to global human rights 
instruments.
301
 
 
The European experience can hardly be mirrored in African RECs. For instance in 
ECOWAS, transnational forces within the subregion are so weak as to generate the kind of 
momentum that will drive economic integration and supranational governance.  So a new set 
of variables ought to be adopted to suit ECOWAS. An adaptation of the theories means that 
this study privileges the role of global and regional dynamics in propelling supranational 
evolution of ECOWAS in the political and security policy sectors. These changes as would 
be demonstrated in subsequent chapters impose on regional institutions and Member States 
certain agenda that ultimately drive integration and create institutional evolution. However, 
as a collective, RECs in Africa have made an almost synchronized move towards greater 
political integration, reflecting the greater continental movement. This transformation may be 
attributed chiefly to the recognition of the complex economic linkages which make it difficult 
for RECs to operate effectively without engaging across sectoral divides, and external factors 
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in the form of the end of the Cold war and greater demand for governmental legitimacy. The 
transition thus appears to have been the consequence of conscious decision-making.
302
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2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
The transformation of ECOWAS from the 1975 to the 1993 treaty regime was predicated 
upon the desire for institutional efficiency, the search for greater political legitimacy by 
ECOWAS leaders and the continuing post-independence enthusiasm for regional co-
operation and regional factors such as the outbreak of conflicts. While these factors have led 
to an expansion of community institutions they do not give a full picture of the direction of 
the community towards delivering on its economic integration mandate. However, despite the 
slow pace of economic integration, the Community has continued to evolve institutionally 
and play its role as a building block for the continental Leviathan while advancing the 
interests and objectives of Member States under the new treaty regime. 
 
At the continental level, African leaders realized that there was the need for institutionalized 
means of cooperation with institutions capable of delivering the goods of integration. In 
search of a Leviathan organization, capable of transforming the fortunes of the African 
people, the OAU was transformed into the AU. However, the goal of economic integration 
has been painfully slow to realise. The prominence of conflicts and civil unrest caused the 
focus of integration in Africa to change from strictly economic integration to human rights 
protection. This transition in integration goals has been explained by the neo-functionalists as 
spillover.  
 
More importantly, the normative content of African integration has been filled by new sets of 
values over the years. Integration is now built on universal values as human rights and 
democracy.  Pan-Africanism the figurative expression of African integration is the symbolic 
validation, ritual and pedigree upon which legitimacy of integration can be measured. Human 
rights have been consistently emphasized in speeches and ceremonies of the AU and African 
leaders. And since Pan-Africanism binds every level of regional organization in Africa, its 
normative contents must be equally embraced by sub-regional organizations. However, the 
emphasis on the historical origins, cultural and anthropological deep-rootedness of African 
integration in Pan-Africanism is not enough to ensure compliance as would be discovered in 
subsequent chapters.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE NEW ECOWAS HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
It is trite that an international community that operates without a well-developed legal system 
in which the authority of law is generally recognized is impoverished.
303
 This is the basis for 
normative legitimacy of international law.  Along these lines, it is important to examine the 
legal framework of ECOWAS particularly as it relates to the newly found mandate of human 
rights. Upon what norms is the ECOWAS human rights framework founded? What are the 
elements of the ECOWAS human rights framework? What factors have so far impacted on 
the development of a specific community legal framework?  These are some of the salient 
questions that not only determine questions of legitimacy of a regime, but also hint at a 
clearer understanding of the institutional and practical nature of the human rights mandate of 
RECs. 
Since normative legitimacy entails the right to rule, the question that follows is, what is the 
extent of ECOWAS law in this issue area, and how compatible are these laws with the 
African and UN systems? It would be recalled that a contextual approach of normative 
legitimacy demands that the kind of authority an institution is exercising, the issue area or 
domain, and how much authority an institution is exercising should be taken into cognizance 
when studying international institutions.
304
 Consequently, the provisions of ECOWAS 
instruments are scrutinized to ascertain determine their purpose and application, within the 
context of legitimacy. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to articulate an understanding of 
the ECOWAS human rights framework, its content and scope. This is vital in determining the 
normative legitimacy of the new ECOWAS regime. 
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3.2 DIMENSIONS TO THE ECOWAS HUMAN RIGHTS REGIME 
The outbreak of violent domestic conflicts in the later years of the 1975 regime immensely 
changed the landscape of integration in the sub-region. The interventions of ECOWAS in 
troubled member states exposed gaps in the community legal framework that created 
opportunities for wider overhaul of Community institutions. The creation of more robust 
institutions in the Community has certain normative implications. The most obvious is the 
expansion of ECOWAS institutions into areas that were previously considered by many states 
to be within their sovereign domain. For example, the new ECOWAS legal framework 
includes a protocol that authorizes the community to monitor elections in Member States to 
ensure that the process is free, fair, and transparent, and the outcomes, peaceful.
305
 The 
ECOWAS protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also lists conditions that constitute 
the constitutional convergence principle which all Member States are expected to adhere to. 
Some of these principles include: the separation of powers; zero tolerance for power obtained 
or maintained through unconstitutional means; popular participation in decision making 
etc.
306
 
Consequently, the new ECOWAS regime not only seeks to protect individuals by stabilizing 
the environment under which they conduct their daily activities, but also guarantee their 
fundamental freedoms as enshrined under the ECOWAS treaty and other legal instruments 
which Member States are parties to. By adopting protocols in a wide variety of areas such as 
Democracy and Good governance, the new ECOWAS regime casts a wide net in its new 
human rights regime. Normatively, this compact approach is a novel one amongst RECs in 
Africa, although the ECOWAS system is not the most complete in certain aspects, it has 
proven to be relatively effective, as this chapter reveals.  
The dimensions to ECOWAS human rights regime, for the purpose of this study are drawn 
from the legal instruments currently in operation in the community. The ECOWAS human 
rights regime covers the following areas: 
I) Peace and Security 
II) Democracy and Good governance 
III) Human Rights and Fundamental freedoms 
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While the above criteria do not exhaust the normative values which are protected under 
ECOWAS laws, they may be understood broadly. They also serve an analytical purpose 
through which ECOWAS’s efforts at legitimation are examined from the normative and 
institutional perspectives, and also for the purpose of compliance.  
The unprecedented military intervention of ECOWAS in Liberia opened up legitimacy 
questions of the ECOWAS regime, primarily because a sub-regional organization acted 
without the authorization of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the only body 
formally empowered to authorize such interventions. Thus, the greatest legitimacy 
question on the ECOWAS regime lies in the peace and security architecture of ECOWAS 
stemming from the political and legal debates on ECOWAS’s role in Liberia and Sierra 
Leone. However, legitimacy questions also lie in other aspects of ECOWAS’s human 
rights regime. Collectively, these dimensions encase the shared values and principles 
upon which ECOWAS’s legitimacy may be widely examined.  
According to Jens Steffek, ‘… in the creation of international regimes all contracting 
parties need to agree explicitly to the values, goals, and procedures for the regime.  This 
moment of consensus in the regime…also provides consensual reference points for the 
regime’s discursive justification and thus legitimacy’.307 He further underlines the 
importance of shared values to the legitimacy question by adding that ‘what creates 
legitimacy is less the fact of having consented, but rather having consented to a certain 
normative reasoning, linking shared values and principles to practice type norms.’308 It is 
important that the shared norms and values developed by ECOWAS over the years are 
examined. 
 
3.3 PEACE AND SECURITY 
 
For the purpose of this study, it is importance to place into perspective the meaning of peace 
and security as commonly used in international legal studies. The traditional conception of 
security focused on the protection and safety of the state, and the management of the use of 
military force. Security in the traditional sense is dominated by the perception of external 
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threats to external threat to the state. But the concept remains a contested one in terms of 
definition, interpretation and specification. The layman’s understanding of security connotes 
the ‘condition of being or feeling safe from harm of danger’.309 The interpretation and 
specification of the ‘condition’ of ‘being safe’ from who or what, and the nature and type of 
‘danger’ and the normative elements, are part of the problematic nature of the 
conceptualisation of security.
310
 
 
During the Cold war, the traditional conception of security focusing on national security, 
interests and power, with the state as the primary referent object of security, the condition of 
anarchy in the international system, and the military use or threat of force, was criticized by 
various scholars as not reflecting the nature and complexity of security.
311
 The emerging 
sources of threat to security in the world could no longer fit into the normative framework of 
the traditional conception of security.  An example often cited is the oil price rise in 1973 due 
to the Arab-Israeli war highlighted the relevance of economic security and the role of 
strategic resources in national security.
312
  
 
During the early post-Cold War period the emerging consensus in both developing and some 
parts of the developed world was that the concept of security needed to be redefined to 
include non-military security issues – human security. The publication of the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Annual Human Development Report in 1994, which 
broadened the definition of security, was the turning point in the debate.
313
  Prior to the 
publication of the report, efforts were already under way in Africa to shift the focus towards 
the security of people. The most significant initiative was the ‘Kampala Document’ which 
called for the establishment of a Conference on Stability, Development and Cooperation in 
Africa (CSSDCA) in 1991. The CSSDCA points to the fact that peace, security and stability 
are the pillars for development and cooperation in Africa.
314
 It emphasises that the : 
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“Security, stability and development of every African country are inseparably linked to that of other 
African countries. Instability in one country affects the stability of neighbouring countries. Instability 
in one country affects the stability of neighbouring countries and has serious implications for 
continental unity, peace and security.”315 
 
Richard Ullman, one of the foremost critics of the ‘militarisation of the concept of security’, 
together, advocated a redefinition of the concept of security and the broadening of the 
security such as the environment, migration, disease, transnational crime, natural disasters, 
global wealth and poverty divisions, ethno-religious and nationalist identities and the dangers 
of cybercrime and terrorism.
316
 The non-military/non-traditional threats to security have led 
to the broadening of the reference objects of security to include individuals, non-state actors 
and sub-national groups.
317
 This change in reference, particularly the emphasis on the 
individual has broadened the scope of security, and other related concepts such as Human 
rights, and Human development.
318
   
 
In Africa, non-military dimensions to security such as environmental degradation, poverty, 
resource scarcity, ethno-religious and nationalist identities, crime, drugs, diseases such as 
HIV/AIDS and malaria, natural catastrophes like drought, famine and flood, and mass 
migration of people, have continued to threaten individual and societal security and survival, 
and even national security. These non-traditional sources of threat to security affect every 
aspect of the life of individuals, societies, and states. More importantly, these non-military 
security threats emanate from a range of non-state, sub-state actors and factors and are trans-
state in character. Also, the dangers and challenges posed by these non-traditional military 
security threats are not confined to a particular state. Essentially, this is where regional bodies 
like ECOWAS serve as a platform for organized, unified regional security systems that serve 
states within the community. 
 
As can be seen from the above analysis, security is best understood as the freedom from 
elimination of threat not only to the physical existence of the state, but also to its ability for 
self-protection and development, and the enhancement of the general welfare of all the 
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citizens.  The common feature of all definitions of security is the protection of the individual 
against threats. The individual is at the most secure in a peaceful environment, which ensures 
the protection and preservation of ‘core values’ and the absence of threats to acquired 
values’.319 Security and peace are interwoven and mutually reinforcing. The absence of peace 
means the absence of security. Equally, the presence of peace invariably secures the presence 
of security. 
 
The ECOWAS legal and institutional framework covers various areas of peace and security. 
However, the most contested aspect of ECOWAS peace and security framework is 
humanitarian intervention. Humanitarian intervention is the dominant aspect of the concept of 
security hence complaints about the ‘militarisation of the concept of security’ by scholars like 
Ullman. Consequently, Humanitarian intervention is hotly contested in international law 
because it involves the subversion of state sovereignty with military force for the purpose of 
protecting human rights during periods of conflict.  The ECOWAS peace and security 
framework under the current regime emanated due to unilateral humanitarian intervention 
carried out in member states in the early 90s. Other aspects of security as understood in 
contemporary times are equally entrenched in other community legislations, which would be 
revealed in other parts of this study. The next section examines humanitarian intervention as 
a sub-concept of peace and security and its relationship with equally important concepts like 
humanitarian law and human rights. 
 
 
3.3.1 HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 
AS KEY ASPECTS OF PEACE AND SECURITY. 
  
The Westphalian idea of statehood is primarily premised on sovereignty over every facet of 
life within the territory. The implication of this ideal is the norm of non-intervention in 
domestic affairs of the state, be it forcible or non-forcible.
320
 Thus, intervention in the affairs 
of a sovereign state without its consent is fraught with difficulties, particularly on the part of 
the intervening states. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, and the advent of 
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globalization, sovereignty has undergone drastic changes. The global awakening on the 
sanctity of the human life and the realization that human rights must be protected has further 
changed the understanding of sovereignty. Where states are unwilling or unable to promote 
and protect the fundamental human rights of its peoples in conflict situations, the 
international community is obliged to intervene as part of its erga omnes responsibility.
321
  
 
The obligation of the international community to intervene for the protection of human rights 
during conflict is conceptualized as Humanitarian Intervention in international law. 
Humanitarian Intervention is defined more elaborately as ‘coercive action by states involving 
the use of armed force in another state without the consent of its government, with or without 
authorisation from the United Nations Security Council, for the purpose of preventing or 
putting top a halt gross and massive violations of human rights or international humanitarian 
law’.322 
 
The importance of Humanitarian Intervention to human rights protection cannot be 
overstated. An effective humanitarian intervention is one that saves lives by preventing or 
ending violent attacks on unarmed civilians where gross, massive and systematic violations 
of human rights takes place.  The minimum expectation of a humanitarian intervention is that 
‘[…] the intended beneficiaries of the action are better off after the intervention than they 
would have been had the intervention not taken place’.323 In order for a humanitarian 
intervention exercise to be considered a success, the number of lives saved should be 
considered. Humanitarian intervention can also produce undesired effects. Seybolt points out 
that if humanitarian intervention is not carried out properly, it wastes lives and resources and 
might perpetuate or exacerbate the problems it is intended to address.
324
 
 
Humanitarian intervention can be undertaken unilaterally (intervention by a single state) or 
collectively (intervention by a group of states). This study examines collective humanitarian 
intervention under a regional entity. So emphasis is placed on application of collective 
intervention mechanism of ECOWAS. Humanitarian intervention suffers from a 
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standardization problem due to the fact that the intervening state/states could potentially 
abuse the process. For example, ECOWAS was accused of violating the principles of peace-
keeping, during its intervention in Liberia in the 90s. 
325
 Various significant expositions of 
criteria have since emerged.
326
 Udoh proposes certain criteria in order to validate military 
missions based on humanitarian purposes as follows:
327
 
 
1) The use of humanitarian intervention must be immediate and only occur during the actual commission 
of the human rights violation or immediate threat of an offence 
2) Authorisation for intervention must be by a competent body within the United Nations 
3) Humanitarian Intervention must be a collective effort executed by more than one nation 
4) Humanitarian Intervention must be used as a last resort when all other means have failed 
5) Humanitarian Intervention must only be used for grave and large-scale violations of human rights 
6) All military forces involve in the intervention must respect the principles and spirit of the Geneva 
conventions and all other applicable International humanitarian Laws. 
 
It is noteworthy that most of the above standards tally with provisions of the UN Charter, 
particularly Chapter IV on the pacific settlement of disputes. However, in practice, the 
likelihood of each criteria being present before a particular humanitarian intervention can be 
embarked on, is low. The UN collective security mechanism has in the past proven to be 
‘notoriously selective’ in response to breaches of peace and other conflict situations, 
particularly in Africa.
328
 The dissonance between the provisions of the UN Charter and the 
politics of its implementation has led to the increase in regional collective security 
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mechanisms around the world. As would be revealed subsequently, in this study, the new 
ECOWAS security mechanism is a response to the failure and ineffectiveness of collective 
intervention administered by the UNSC in the past, on the continent. 
 
While human rights lay down guarantees and safeguards of rights in society, humanitarian 
law creates room for protection of the vulnerable in the outbreak of armed conflict.
329
  It 
logically follows that humanitarian intervention is the practice that ensures the successful 
operation of humanitarian law during conflict. The effective application of both areas of 
international law ensures that human rights are guaranteed and protected at all times. Both 
human rights and humanitarian intervention cannot be separated in a dynamic and rapidly 
evolving world where there are constant acts of violation of human rights manifested in 
various forms. However, both branches of international law are considered distinct despite its 
overlapping and until now, still seek pre-eminence over each other. 
 
 
 
3.3.2 ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF ECOWAS PEACE AND SECURITY 
ARCHITECTURE 
 
The initial mandate of ECOWAS under the 1975 treaty was regional cooperation and 
economic integration as ways to lift the sub-region out of the economic stranglehold of the 
advanced markets and enhance the living standard of its citizens. These lofty objectives could 
only be achieved in a stable environment. Unfortunately, Member States continued to 
experience one form of conflict or the other. During the first few years of operation of the 
1975 treaty, there had been internal conflicts in Togo, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea 
Bissau, Benin and Burkina Faso.
330
 There was also inter-state conflict between Mali and 
Burkina Faso in 1975 and 1985. Senegal and Mauritania also witnessed conflict between 
them in the same period.
331
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Realising the inherent destabilising effect of centrifugal forces in the sub-region, and the need 
for a collective mechanism for peace and stability in the sub-region, ECOWAS Member 
States adopted a Protocol Relating to Non-Aggression (PNA) in April 1978.
332
 The protocol 
sought to outlaw aggression by member states, and gave primacy to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes. The protocol did not establish any institutional apparatus to ensure that decisions 
of Member States were followed up with concrete action and therefore failed to prevent fears 
of instability within the region. 
 
To correct this defect, Member States adopted the Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on 
Defence (PMAD) in 1981.
333
 The PMAD committed Member States to a collective self 
defence treaty by accepting that armed threat or aggression against one constituted a threat or 
aggression against the entire community and resolved to give mutual aid and assistance.
334
 
The PMAD outlined conditions for intervention and assistance. Article 17 permitted 
Community action when there was a conflict between two Member States of the Community. 
The Community was also empowered to intervene when, as defined under Article 18, there 
was an internal conflict in Member State of the Community that was actively maintained and 
sustained from outside. Community forces were restricted to purely internal conflicts. 
 
 The NAP and PMAD proved to be insufficient legal frameworks to justify the intervention 
of ECOWAS in the violent internal conflicts that took place in the West African sub-region 
in the immediate post-Cold War era. The West African security landscape was severely 
rocked by violent internal conflicts in Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Guinea-Bissau, and Cote 
d’Ivoire. The unprecedented ECOWAS military interventions in two of these conflicts not 
only changed the mandate of ECOWAS as an organization, but also the normative and 
conceptual understanding of peace and security in international law. The implication of 
ECOWAS’s response to the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone raised two challenges to the 
organization’s legitimacy. First, some Member States argued that it exceeded ECOWAS’s 
mandate, and violated regional and global norms of non-intervention. These arguments were 
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predominantly based on whether the ECOWAS Ceasefire and Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
troop-contributing states violated the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference? 
Intrinsic in this argument is the question why an organization set up for economic integration 
become involved in political/security issues? In other words, did ECOWAS have the mandate 
or legitimacy for the regional policing role that it undertook?  
 
 
3.3.3 ECOWAS IN LIBERIA & SIERRA LEONE: LEGITIMATING INTERVENTION 
 
The Liberian conflict started in 1989 by the rebel group National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
(NPFL) and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started plans to take over the West 
African sub-region by toppling sitting regimes through armed rebellions. By May 1990, the 
Liberian crisis had degenerated into a killing spree.
335
 The Liberia Council of Churches, 
Muslim Leaders and other influential Liberians asked the United Nations and the United 
States to intervene, but nobody was willing to intervene.
336
 The Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) then referred to its non-interference clause in the internal affairs of Member 
States as reason for non-intervention.
337
 
 
It was due to the inaction of the international community that the 13
th
 session of the Authority 
of Heads of States and Government of ECOWAS convened in Banjul, The Gambia, in 1990 
proposed the setting up of the Community Standing Mediation Committee. The Mediation 
Committee consisting of seven ECOWAS Member States was charged with the mediatory 
role between all the factions.
338
 The Mediation Committee on 27 August 1990 established an 
ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia to halt the indiscriminate 
killing of innocent civilians and destruction of property. ECOMOG was also mandated to 
restore law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.   
All attempts by the Standing Committee to make the warring parties reach an agreement were 
futile and war continued unabated.
339
 By the end of August 1990, it became obvious that 
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more forceful involvement was needed to physically dislodge the warring factions. 
Accordingly, the Mediation Committee took the decision to dispatch ECOMOG to Liberia to 
enforce a ceasefire. 
 
Laudable as the intention of ECOMOG to intervene in the Liberian crisis seemed at the time, 
the intervention generated a reverberation of critical comments emanating from issues of 
legitimacy and legality. With regards to legality, the 1975 Treaty was devoid of any conflict-
related provisions. The NAP prohibits aggression among Member States but did not 
specifically mention peace-keeping nor provide for the right of unilateral intervention in 
Member States.
 340
  The PMAD recognizes any aggression against any a member state as 
aggression against the whole community. However, the protocol only provided for 
intervention in situations where internal armed conflict in a Member State was actively 
maintained and sustained from outside,
341
 an armed conflict between two or more member 
states,
342
 or an external armed threat or aggression.
343
 None of the provisions of the protocols 
governed internal conflicts emanating from within a Member State. This proved a legal 
hurdle for the ECOWAS Member States’ decision to intervene in subsequent internal conflict 
in Sierra Leone. 
 
ECOWAS Member States against the intervention, led by Cote D’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, 
pointed to the fact that military action took place without the authorization of the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is the exclusive body charged with the 
responsibility to maintain international peace and responsibility under the UN Charter.
344 
Both countries hotly contested the basis for the peace-keeping in Liberia for a couple reasons. 
Firstly, they argued that Security Council authorization was not sought under Article 53 of 
the UN Charter. Secondly, both Member States frowned on the operation because there was 
no collective decision by all Member States. Hence, their position was that the ECOWAS 
Summit was not competent to intervene in a Member State’s internal conflict. 345 
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ECOWAS’s invocation of humanitarianism was necessitated by the fact that the 
peacekeeping forces on ground in Liberia were frustrated by internal squabbles which played 
into the hands of the different warring factions, strengthening claims for further military 
action.
346
 Amidst the outcry and criticisms, ECOWAS mounted an international campaign, 
which had a receptive audience in the post-Cold War period, especially among some of its 
members. ECOWAS’s humanitarian argument was also aimed at connecting with civil 
society in the sub-region and other international actors such as the United Nations.
347
 This 
appeared a clever move at the time since it broadened ECOWAS’s constituency from its 
members to include civil society, a development that resonated with calls for a people-
oriented ECOWAS as advised by the CEP.
348
 The humanitarian argument strengthened 
ECOWAS’s position against those members that opposed the intervention and most 
importantly pressured the UNSC to retroactively authorize the intervention.
349
 
 
ECOWAS legitimized its actions by arguing that it was being ‘ones brother’s keeper, which 
was the perhaps the strongest position it had because international law clearly forbade 
unilateral humanitarian intervention outside the framework of the UN Charter.
350
 However, 
this argument was plausible because of the normative shift in the international political 
environment following the end of the Cold war. It became fashionable to talk of an emerging 
global community and humanitarian intervention. This kind of intervention did not respect 
established territorial borders or protocols, such as obtaining the permission of a host state 
before deployment, especially ‘when a state has virtually ceased to exist, [when] there is no 
effective civil authority, and when the subjects are in a quasi-nature’.351 
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In response to criticisms of ECOWAS’s deployment of ECOMOG and the violation of the 
non-interference clauses of the OAU and UN Charter, then OAU Secretary-General described 
the criticism as rhetorical, stating that: 
 
Before ECOWAS undertook its initiative many, including the African media were condemning the 
indifference demonstrated by Africa… (therefore) to argue that there is no legal basis is surprising. 
Should the countries in West Africa just leave Liberian to fight each other? Will that be more 
legitimate? Will that be more understandable?
352
 
 
The OAU, like ECOWAS, placed crucial emphasis on the humanitarian argument. The OAU 
Secretary-General argued that even if the intervention was construed as of questionable 
legality, it remained proper. The ECOWAS Chairman was even more categorical when he 
noted that: ‘the wanton killings going on in Liberia has made that country a slaughter-house 
and the situation could no longer be treated as an internal matter.’ 
 
From the outset the international community’s response, especially the UNSC’s, was one of 
guarded approval. It can be likened to the way it responded to Tanzania’s intervention in 
Uganda in 1979; it validated the result without formally validating the means.
353
 But in its 
strongest show of support of ECOMOG, a senior US administration officially observed that, 
 
In a country where anarchy reigned, ECOMOG provided order and a bastion of security in Monrovia 
and hundreds of thousands of Liberians flocked to the relative safety of the city… ECOMOG remains 
virtually the only force in Liberia unblemished by serious human rights abuses and is the only military 
force not motivated by personal aggrandizement.
354
 
 
The most important act of validation came from endorsement of the UNSC through 
Resolution 788. The UNSC in the resolution determined that the situation in Liberia 
constituted a threat to international peace and security. The body also recognized the need for 
increased humanitarian assistance in the circumstances and commended ECOWAS for its 
effort to restore peace, security and stability in the country.
355
 Perhaps the most convincing 
                                                          
352
 West Africa Magazine, August 1990, 1085. 
353
 Bah (2013), p.94. 
354
 See, ‘US Reaffirms Its Policy Toward Liberia’, Statement by Leonard H. Robinson, Jr., Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for African Affairs the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 19 
November 1992. Available at http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/1992/html/Dispatchv3no48.html 
(accessed 15 April 2014). 
355
 Resolution 788 supra. 
84 | P a g e  
 
indication of UNSC’s approval of ECOMOG was the request that all states respect the 
measures established by ECOWAS to bring a peaceful resolution to Liberia.
356
  This was 
significant at the time because the UNSC while playing a secondary role to a sub-regional 
organization, helped legitimize the intervention, albeit retroactively.  
 
Following the overthrow of the Tejan-Kabbah government in May 1997, the Nigerian-led 
ECOMOG force was authorized to restore the deposed civilian government. As in Liberia, 
the intervention attracted global criticism. As the UN pressed for sanctions to be 
implemented, ECOWAS led mediation for a peaceful settlement and the restoration of the 
ousted civilian government. The negotiations culminated in the Conakry Accord in which the 
military junta agreed to step down in April 1998.
357
 However, after the two weeks period 
given to junta to relinquish power to the government elapsed, ECOMOG went on the 
offensive in February 1998, ousting the military junta, cutting short the April deadline 
reached in Conakry.
358
 
 
Following the Nigerian-led intervention, The Economist commented: 
“Whatever happened to non-interference? Meddling in other countries’ affairs let alone invading them, 
used to be a taboo, even in the best of causes. But when the Nigerian troops moved against the junta 
officers in Sierra Leone who had over-thrown the elected government, their intervention was accepted 
by the world as if Sierra Leone were Nigerian territory and not an independent state nearly 900 miles 
away.” 359 
 
Despite such sentiments, then UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, appeared to give backing 
to the use of force when he told African leaders that ‘Democracy has been usurped. Let us do 
whatever is in our power to restore its owners, the people. Verbal condemnation… is not 
sufficient.’360 The US called on ‘those claiming power in Freetown to return power promptly 
to the country’s elected leadership and parliament.”361 
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The OAU was quick to condemn the coup d’etat and called for the restoration of democracy. 
On its part, the UNSC was quick to condemn the coup and passed a resolution
362
 requesting 
the military junta to ‘relinquish power’ and allow the restoration of the democratically elected 
government, it only did so five months after the coup. The UNSC went ahead to find that the 
situation was a threat to international peace and security in the region. However, it fell short 
of authorizing the use of force. It merely authorized ECOWAS to ensure the strict 
implementation of sanctions.
363
  
 
With the junta successfully ousted, the UNSC accepted ECOWAS’s actions, turning a blind 
eye to the legality of the intervention. The UNSC issued a statement commending ‘the 
important role’ that ECOWAS played in the peaceful resolution of the crises.364 The 
international applause showered on ECOWAS did little to dispel fears over the use of force 
between sovereign states. Fundamental questions continue to hang asked about unilateral 
intervention and the use of force on sovereign states. Retroactive approval by the UNSC adds 
further confusion to the debate as it appears that the UNSC may legitimize unilateral 
intervention where it recognizes that international peace and security is under threat in a 
State, but the UN charter forbids any of such actions carried out outside the supervision of the 
UNSC. This leaves states in volatile regions of the world such as West Africa, in a difficult 
situation. Do they protect individuals during conflicts? Do they wait for UNSC approval 
which has proven to be a time consuming in the past, at the irretrievable cost of millions of 
precious human lives and property? ECOWAS Member States’ reacted to the legal handicap 
of the interventions in the Liberia and Sierra Leonean conflicts by introducing a new legal 
regime for humanitarian intervention, which gives the community mechanism the right to 
intervene during conflicts. The next section examines the new ECOWAS security 
architecture and areas of normative incompatibility with the UN Charter. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
362
 Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October1997. 
363
 See, K. Nowrot & E. Schabacker, ‘Military Intervention in Sierra Leone’, 4 International Law Review (1998), 
p.328. 
364
 Ibid., p.338. 
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3.3.4 THE NEW ECOWAS SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
 
In the Preamble to the 1993 revised treaty, ECOWAS member states agreed that ‘… the 
integration of the Members into a viable regional community may demand the partial and 
gradual pooling of national sovereignties to the Community within the context of a collective 
political will…’365  This clause represented a departure from the non-interventionist stand of 
most African States under the OAU regime. This culture of non-intervention and respect for 
sovereignty was reflected in the 1975 treaty regime of ECOWAS. However, Africa’s 
experience as battle ground for proxy wars during the Cold War and the humanitarian 
catastrophes of the 1990s gave impetus to regional collective security mechanisms and a 
strong interventionist norm. 
 
The aftermath of the intervention of ECOMOG in Liberia and subsequent military missions 
that followed increased the salience of security and humanitarian activities in the sub-region. 
Thus, pursuant to Article 58 of the Revised Treaty,
366
 ECOWAS member states adopted the 
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peace-keeping and Security
367
 (MCPMRPS). 
 
The MCPMRPS attempts to place humanitarian intervention on a firmer legal footing and 
strengthen the new ECOWAS security architecture in all ramifications. In a break from 
previous arrangements, the ECOWAS Conflict Mechanism is not limited to inter-state 
conflicts; it has the mandate to intervene in internal conflicts that pose a threat to human 
rights and the general peace and security of the region. The MCPMRPS, amongst other 
things, aims to
368
: 
a) Prevent, manage and resolve internal and inter-State conflicts; 
b) Implement the relevant provisions of Article 58 of the Revised Treaty; 
c) Implement the relevant provisions of the Protocols on Non-Aggression, Mutual 
Assistance in Defence, Free Movement of persons, the Right of Residence and 
Establishment; 
                                                          
365
 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, adopted 24 July 1993. 
366
 Under Article 58 of the treaty, member states undertake to work to safeguard and consolidate relations 
conducive to the maintenance of peace, stability and security within the region. 
367
 Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace and Security, 
adopted 10 December 1999, available at http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=ap101299&lang=en 
(accessed 15 April 2014). 
368
 Article 3 of the MCPRMPS. 
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d) Strengthen cooperation in the areas of conflict prevention, early warning, peace-keeping 
operations, the control of cross-border crime, international terrorism and proliferation of 
small arms and anti-personnel mines; 
e) Maintain and consolidate peace, security and stability within the Community; 
f) Establish institutions and formulate policies that would allow for the organization and 
coordination of humanitarian relief missions; 
g) Promote close cooperation between Member States in the areas of preventive diplomacy 
and peace-keeping; 
h) Constitute and deploy a civilian and military force to maintain or restore peace within the 
sub-region, whenever the need arises. 
 
By regulating every aspect of peace and security in the community, the MCPMRPS is an 
attempt at a holistic approach to maintaining peace and security. Objectives of the 
MCPMRPS also include equitable management of natural resources shred by Member States 
which may cause inter-state conflicts, protection of the environment, safeguarding the 
cultural heritage of member states, and implementation of policies on anti-corruption, money-
laundering and illegal circulation of small arms.
369
 It is evident from the objectives of the 
MCPMRPS that Member States intended to create a mechanism with wide authority and the 
capacity to regulate any potential causes of conflict between Member States.  
 
 
To increase the legitimacy of its actions and bolster the emerging norms, ECOWAS Member 
States established new decision-making mechanisms. Member States realised that the 
absence of credible decision-making instruments and the resort to ad hoc mechanisms such as 
the Standing Mediation Council (SMC) established to deal with the conflict in Liberia 
undermined its initial peace-making efforts.
370
 Consequently, ECOWAS established several 
mechanisms as its standing decision-making organs. The key organs of the MCPMRPS are: 
  
 the Authority (or Summit) of Heads of State and Government;371 
 the Mediation and Security Council(MSC);372  
                                                          
369
 Ibid. 
370
 Bah (2013), p.101. 
371
 Article 5 of the MCPMRPS. 
372
 Article 8 of empowers the MSC to make important decisions relating to matters of peace and security and 
the deployment of peacekeeping troops. The MSC shall comprise of 9 Member States, 7 shall be selected by 
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 the Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN);373 
 the ECOWAS Standby Force;374  
 the Defence and Security Commission (DSC); 375 and  
 the Council of Elders.376    
 
The Authority is the supreme institution of the community with general direction and control 
of the community, while the MSC acts as the equivalent of the UNSC. The MSC is an 
innovative regional mechanism, but unlike the UNSC it has no permanent members.
377
 
Although Article 6(1) of the Mechanism designates the Authority as the highest decision 
making body, it is not so in reality. The Authority as the highest decision body has delegated 
all its powers to the MSC under Article 7. However, in practical terms, there appears to be 
little or no significant value in the delegation of power by the Authority to the MSC. The 
MSC, can on its own, initiate actions under the Mechanism without restraints.
378
  
 
The MSC is also responsible for deciding and implementing ‘all policies for conflict 
prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping and security’.379 These provisions 
show that the MSC, in fact, has greater powers than the Authority under the Mechanism. 
While these provisions point at supranationalism, there is a need to balance the powers 
accruable to the MSC. The relationship between the General Assembly and the UNSC under 
the UN Charter for example, clearly establishes the relationship between both bodied and 
makes a distinction between actions which each body may take.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Authority, and the other two shall be the current and immediate past chairman of the Authority. 
Membership of the MSC is on a rational basis and members are elected for a two- year period with no 
permanent seats. 
373
 Articles 23 and 24 outline the role and function of ECOWARN. The organ shall undertake risk mapping, 
observation and analysis of social, economic and political situations in the sub-region which have the potential 
of degenerating into conflict and present appropriate threat perception analysis. 
374
 Article 17 established the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). It was later transformed into a 
standby force in June 2004. The force is made up of 6500 highly trained soldiers to be drawn from national 
units. It includes a rapid reaction Task Force of 1500 troops which have the capability to be deployed within 14 
days, whilst the entire brigade could be deployed within 90 days. 
375
 Under Article 19, the DSC is responsible for the examination of all technical and administrative issue and 
also the assessment of all logistical requirements for peace-keeping operations. Chiefly amongst its 
responsibilities is the appointment of the Force Commander and determining the composition of Contingents 
of a peace keeping operation. 
376
 Article 20 outlines the mandate of the Council of Elders. The Council of Elders comprises of a list of eminent 
personalities who can use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and 
facilitators. The list is to be compiled annually by the President of the Commission. 
377
 Bah (2013), p.101. 
378
 Article 26(b)  of the Conflict Prevention Mechanism. 
379
Ibid., Article 10(b). 
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The MSC’s functions include the authorization of all forms of intervention and deciding 
particularly on the deployment of political and military solutions,
380
 approving all mandates 
and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving solution,
381
 reviewing the 
mandates and terms of reference periodically, on the basis of evolving situations,
382
 and also 
appointing the Special Representative of the executive Secretary and the Force 
Commander.
383
  In light of these provisions, and also current practice, it is unlikely that in a 
situation warranting the authorization of an action, the Authority will overrule the decision of 
the MSC.
384
 The delegation of the Authority’s power under Article 7 is effected ‘without 
prejudice to its wide-ranging powers under Article 9 of the Revised Treaty’. However, this 
proviso serves no purpose, because it fails to subject the delegated power to the controls of 
the Authority.  Although Article 9(4) of the revised treaty to which Article 7 refers, vests the 
Authority with supreme powers, this is subject to contrary provisions in the Treaty or other 
Protocols. The delegation of power by the Authority to the MSC is an open one, which would 
require effective constitutional mechanisms to subject it to scrutiny, without which it can be 
abused.  
 
 
3.3.5 HUMANITARIAN INTEREVENTION UNDER THE MCPMRPS: ASPECTS OF 
NORMATIVE INCOMPATIBILITY WITH THE UN CHARTER SYSTEM. 
 
To implement Article 58 of the Revised Treaty, Article 25 of MCPMRPS provides that the 
Protocol is to be invoked: 
(a) In cases of aggression or conflict in any Member State or threat thereof; 
(b) In case of conflict between two or several Member States; 
(c) In cases of internal conflict; 
(i) that threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster; or 
(ii) that poses a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region; 
(d) In event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law. 
(e) In the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of  a democratically elected 
government; 
                                                          
380
 Ibid., Article 10(c). 
381
 Article (10(d). 
382
 Article (10)(e). 
383
 Article 10(f) . 
384
 See Articles 11-14. 
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(f) Any other situation as may be decided by the Mediation and Security Council. 
 
By the same token, Article 10 vests the MSC with the powers to: 
(a) Decide on all matters relating to peace and security; (b) decide and implement on all 
policies for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peace-keeping and 
security; (c) authorise all forms of intervention and decide particularly on the 
deployment of political and military missions; (d) approve mandates and terms of 
reference for such missions; (e) review the mandates and terms of reference 
periodically, on the basis of evolving situations.
385
 
 
It is noteworthy that the sub-regional mechanisms like ECOWAS are considered ‘part of the 
overall security architecture of the [African] Union, which has the primary responsibility for 
promoting peace, security and stability in Africa’.386 The relationship between sub-regional 
groups like ECOWAS and the African Union underlined in the AUPSC Protocol reflect a 
new collective security arrangement under the AU regime which is tightly knit and cohesive 
at all levels. This represents a change from the OAU regime where conflicts that had long 
term effects on African states could not be contained because there were no concerted plan of 
action by African States at all levels.
387
 
 
In the same breath as the ECOWAS MCPMRPS, in its right of intervention, Article 4 of the 
AU Constitutive Act provides that: 
The Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: 
(h) The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and 
crimes against humanity; 
(j) The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore 
peace and security. 
 
                                                          
385
 See Article 10 of the MCPMRPS Protocol, Ibid. 
386
 See the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union 
signed on July 2002 at Durban South Africa, and came into force on 26 December 2003, Article 4(k) 
(hereinafter the ‘AUPSC Protocol’). 
387
 The Liberian civil war demonstrated this problem. The OAU often held a different position from ECOWAS 
Member States. This was worsened by the lack of a legal framework for humanitarian intervention at the time. 
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Similarly, the Protocol of the AUPSC provides that in discharging its duties, the AUPSC 
shall inter alia be guided by ‘the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant 
to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, 
genocide and crimes against humanity in accordance with Article 4(h) of the Constitutive 
Act’.388 
 
These provisions have serious implications for the UN charter system and state practice in 
international law. During the drafting of the Charter, the question of primacy of the UN over 
regional organizations and the UN was hotly debated.  While some states favoured the 
principle of universalism represented by the UN, others like the Latin American states, 
preferred regionalism.
389
 The provisions in chapter VIII of the UN Charter reflects the 
compromises by the groups that anchored the relationship between the UN and regional 
organizations like ECOWAS on the principle of subsidiarity, but left some issues 
unresolved.
390
 Enforcement action by regional organization not in collective self-defence 
must be authorised by the UNSC, and any provision in regional agreement that permits the 
organization to take enforcement action against a Member State without UNSC authorisation 
is inconsistent with Article 53 of the Charter. It has therefore been argued that unilateral 
humanitarian intervention enshrined in MCPMRPS and the AUPSC is incompatible with the 
UN Charter and thus invalid.  
 
The first area of normative incompatibility with the UN Charter is the right of the unilateral 
use of force. Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits the use of force in inter-state relations. 
It is widely accepted by international law scholarship that this provision constitutes a jus 
cogens under international law from which no derogation is permitted.
391
 Article 25 of the 
MCPMRPS providing for the right of the ECOWAS to use force within Member States on 
grounds not provided for in the UN Charter apparently violate Article 2(4) of the UN Charter 
                                                          
388
 Article 4(j) of the AUPSC. 
389
 See, S.N MacFarlane and T.G Weiss, ‘The United Nations, Regional Organisations and Human Security: 
Building Theory in Central America’, 15(2) Third Word Quarterly (1994), p.280. 
390
 See, M.Pugh, ‘The World Order Politics of Regionalization’, in M. Pugh and W.P.S Sidhu (eds), The United 
Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond, (Boulder Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2003), p. 35.  See 
Articles 52 and 53 of the UN Charter. 
391
 This also applies to the principle of non-interference in matters especially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of a state contained in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. See, N. Ronzitti, Rescuing Nationals Abroad through 
Military Coercion and Intervention on Grounds of Humanity, (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985), p.87. 
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on the unilateral use of force.
392
 Such forcible actions, whenever they are authorized by 
regional arrangements without the authorizations of the Council, are often regarded as 
unilateral.
393
  
 
Furthermore, these provisions have codified new grounds for exceptions to the rule on the use 
of force besides those of self-defence and chapter VII enforcement actions under the UN 
Charter and pose a ‘fundamental challenge’ to the UN system as they seek to supervene upon 
the provisions in Article 2(4) and chapter VII of the UN Charter.
394
  These grounds under the 
AU act are war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, with reference to the proposed 
amendment of the AU Act, includes a threat to legitimate order.
395
   Under the MCPMRPS 
these ground include internal conflict threatening humanitarian disasters or sub-regional 
peace and security, massive violation of human rights and overthrow or attempted overthrow 
of democratically elected governments. Article 25 also includes an omnibus clause which is 
undefined by the protocol. It is expected that the scope is determined trough pragmatism and 
the practice of ECOWAS Member States.
396
 
 
Expectedly, it is argued, continuously, that a regional organisation would be violating 
international law if it uses force against any state without UNSC authorisation except in 
collective self-defence.
397
 The same rule  also applies where a treaty gives a regional 
organisation a “right” of unilateral intervention in a state without requiring the 
‘contemporaneous consent’ of the target state and such treaty is void for violating Articles 
2(4) and 103. The codification of the right of humanitarian intervention by ECOWAS and the 
                                                          
392
 Article 4(h) of the AU Act and Article 4(j) of the AUPSC Protocol. Although Article 4(f) of the AU Acts 
prohibits the use of force by Member States against one another, this does not apply to the AU itself. 
393
 N, Kirsch, ‘Unilateral Enforcement of the Collective Will: Kosovo, Iraq, and the Security Council, 3 Max 
Planck Yearbook of United National Law (1999), p.59. 
394
 J. Allain, ‘The True Challenge to the United Nations System of the Use of Force: The Failures of Kosovo and 
the Iraq and the Emergence of the African Union’, Max Planck United Nations Yearbook (2004), p.238. 
395
 Protocol on the Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union adopted by the 2
nd
 Ordinary 
Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique on 11 July 2003, amending Article 4(h) of the 
AU Act. See also, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The ‘Ezulwini 
Consensus’. Executive Council 7
th
 Extraordinary Session, 7-8 March 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Ext/EX. CL/2 
(VII), available at http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/AU_Ezulwini%20Consensus.pdf (accessed 15 
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execution to the prohibition of the use of force while maintaining the position of Article 4(h) authorising 
intervention in grave circumstances. 
396
 J. Iyi, ‘The AU/ECOWAS Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention Legal Regimes and the UN Charter’, 21 African 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (2013), p.497. 
397
 D.E. Acevedo, ‘Collective Self-defense and the Use of Regional or Sub-regional Authority as Justification for 
the Use of force’, 78 American Society of International Law Proceedings, (1984), p.73. 
93 | P a g e  
 
AU introduces a new dimension to the debate of the use of force because it seeks to protect 
individuals from atrocities of a grave kind which are usually the result of conflicts. 
Irrespective of the purpose of the use of force, even to halt mass atrocities in the territory of a 
state by a third state or a group of states, some international law scholars still insist on the 
permanency of the UN charter. 
398
  
 
However, an opposing argument which seeks to justify the normative evolution of a right of 
regional bodies to intervene in Member States has emanated. It proceeds on the basis that  
given the changes that have taken place since the end of the Cold War, the efficacy of the UN  
Charter in particular and international law in general can only be achieved  if they are 
‘interpreted and applied in a manner commensurate with the requirements of an evolving 
international community’.399  It is argued that the trends in the development of international 
law norms in relation to the international protection of human rights, including the evolution 
of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm,
400
 support the view that the use of force by 
external actors to prevent or halt massive human rights violations does not fall under Article 
2(4).
401
 Perhaps, the drafters of the UN Charter could not have anticipated the degeneration of 
global security in the aftermath of the cold war, which was in itself devastating to humanity. 
The much more realistic option would be that the principle of non-use of force should be 
                                                          
398 In this regard, Heidelberg adds that: 
“If the members of a regional arrangement… agree that in a case of internal disturbances or other events 
within one of the States concerned, the other States can intervene with military forces without the consent of 
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doubtful and must, in principle be denied. Here, the territorial integrity of all States and the prohibition of the 
use of force is at stake. An agreement permitting forceful intervention would hardly be compatible with the 
Charter and would fall under Article 103”. See, R.B Heidelberg, ‘Article 103’, in B. Simma (ed.), The Charter of 
the United Nations: A Commentary, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 121-122. 
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 Acevedo (1984), p.70. 
400
 R2P is an emerging norm in international law which focuses on the responsibility of states to protect the 
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Deng, ‘Frontiers of sovereignty’, 8 Leiden Journal of International Law (1995), 249;  J. Sarkin, ‘The Role of the 
United Nations, the African Union and Africa’s Sub-Regional Organizations in Dealing with Africa’s Human 
Rights Problems: Connecting Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect’, 53 Journal of 
African Law (2009), 1; International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to 
Protect: Research, Bibliography and Background (International Research Council, (2001); G. Evanns, The 
Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 
2008). 
401
 Iyi (2013), p.499. See also, F.R Teson, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality, 2
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 edn, 
Transnational (1007), p.150; F.K Abiew, The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian 
Intervention, ( The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999), p.43; W.M Reisman, ‘Criteria for Lawful Use of 
Force in International Law’, 10 Yale Journal of International Law (1984-5), p.281. 
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juxtaposed with the community needs for collective intervention deployed in defence of 
human rights to halt mass atrocities
402
. 
 
The second aspect of normative incompatibility between the ECOWAS security regime and 
the UN Charter system rests on the primacy of the UNSC as the watchdog of international 
peace and security. Article 10(a) of the MCPMRPS which gives authoritative agency to the 
MSC, and Article 16(1) of the AUPSC which vests sole authority to the AU clearly clash 
with Article 24(1) of the UN Charter which confers the primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and security on the UNSC. It is not clear which of these 
organizations have the primary responsibility of maintaining peace and security in Africa in 
the case of AU and West Africa in the case of ECOWAS.  
 
In effect, the MCPMRPS and the AUPSC protocols seek to dislodge the UNSC as the 
authoritative agency having primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security 
in Africa.
403
 The AU on its part recognizes its status as a chapter VIII regional organization 
under the UN Charter in relation to the maintenance of peace and security.
404
 But that is 
where the conformity with the Charter stops. Article 17(1) of the AUPSC Protocol recognises 
the primary responsibility of the UNSC in the maintenance of peace and security but at the 
same time, Article 16(1) allocates exactly the same role to the AUPSC. The AU has alluded 
to the primacy of the UN in maintenance of international peace and security, but reserves the 
right of unilateral action in Africa which only ‘reverts to the UN where necessary’.405 
 
 
The ECOWAS MSCPRMS is mute on this matter. The Protocol is not so candid about its 
relationship with the UN in this respect, so reaching a conclusion in this regard might be 
fatal. However, by virtue of the powers vested on the MSC in Article 10, to perform the role 
reserved for the UNSC under the Charter, it is plausible that the MCPMRPS has the same 
effect as the continental framework. As earlier demonstrated in this study, ECOWAS had 
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403
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launched humanitarian interventions without the backing of any legal instrument in its peace 
and security or human rights corpus, necessitating the adoption of a robust, tightly-knitted 
security framework. It is understandable if ECOWAS and the AU insist on a right to 
intervention in African States without UNSC authorisation. 
 
Commenting on the inconsistency of the MCPMRPS with UN obligations, Professor 
Margaret Vogt then of the UN Secretariat, who worked on the protocol as a resource person 
observed that the Mechanism ‘failed to recognize or adhere to the underlying principles of 
Article 53 of the Charter on enforcement action’.406 In response, the former Director of Legal 
Affairs of ECOWAS, Mr. Roger Laloupo, remarked that: 
 
The meeting (of experts) considered these observations made by the Prof. (Mrs.) Vogt wand was of the 
view that whilst the subregion appreciates the importance of its obligation under the United Nations 
Charter, its recent experience has shown that the cost of waiting for the United Nations authorisation 
could be very high in terms of life and resources.
407
 
 
Waiting for UN authorization for intervention has in the past proven costly in conflicts in 
Africa. The Rwandan genocide often springs to mind as evidence that regional security 
mechanisms suited to the African continent is a necessity. The AU Act and AUPSC Protocol 
both reveal the determination of African states to take control of the use of force and 
humanitarian intervention in Africa, and not let history repeat itself. Numerous criticisms 
which the legal inconsistencies of both frameworks have attracted are justified in scholarly 
terms. But to dismiss the practical salience of these provisions ignores the circumstances and 
context in which they were adopted. As one scholar aptly explains ‘it is the peripheral role of 
Africa in the international system and the reluctance to commit troops and resources to Africa 
that is leading African leaders down the path or unilateral action, without concern for 
international endorsement’.408 
 
Explaining the thinking of the leadership of African states in this regard, former president 
Thabo Mbeki of South Africa explains: 
 
                                                          
406
 Meeting of Expert on the Draft Protocol Relating to the Mechanism on Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security 17-19 November 1999, Lome Togo cited in Abass (2000), p.212. 
407
 Ibid. 
408
 Iyi (2013), p.511. 
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“Our view has been that it’s critically important that the African continent [deals] with these conflict 
situations on the continent… we have not asked anybody outside of the African continent to deploy 
troops to Darfur. It’s an African responsibility, and we can do it.”409 
 
What is deductible from this view is that the aim of regional organizations in Africa is to 
retain the right to unilateral intervention in Africa.  It appears that the agencies are prepared 
to obtain UNSC authorisation for the use of force where possible, but in the event of practical 
impossibility, be able to act without it.
410
 It must be emphasized that although the vesting of 
authority to intervene in the UNSC has created problems in the past, that is not sufficient 
justification for the ECOWAS/AU right of intervention without UNSC approval or to suggest 
that such authorisation could be obtained after the fact.
411
 The UN Charter is silent on 
whether authorisation should be prior or post. It has been argued that to circumvent UNSC 
delays and politics of veto, ex post facto ratification by the UNSC can legalize regional 
humanitarian intervention.
412
 This view legitimizes ECOWAS’s intervention in Liberia and 
Sierra Leone. 
 
Abass has argued that an unilateral humanitarian intervention under the ECOWAS/AU 
frameworks such as that of ECOWAS does not lack the ‘collective character’ of the 
international community represented by Security Council or General Assembly as enshrined 
in the UN Charter, just because it does not enjoy the support of Security Council ab initio. To 
clarify the conceptual issue of UN approval, he submits that a ‘distinction needs to be made 
between an action embarked upon by a collection of states, after the  UNSC has determined 
under Article 39 of the UN Charter without being able to proceed further, and one taken 
without such determination’.413 In all, he advises that the expected impact of the ECOWAS 
Mechanism on the UN collective security system should be measured by the parameters of its 
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compliance, or lack of it, with the suggested conditions and not particularly by the 
inconsistency of some of its provisions with the UN Charter.
414
 
 
However normatively illegitimate the ECOWAS and AU mechanisms might appear under 
international law, its importance to maintaining human security in a continually volatile 
continent is clear for even the worst sceptic to see. Questions over the encroachment on 
sovereignty of African states do not detract from the ‘fact that as legal instruments, they are 
bold, forward looking and ground-breaking’.415 Globally, there has been a movement towards 
regional security arrangements, with regional organisations expected to play a more active 
role in the maintenance of peace and security within their regions.
416
 Hammerstad examines 
the effect of this global shift towards regional security in Africa arguing that RECs in Africa 
are increasingly willing to replace “hard sovereignty” in terms of which interference in other 
Member States’ affairs is expressly forbidden, with regimes that allow for foreign 
intervention under defined circumstances.
417
 Going by Hammerstad’s position, it appears that 
States are increasingly concerned about security risks generated by their neighbours arising 
from poor governance which inevitably leads to cross-border instability reflecting a dilution 
in the collective security approach under the UN Charter. 
 
The unilateral intervention provisions contained in the ECOWAS framework apparently 
amount to an attempt to modernise the provisions of chapter VIII, in light of the past failings 
of the UN system, particularly in Africa. Drawing up a framework for unilateral humanitarian 
intervention which is normatively specific in the current state of global security is nothing 
short of wishing for a pie in the sky. Expectations of a framework that balances the politics of 
the UNSC while ensuring timely intervention in the numerous hotspots of conflicts in the 
world are unrealistic. The resources of the UN are particularly stretched at this point in 
history due to the fragile state of global financial climate, and the volatility of global security. 
Stronger regional security mechanisms ought to be supported as they can play a decisive role 
in their various regions. Strict normativity and codification is a far stretch at this point in 
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time. Normative ambiguity in unilateral humanitarian intervention, on the other hand, is the 
practical reality and still ‘presents an array of advantages for all the main actors involved.’418 
 
 
3.4 DEMOCRACY AND GOOD GOVERNANCE 
 
The African continent began to experience some key ‘constitutional moments’419 at the 
beginning of the 1990s. One of the most significant cases of this constitutional revival 
occurred in the small West African country of Benin. In February 1990 protracted strikes and 
popular protests forced Mathieu Kѐrѐkou, the long-serving dictator of Benin, to convene a 
national conference. The conference,420  broadly representative, albeit extra-parliamentary, 
consisting of influential political, civic, and occupational groups and elites declared itself 
sovereign and proceeded to enact far-reaching changes to the country’s constitutional order.421 
The conference stripped Kѐrѐkou of all executive power, abolished the one-party system, 
installed an interim prime minister and legislature, and authorized the drafting of a new 
constitution that won popular approval as the basis for a democratic reconstitution of civil 
authority. 
 
Kwesi Prempeh describes the impact of this constitutional moment on the African continent 
and contrasts it with the past: 
 
“In the years since Benin’s precedent-setting transition, the unique mode of which quickly spawned 
imitators across francophone Africa, regime change and constitutional reform have been forced upon 
reluctant but beleaguered autocrats across east, west, central, and southern Africa. Single-party 
parliaments, military juntas, and presidents-for-life no longer dominate the political map of the 
continent, as they did at the end of the 1980s. By 1999, most African states permitted multiparty 
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competition for legislative and presidential offices. The number of multiparty elections held in Africa 
in the last decade of the twentieth century alone was twice as many as in the entire three decades up to 
1990.”422 
 
While these constitutional changes were taking place, some West African states were still 
faced with the challenges of unconstitutional changes in governments and military 
dictatorships. In Liberia and Sierra Leone for example, the eruption of decade-long civil wars 
saw numerous coups and counter-coups. ECOMOG sent troops into Liberia to assist the 
Interim Government of National Unity in 1990 and into Sierra-Leone in 1998 to assist the 
government of President Tejan Kabba which had been deposed in a coup. The controversies 
that trailed the legitimacy of both interventions accelerated the need for a supranational legal 
framework that guaranteed democratic constitutionalism as a regional norm.  
 
The MCPMRPS put ECOWAS and its military arm (ECOMOG) on a permanent footing but 
fell short of preventing conflicts that emanate from undemocratic changes in government. In 
an attempt to deter and prevent military coups and unconstitutional changes in government 
ECOWAS adopted the Democracy and Good Governance Protocol (Protocol on Democracy) 
in 2001.
423
 Some of the key constitutional convergence principles shared by Member States 
under the protocol include: 
 
a) Separation of powers; 
b) Accession to power through free, fair and transparent elections;  
c) Zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means; 
d) Popular participation in decision-making, strict adherence to democratic principles and 
decentralisation of power at levels of governance; 
e) No serving member of the armed forces may seek to run for elective political 
g) The rights set out in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights shall be 
guaranteed in each Member State.
424
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It is noteworthy that this normative shift in constitutionalism has also been manifested at the 
AU level. Article 30 of the Constitutive Act of the AU declares that “governments which 
shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the 
activities of the Union.”425 Equally important, in this regard is the AU Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance in Africa (ACDEG)
426
 which consolidated the principles 
enunciated in the Declarations and Decision adopted by the OAU on the same subject. 
Articles 23 to 26 of the ACDEG contain the AU definition of ‘unconstitutional governments’ 
and the sanction regime to deal with any such situation.
427
 
 
 
3.4.1 KEY FEATURES OF THE PROTOCOL ON DEMOCRACY AND GOOD 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Bearing in mind that ECOWAS Member States have been incompetent in conducting free 
and fair elections in the past, the Protocol on Democracy introduced new guidelines to ensure 
successful elections. Article 1(b) of the Protocol on Democracy requires that ‘every accession 
to power… be made through free, fair and transparent elections’. The modification of a 
country’s electoral law in the six months prior to an election is prohibited and elections have 
to be held within constitutionally mandated time periods.
428
 The independence of election-
monitoring bodies is required as is the maintenance of electoral registers allowing people to 
vote equally, irrespective of race or gender.
429
 These provisions of the Protocol are 
unambiguously worded and failure to adhere to these requirements would attract the coercive 
measures such as the imposition of sanctions from ECOWAS.
430
 
 
The drafters of the Protocol on Democracy clearly aimed to check various tactics that have 
been devised by African leaders in the past to hold on to power. This is reflected in the 
specificity of the provisions of the Protocol on elections. The Protocol also mandates 
ECOWAS election monitoring missions and mutual cooperation and support in elections. In 
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Enforcement mechanisms of the Protocol allow for exclusion of Member States from 
meetings, the non-recognition of governments in community of fora and sanctions. 
 
The ‘constitutional convergence’ principles of the protocol are strongly worded, concise and 
unambiguous. This indicates that Member States agreed in the drafting process that domestic 
law should aim towards harmonisation on matters of succession.
431
 In this regard, the 
Protocol clearly states that there shall be ‘zero tolerance for power obtained or maintained by 
unconstitutional means’.432 The prohibitory nature of the protocol makes it difficult for any 
recalcitrant state to legally circumnavigate the provisions of the protocol. Even if it could be 
argued that the protocol is ‘soft law’, its combined reading with the AU law on 
unconstitutional changes of government  reveals  that Member States of both organizations 
intended to be bound by these instruments.
433
 These provisions conceptually legitimates 
ECOWAS’s actions when applying the protocol’s coercive measures as Member States are 
not only in violation of community law,  pre-requisite of ECOWAS membership, but are also 
failing to adhere to their own domestic law.
434
 
 
 
3.4.2 POTENTIAL LEGAL EFFECT OF THE PROTOCOL FOR DEMOCRACY. 
 
One of the most debated aspects of the law of succession is the legitimacy of a government 
that assumes power through unconstitutional means. Under constitutional law, judges have 
the responsibility to rule on the status of decrees issued by a ‘coup government’. They are 
often asked to consider the increasingly political question of the legitimacy of the 
government in question and the coup that brought it to power.
435
 The Kelsenian theory of 
revolutionary law which is often deployed in legal argument in this regard, posits that after a 
revolution the extant legal order is completely reorganized.
436
 Kelsenian principles have been 
applied by the Supreme Court in Nigeria to hold that a coup dispenses with the whole ore-
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existing legal order.
437
 On the contrary, the Supreme Court in Ghana, previously rejected 
Kelsenian arguments, and referred to it as ‘fictitious’.438 
 
The legal status of the Protocol on Democracy in ECOWAS Member States creates a system 
where the Kelsenian position of the sort described above is not sustainable. The Protocol is of 
equal legal effect as the ECOWAS treaty to which Member States are bound and successive 
governments must be bound by.
439
 Although the treaty is yet to assume direct effect in 
Member States, Member States are required to interpret domestic law in line with the 
Treaty.
440
 As the protocol binds Member States into only recognizing democratic succession 
as legal, a coup government cannot be recognized as legal by a domestic court due to the 
nature of its succession. At the very least the protocol is subject to a degree of entrenchment, 
making it difficult to set aside a ‘pre-coup’ constitution.441  This leaves the judiciary 
susceptible to personal attack, interference from the executive or to their power being 
undermined by military government following an unfavourable decision, as has been the case 
in the past.
442
 
 
Since ECOWAS is an intergovernmental organization, bilateral recognition is technically 
affected by the existence of a protocol that binds Member States. Consequently, only the 
collective political action agreement by Member States can give effect to economic sanctions 
or military action. Regional precedents have shown that states involved in such collective 
action may, in the absence of a legal provision, alter their bilateral relations with the erring 
state. Collective action is, however, determined by political mechanisms and there are no 
provisions in the protocol to ensure that Member States consider such actions. For example, 
Senegal disagreed with the AU over its position during the 2008 coup in Mauritania and 
flayed the AU decision on suspension.
443
 There is no punitive measures in the protocol on 
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dealing with a state that ‘breaks ranks’ or that continues to bilaterally cooperate with a 
recalcitrant Member State, contrary to community sanctions.
444
 
 
The protocol by setting up a standard for legitimacy also provides clarification in cases of 
contested multilateral legitimacy, where two governments both maintain that they are the true 
government of the sovereign territory.
445
 This had previously arisen when members of the 
OAU opposed the recognition of the new government of Ghana who had come to power via a 
coup.
446
 The legal test that emerged to solve such disputes used to be one of empirical control 
of the territory, rather than legitimacy of succession. The test of empirical control remained 
the norm when determining representational questions until the early 1990s and prior to then 
the legitimacy of succession was rarely considered in multilateral fora.
447
 
 
 
3.4.3 SHORTCOMINGS OF THE PROTOCOL ON DEMOCRACY 
 
The constitutional convergence principles enshrined under the protocol are commendable, but 
the protocol is incomplete in certain aspects. The later part of the protocol focuses on issues 
such as poverty reduction and the promotion of social dialogue as well as good governance 
and democracy. These issues do not fall within the rubric of ‘constitutional convergence’ and 
are formulated in a non-mandatory, aspirational manner. Even some areas relating to 
democracy and the conduct of elections are imprecisely formulated. For example, Article 1(k) 
of the Protocol simply states that ‘the freedom of the press shall be guaranteed’ but this is far 
from an actionable or a measurable provision, making it difficult for the protocol’s coercive 
sanctions to be applied for a breach of these obligations.
448
 
 
Another shortcoming of the protocol is the possibility of misinterpreting some of its 
provisions on elections. This aberration occurred in the 2010 Ivory Coast crisis. When Article 
7 and 9 are read conjunctively, a losing candidate that disputes an election result should abide 
by ‘guidelines…stipulated by law’.449 Under the Ivory Coast constitution, the Constitutional 
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Council is the body tasked with arbitrating election disputes, and in December 2010 it 
declared President Laurent Gbagbo as the legal winner of the presidential election. Gbagbo 
applied to the Council through appeal after the UN-backed Independent Electoral 
Commission (IEC) had previously ruled that Alassane Ouattara was the legitimate winner of 
the election. It was, however, widely suspected that Gbagbo influenced the Constitutional 
Council. Yet the Council’s decision remained lawful as the constitution provides that the 
Council is the final source of authority on election disputes. Because there is no mechanism 
in the protocol to appeal a decision on election disputes to ECOWAS, or which permits 
investigations into corruption in domestic institutions, Gbagbo technically complied with the 
protocol by honouring the Constitutional Council’s decision. 
 
The ambiguity on the issue of mechanisms for solving election disputes allowed Gbagbo to 
legitimise his actions during the Ivory Coast electoral crisis of 2010. In order to avert a 
similar scenario from occurring in another Member State, two solutions have been 
recommended. First, the protocol could be amended to clarify the status of monitoring 
mechanisms they set up. Second, the protocol could set up a division in the ECOWAS 
Community Court of Justice (ECCJ) to entertain appeals to clarify ambiguities or hard cases 
under the protocol.
450
 This would help further entrench democratic values in Member States 
and develop the visibility of the Court.
451
 
  
As earlier indicated, the protocol is also imprecise with regards to implementation of 
sanctions. Under Article 45 the only sanctions ECOWAS can directly impose are limited 
political sanctions relating to individual states’ membership of ECOWAS, such as suspension 
from ECOWAS meetings. Other wider economic sanctions depend on an agreement by 
Member States at the Heads of government level and on the actions of other multilateral 
organizations that Member States belong to. The AU has shown in the past that sanctions are 
not just a procedural issue and that they are vital for the promotion of the democratic norms. 
The AU wasted little time in publically condemning the political events that occurred in 
Mauritania in 2008. Following the August 6th coup in Mauritania, the AU made it clear that 
it would suspend Mauritania’s membership in the organisation until constitutional order had 
been restored. The Peace and Security Council of the AU imposed a travel ban on civilians 
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and soldiers in the military government as well as froze off their assets.
452
 Continuous 
pressure led to the formation of a transitional government, divided between civilian 
politicians and soldiers that was established to take hold of government until elections could 
be held in July 2009.
453
 
 
The constitutional convergence provisions of the protocol reflect current legal thinking at the 
AU level that coups are unlawful. The African Commission has held that coups violate 
people’s rights to free expression, assembly and participation in their government as 
enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.454 However, the Protocol’s 
practical application has focused almost exclusively on the threat of unconstitutional changes 
of government and not on enforcing norms and promoting good governance.
455
 Despite these 
gaps, the protocol adopts a holistic approach to democracy by covering a broad spectrum of 
issues pertaining to the maintenance and furthering of democratic ideals. Therefore, the 
protocol is an important addition to the ECOWAS human rights framework. 
 
 
3.5 HUMAN RIGHTS & FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ECOWAS LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK. 
 
The traditional philosophy of human rights as rights that accrue to human beings on the basis 
of a collective humanity is the first possible understanding of human rights within ECOWAS 
legal framework. The Czech-French Jurist and first Secretary of the International Institute of 
human rights Karel Vasak classified human rights into three generations.
456
 The first 
generation refers to civil and political rights prominent in Western liberal democracies; the 
second generation or group rights refer to economic, social and cultural rights. These rights 
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are rights which require affirmative government action for their realisation. They are often 
styled as group rights or collective rights in that they pertain to the well-being of whole 
societies. Third generation rights or solidarity rights are the most recently recognized rights 
and is the less official of all three rights. This grouping of rights is predicated not only upon 
both affirmative and negative duties of the state, but also upon the behaviour of each 
individual.
457
 These include the right to development (RTD), the right to peace, the right to a 
healthy environment and the right to intergenerational equity. Despite this generally accepted 
classification, there exists some dichotomy in the recognition of rights in different regional 
human rights systems.
458
  
 
A ‘fourth generation’ of rights have recently been suggested by GAL proponents. This 
generation of rights are drawn from administrative justice and is said to have originated from 
Europe in the 1990s.
459
 These rights, which take the shape of ‘principles of good 
administration’, cover the central ground of modern administrative law. An excerpt of this 
category can be found in Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights
460
 
(ECHR) which provides for ‘a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an 
independent and impartial tribunal’ in any case involving a determination of a person’s civil 
rights and obligations’. This clause has so far, proven to be influential in the field of GAL. 
These due process rights have gained increased popularity since the discipline of GAL 
surfaced in international law. However, due process rights have since been accepted by 
common law systems and received recognition in other systems.
461
 These rights are yet to 
gain universal recognition and have remained the preoccupation of European and American 
administrative scholarship. 
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ECOWAS as a sub-regional organization does not possess its own catalogue of human rights. 
The expectation is that human rights should not be defined differently from the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights462 (African Charter) which serves as the continental 
rule book on human rights. From a practical perspective, the understanding of human rights 
under the ECOWAS legal framework is derived from human rights instruments adopted by 
reference in the revised treaty and other community instruments, and this may entail a variety 
of sources. The Preamble of the Revised Treaty explicitly mentions the African Charter and 
the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS as documents that guide the 
community.
463
 This suggests that the Declaration of Political Principles and the African 
Charter are fundamental in the ECOWAS definition of rights and are significant in their 
guarantee of human rights.
464
 Consequently, human rights within the rubric of ECOWAS 
may be understood as consisting of all generation of rights provided in instruments referred to 
by Community instruments and legislations. 
 
Having ascertained the components of the ECOWAS human rights framework, it is important 
to consider the substantive provisions of law upon which the community protects and 
enforces human rights. From a constitutionalist perspective four elements make up the legal 
order of an international institution.
465
 First, rules for conduct must be present. Secondly, 
there must be entities to which the rules apply or relate. These are the subjects of the legal 
system. The legal system confers benefits and imposes burdens on the subjects. Third, there 
must be authority to identify the rules that form part of the legal system.
466
 The final element 
is an obligation to obey the norms of the legal system. This obligation is enforceable through 
both public and private means.
467
 Hence, it is within the provisions of the constitutive treaty 
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and other acts of the community that these rules of conduct (substantive values) can be 
traced.   
 
Ajulo classifies sources of ECOWAS law into two broad categories of primary and secondary 
sources. He identifies ECOWAS Treaties (1975 and Revised Treaty), the protocols and 
conventions, treaties with third countries, legislations of the ECOWAS parliament, and other 
sources referred to in the treaty, as primary sources of ECOWAS law. He further classified 
subordinate legislation of other community organs, customary international law, general 
principles of law, judicial decisions, teachings of highly qualified publicists and ECOWAS 
‘internal law’ as secondary sources of law.468  These legal instruments form the sources of 
community law and within its texts the provisions on human rights protection and 
enforcement can be found. 
 
 
3.5.1 PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED TREATY 
 
One of the features of the 1975 Treaty regime was its incomplete legal framework. Therefore, 
there was no mention of human rights anywhere in the treaty and no provision of the treaty 
could lead to a deduction of an intention to protect human rights. Conversely, in the preamble 
to the 1993 Revised Treaty, Member States alluded to the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights and the Declaration of Political Principles of ECOWAS as some of the 
background materials considered in drafting the Revised Treaty. The reference of the 
preamble to the Revised Treaty to the African charter arguably signalled the intent of member 
states to uphold human rights as one of the principal values of the community. However, the 
mere mention of these human rights instruments in the preamble does not make the rights 
contained therein automatically enforceable by community citizens. 
 
The Revised Treaty sets out four fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the community. These 
are the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. The treaty also establishes the 
right to residence and establishment.
469
 The treaty also does not couch these four freedoms in 
clear rights language but only guarantees these freedoms as steps towards establishment of a 
common market. The indispensability of these four freedoms to economic integration was 
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further strengthened by Article 59 which enjoins Member States to guarantee the ‘right of 
entry, residence and establishment’ of citizens of the Community’, and an undertaking by 
ECOWAS member states to recognize ‘ these rights of Community citizens’. Thus, it can be 
advanced from these provisions that Member States intended to provide and protect rights, 
under the guise of economic freedoms. 
 
Article 4 of the Revised Treaty also contains significant human rights provisions as 
fundamental principles of ECOWAS. In Article 4, member states, in pursuit of community 
objectives, solemnly affirmed and declared their adherence to principles such as the 
maintenance of regional peace, stability and security;
470
 accountability, economic and social 
justice and popular participation in development;
471
 and promotion and consultation of a 
democratic system of governance in member states.
472
 These provisions are in tandem with 
the dimensions earlier discussed in this chapter that constitute the understanding of human 
rights in the ECOWAS regime. The most directly related provision of the treaty to human 
rights is Article 4(g) which requires member states to adhere to the ‘recognition, promotion 
and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with the provisions of the African 
Charter.  These references to rights in the Revised Treaty certainly do not directly impose 
obligations on ECOWAS since they are merely fundamental principles, which are intended to 
guide the operation of the organization’s activities. However, these principles remain 
significant as they reveal the considerations of the organization towards attaining its purpose.  
 
Attached to the provisions already discussed above, the Revised Treaty also commits 
Member States who are signatories to the Declaration of Political Principles and the African 
Charter, to cooperate for the purpose of realising the objectives of those instruments.
473
 The 
declaration of Political Principles is quite detailed in the commitments of Member States 
towards the realisation of human rights in the community. In contrast, the 1975 treaty does 
not reveal any commitment by Member States to protect human rights. However, the African 
Charter was adoped at about the same period as the Declaration of Political Principles, and it 
was no surprise that member states declared their full adherence to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in all their plenitude.
474
 Member States also vowed to promote and 
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encourage the full enjoyment by all its peoples of their fundamental human rights, especially 
their political, economic, social, cultural and other rights inherent in the dignity of the human 
person and essential to his free and progressive development.
475
  
 
The Revised Treaty may not be considered a human rights instrument in itself, but it contains 
adequate reference to human rights in the same manner as the introductory texts of other 
international institutions such as the United Nations (UN Charter), the Charter of the defunct 
OAU and the Constitutive Act of the AU. Judging the provisions of the revised treaty alone, 
it may be argued that ECOWAS does possess the ‘right to rule’ in the area of human rights 
protection. At the least, these provisions form the legal foundations for the allocation of rights 
and obligations in human rights, which can sufficiently sustain claims for, and institutional 
competence in human rights. The CEP as part of its recommendations warned: 
 
… as the world shrinks more and more into a global village… peoples’ awareness of events in 
other parts of the world… have brought into focus the concentration, the natural feelings of 
sympathy and human solidarity and the urge to protect and enhance certain fundamental 
values.
476
 
 
This was an early indication of the path the community was willing to thread, and being that 
the drafters of the revised treaty heeded this warning by including other human rights 
instruments in the course of treaty amendment suggests that member states recognized that 
the economic objectives of the community are better achieved in an environment where 
human rights is the utmost priority. 
 
 
3.5.2 PROTOCOLS OF THE COMMUNITY 
 
In 2006 the revised treaty was amended by a supplementary protocol
477
 to usher in a new 
legal regime in the community. Under the new regime community acts are to be known as 
Supplementary acts, regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions.
478
. 
Prior to the introduction of this legislative regime, ECOWAS community law-making was 
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mostly by way of protocols. Protocols serve as the instruments through which the scope of 
the main treaty is extended. As a result, some of the most elaborate provisions relating to 
human rights within the ECOWAS legal framework is contained are contained in protocols. It 
is important to note that under Article 1 of the revised treaty, protocols of the community 
have the same force of law as the treaty but are treated differently here for analytical 
convenience. 
 
Earlier on, it was established after a careful reading of the 1975 Treaty, that it contained no 
human rights provisions in its body. However, some protocols made pursuant to the treaty 
contained few provisions on human rights although in the form of economic freedoms.  The 
first of these protocols was the Protocol relating to the Free Movement of Persons, Residence 
and Establishment.
479
 Subsequently, the protocols became more precise in language, 
explicitly mentioning human rights, albeit to regulate the enjoyment of economic freedoms 
under the Trade Liberalisation scheme.
480
 As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, ECOWAS 
protocols have been under the new treaty regime constantly reflect the human rights 
aspirations of ECOWAS Member States. This demonstrates a change of attitude by 
ECOWAS Member States towards the actualisation of human rights in the community.  
 
 
3.5.3 SECONDARY LAW (SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION & SOFT LAW). 
 
The question on whether ‘soft law’ constitutes law has long been debated by international law 
scholarship without any acceptable consensus. This has prompted some scholars to suggest 
that the concept is jettisoned due to its redundancy
481
. Klabbers argues that the idea of soft 
law not only does it rest on shaky presumptions, but also fails to find support in state and 
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judicial practice.
482
 He concludes that ‘it is not necessary to resort to the soft law thesis to do 
justice to political considerations.
483
  
 
Klabbers may be right in his submission that soft law defies the normative character of law as 
creating obligations and at the same time capturing different moods and sentiments including 
political considerations of states. But international relations scholars still insist on applying 
the soft law thesis particularly in the context of the legalization process of international 
institutions.
484
 Abbott and Snidal argue that international actors choose softer forms of 
legalized governance that offer superior institutional solutions. They specify between hard 
legalization or hard law (representing treaties and other legal arrangements that aim to guide 
specific substantive or political problems) and soft law, which they argue represent the 
weakening of legal arrangements on the basis of obligation, precision, and delegation.
485
  
 
This distinction is important in understanding the nature of subordinate or subsidiary 
legislation of international organizations such as ECOWAS and the extent to which they are 
binding. The revised treaty as part of its reforms established additional community organs. In 
order for these organs to function effectively they must make decisions that have legal force. 
Additionally, they may also issue directives and regulations that are none binding but only 
serve to ensure uniform implementation of community policies or for inter-regulation of 
community institutions.  
 
The supplementary protocol amending the revised treaty provides for various modes of 
applicability of legislative instruments under the new regime. The Authority shall adopt 
Supplementary acts which shall be annexed to the Treaty;
486
 The Council shall enact 
Regulations, issue Directives, take Decisions or formulate Recommendations and 
Opinions.
487
 Legislative power is also vested on the Commission which may adopt rules 
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relating to the execution of Acts enacted by the Council of Ministers.
488
 The Authority is the 
supreme institution of the community.
489
 Accordingly, supplementary acts adopted by the 
Authority shall be binding on community institutions and Member States, where they shall be 
directly applicable.
490
 Directives shall also be binding on member states in terms of 
objectives to be realized, but member states are free to adopt modalities they deem 
appropriate for the realization of such objectives.
491
 
Legislations of other community organs that are none binding may also constitute sources of 
human rights. Under the new legal regime, the Council of Ministers and the Commission may 
‘formulate’ non-binding Recommendations and Opinions respectively.492 The Community 
parliament (through its highest body - the Plenary) may also adopt non-binding ‘Resolutions 
of Parliament’ in accordance with the Treaty and other legal texts of general application to 
institutions of the community.
493
 These resolutions shall be forwarded to other decision-
making bodies of the Community.
494
 Resolutions together with Recommendations, Opinions 
and Declarations make up non-binding sources of ECOWAS law. These non-binding 
instruments appear to suit Abott and Snidal’s characterization of delegated legislation as ‘soft 
law’. 
Soft laws may not qualify as law, but they are utilized to station harder legalization. 
Furthermore, they offer many of the advantages of hard law, avoid some of the costs of hard 
law, and have certain independent advantages of its own. 
495
 Within the legal framework of 
the ECOWAS community these subsidiary instruments conduct or regulate member state 
activities but do not impose obligations nor create formal sanctions, in the same way as the 
treaty or other subsidiary legislation of the community. In the same vein, the provisions of 
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these instruments may create voluntary human rights obligations for Member States without 
attracting the usual sanctions in the event of a breach.  One of the independent advantages of 
soft law appears to be its instrumental value in interpretation of treaty objectives, especially 
tailored to non-judicial means of dispute settlement. This view is opposed by realists who 
fear that increasing use of soft law might ‘destabilize the whole international normative 
system and turn it into an instrument that can no longer serve its purpose’.496 However, soft 
laws may serve an instructive purpose, as actors learn about the impacts of agreements over 
time – transforming to ‘hard law’ in the process.  For example, the ECOWAS Declaration on 
Political Principle was initially soft law under the 1975 constitutional epoch but was 
subsequently integrated into the revised treaty promoting it to the status of hard law.
497
 
While instruments like the Declaration on political principle may not be enforceable against 
Member States, they remain useful for non-judicial demand and implementation of rights. In 
the absence of a definite catalogue of rights and against the variety of binding documents 
within the ECOWAS legal framework these instruments represent specific documentation of 
rights and are arguably more significant for the protection of human rights in the community. 
The downside of soft law is its potential to be compromised especially as states try to 
regularize their asymmetric relations.
498
 However, in the context of subsidiary legislation of 
community organs, they form a crucial part in the negotiation process of eventual hard law. 
Soft law is flexible and may serve as a tester for eventual hard law because their non-binding 
nature may reduce the potential for conflict with existing mechanisms. Whether they 
constitute law in the traditional sense or not, they form an intrinsic part of the practice of 
international organizations. 
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3.5.4 THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Charter)499 is considered by 
many to be the central instrument for regional human rights protection in Africa. Frans 
Viljoen refers to the African Charter and other OAU/AU treaties as encasing the ‘shared 
value’ systems of Africans.500 The African Charter by way of reference in the instruments of 
the community first appeared in the 1991 and has been consistently referred to in the major 
legislative documents of the community since then.
501
 However, the most important reference 
to the African Charter remains the revised treaty.  
As highlighted earlier, the preamble of the revised treaty, as well as Article 4 on fundamental 
principles of the community all refer to the African Charter.  Article 56(2) of the revised 
treaty on political affairs enjoins member states of the community to co-operate towards the 
realisation of the African charter for the purpose of realising the objectives of the 
instrument.
502
 The Constitutive Act
503
 of the African Union which all ECOWAS member 
states are signatory to, has as part of its objectives, the promotion and protection of human 
and peoples’ rights in accordance with the African Charter and other relevant human rights 
instruments.
504
 Therefore the African Charter is indispensable to the realisation of human 
rights in the continent and forms a normative source of the human rights system of 
ECOWAS.   
 
3.5.5 SUPPLEMENTARY INSTRUMENTS OF THE OAU/AU 
Over the years a number of other important normative human rights documents have been 
adopted in Africa to supplement the African Charter.
505
 Some of the important instruments 
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worthy of mention include the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child,
506
 and 
the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women 
in Africa.
507
 Other documents include; Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa,
508
 Cultural Charter for Africa,
509
 the African Youth Charter, the 
African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,
510
 as well as the African Union 
(AU) Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons (Kampala 
convention).
511
 The Kampala convention is the first instrument in human history to state 
formal guidelines to handle the plight of millions of internally displaced people. 
Nowhere in the world is the need for such guideline more urgent than in Africa where there 
has been a chequered past of internecine wars which has displaced millions of people.
512
 
ECOWAS is making practical arrangements in this area. Although there is no protocol for 
internally displaced people, the community places the resettlement and reintegration of 
displaced community citizens high on its priority development projects.
513
 The community 
through the ECOWAS Peace Fund, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the UN High 
Commission for Refugees (UNCHR) and the Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement 
Commission (LRRRC) has recently constructed four estates in Liberia’s Grand Cape Mount 
and Bomi counties. These estates offer more than just shelter for refugees, the programmes 
encompasses other social interventions including market facilities, community halls, water, 
health and sanitation and education services, as well as income-generating opportunities, such 
as agricultural activities. 
                                                          
506
 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force 29 November 1999, nearly a decade after its 
adoption. It is currently ratified by all ECOWAS member states. 
507
 Adopted by the 2
nd
 ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, Maputo, 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 
November 2005. Available at http://www.achpr.org/english/_info/women_en.html (accessed 15 April 2014). 
Ratified by all ECOWAS Member State except Sierra-Leone. 
508
 OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.3 (1969), 1001 UNTS 45, entered into force 20 June 1974. It is currently ratified by all 
ECOWAS Member States. 
509
 Adopted on 5 July 1976, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/cultural-charter-africa (accessed 15 
April 2014). Ratified by 13 ECOWAS Member States (Ivory Coast, Gambia, and Liberia) are yet to ratify the 
Charter. 
510
 Adopted January 2007, available at http://www.au.int/en/content/african-charter-democracy-elections-
and-governance (15 April 2014). It is currently ratified by 9 ECOWAS Member States with the exception of 
Cape Verde, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Liberia, Mali, and Senegal. 
511
 Adopted by the Special Summit of the Union held in Kampala, 22 October 2009, entered into force on 6 
November 2012.Available at http://pa.au.int/en/content/entry-force-african-union-convention-protection-
and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons (accessed 15 April 2014). 
512
 As at 2011, of the 26 million people internally displaced worldwide, 10 million are said to be in Africa. See 
‘Africa leads in championing the rights of internally displaced persons in the world’ available at 
http://en,radiovaticana.va.en3/Articolo.asp?c=645119 (accessed 15 April 2014). 
513
 See, ‘Reintegration of Displaced Community Citizens, An ECOWAS Priority’ available at 
http://news.ecowas.int/presseshow.php?nb=136&lang=en&anee=2012 (accessed 15 April 2014). 
117 | P a g e  
 
Most of these new human rights instruments created under the AU have their universal 
equivalents under the UN legal framework. However as Viljoen notes, they were created to 
suit regional specifities and African cultural conceptions of human rights as the protocol on 
internal displacement above speaks to. Another example that suffices is the African Women’s 
Protocol. When compared to the UN convention on the Elimination of all Forms of 
Discrimination against women (CEDAW), the African Women’s Protocol speaks in a clearer 
voice about issues of particular concern to African women. It expands on the scope of rights 
already protected under CEDAW but with greater specifity. The Women’s protocol is the 
first treaty to provide for the right to circumscribed ‘medical abortion’;514 and to provide for 
the right of a woman to be protected against HIV infection, and also to know the HIV status 
of her (sexual) partner.
515
 The protocol also protects women against domestic violence, 
criminalizes ‘rape in marriage’, protects women in armed conflict516 and accords women 
refugees’ protection under international law.517 Under the protocol, the girl-child may, in 
particular not be recruited or take direct part in hostilities.
518
 State parties to the protocol must 
set the minimum age of marriage at 18, and all marriages must be recorded in writing.
519
 This 
protocol takes a holistic approach on the predicaments of women in the region and addresses 
various traditional practices that disparage women. 
Viljoen highlights the importance of norm creation and standardisation at the regional level 
as evidenced in AU/AEC human right instruments, but also states that there are disadvantages 
in international law.
520
  He argues thus: 
In as far as normative human rights regime of regional IO deviates from that of the universal IO, a distinction 
should be drawn between supplements (or ‘deviations’) that differ from but are still consistent with universal 
norms, and contradictory norms that are in conflict with universal standards. When a nested institution 
articulates a position at odds with that of the host institution, it may work to undermine the legitimacy of the 
‘universal consensus’.521 
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While there is a tendency to deviate from universal standards in the process of creating norms 
that address regional specifities, there is the overarching need for individual protection and 
ensuring sociological legitimacy. However it is possible that African institutions may in some 
cases arrive at interpretations – for example decisions by the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights and sub-regional tribunals – contradicting findings of global or other regional 
institutions. It is in this context that the issue of ‘fragmentation of norms’ may most likely be 
manifested.
522
 Viljoen concludes that ‘the problem of fragmentation is overstated at least as 
far as the tension between global, regional and sub-regional human rights frameworks are 
concerned’.523  
It is noteworthy, that the above mentioned instruments are not expressly referred to in the 
revised treaty or other subsidiary legislations of the community but represent a crucial part of 
the regional and sub-regional human rights systems. They seek to protect the same values that 
the ECOWAS experiment is built upon – the betterment of the standard of living of the 
African people. Considering the fact that most of the instruments above are content-specific 
and are largely absent in the legal framework of the ECOWAS community, it would be 
sensible for community citizens and practitioners to rely on the rights granted in these 
instruments before regional courts and municipal courts where the State in question is a 
ratifying party. However, there may be room for contradiction between the continental human 
rights instruments and those of the ECOWAS community that govern similar areas. There are 
no provisions in the AU/AEC human rights system to suggest that sub-regional human rights 
systems are subservient to the continental system. The AEC treaty is silent on this point and 
would be determined in greater detail below. 
 
3.5.6 THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
As already discussed above, the UN Charter
524
 and its accompanying human rights 
instruments form the universal standard of human rights which generally applies to member 
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states. The UN Charter in itself is not a human rights instrument. However, as some scholars 
have noted, it contains general provisions which have ‘the force of positive international law 
and create basic duties’ on human rights protection.525   The UN Charter at the barest 
minimum obliges ECOWAS and its Member States to cooperate towards ‘solving 
international problems of an economic, social, cultural and humanitarian character and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all 
without distinction  as to race, sex, language, or religion’.526 The obligation to protect human 
rights is further deepened by a reminder that Member States shall fulfil in good faith the 
obligation assumed by them in accordance with the charter.
527
 The fact that the UN is a 
parent organization, to which all other international organizations are subsidiary, confers UN 
instruments with the status of universality.  Hence, the UN charter and other human rights 
instruments affixed to it constitute a source of human rights in ECOWAS law, a global 
standard which all other human rights instruments are expected to conform to.
528
 
Consequently, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
529
 a declaration made 
under the auspices of the UN is a global standard setting human rights instrument that forms 
an important source of human rights law in ECOWAS. The declaration although not binding, 
is the ‘common standard of achievement for all peoples of all nations’.530  Although the 
UDHR is merely a declaration which creates no immediate duty of implementation on the 
part of UN Member States, it is nonetheless a blue print upon which various forms of human 
rights law can be founded upon. National courts have relied on the UDHR as a substantive 
source of human rights. In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala
531
 the US second circuit court, relied 
heavily on the UDHR to establish that torture constitutes a violation of human rights. The 
court was also faced with interpreting the status of non-binding treaties in international law – 
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as some commentators had claimed the UDHR is evidence of customary international law.
532
 
In relation to this, the court noted that U.N resolutions have been viewed as “formal and 
solemn instruments, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and lasting 
importance are enunciated”.533 The court stopped short of holding that the UDHR or other 
relevant U.N resolutions create binding law or generate jus cogens laws.  
It could also be argued that the UDHR represents the first layer of the international value 
system in the sense that it is a source of jus cogens norms that by definition have erga omnes 
effect. The UDHR as the first layer of the international value system establishes most of the 
peremptory norms recognized under international law such as prohibition of genocide, 
torture, slavery, and racial discrimination. The UDHR falls within the normative framework 
of the UN charter and has also been instrumental in the verticalization of the relations of 
Member States, creating a hierarchical dimension of the international value system. For that 
reason, the UDHR is custom and as such falls well within the legal framework of ECOWAS 
as a source of rights.
534
 
Despite the continued debate over the customary law character of the UDHR, the fact 
remains that, it could be transformed into binding law by positive enactment and judicial 
attitude as the ECOWAS legal framework suggests. The UDHR is referred to in protocols 
enacted under the 1975 regime. The treaty itself does not refer to the UDHR, but certain 
protocols explicitly refer to and define human rights in terms of the UDHR.
535
 The 
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention protocol and the protocol on Democracy and Good 
governance both refer to the UDHR under the current treaty regime.
536
  
Other international human rights instruments referred to in ECOWAS protocols include ILO 
Conventions.
537
 ILO conventions are yet to feature before the ECCJ in claims on violation of 
human rights. This could be attributed to the fact that the community legal framework is still 
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 K. Nayar, ‘Human rights: The United Nations and United States foreign policy, 19 Harvard International Law 
Journal, (1978) p.813. 
533
 Filartia vs Pena-Irala supra, 883. 
534
 Ebobrah (2009), p.129. 
535
 Articles 1 and 3 of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/7/85 on the Code of Conduct for the Implementation 
of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons refers to the UDHR. 
536
 Article 2 of the Mechanism for conflict prevention and the preamble to the protocol on Democracy and 
good governance.  
537
 See for example, Article of A/SP.1/7/86 Supplementary Protocol on The Second Phase (Right of Residence) 
of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, The Right of Residence and Establishment available at 
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=asp010786&lang=en (accessed 15 April 2014). 
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largely undeveloped in issues pertaining to worker or employer rights and labour law in 
general. It is worth reiterating that ECOWAS Member states have overwhelmingly ratified 
key ILO convention in this respect.
538
  The fundamental ILO conventions include: Freedom 
of Association and Protection of the Right to organise convention;
539
 Right to Organize and 
Collective Bargaining convention;
540
 Forced Labour convention;
541
 Abolition of Forced 
Labour convention;
542
 Equal Remuneration convention;
543
 Elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation convention;
544
 Minimum Age convention;
545
  and 
Worst forms of Child Labour convention.
546
 Despite the overwhelming ratification of these 
ILO conventions and the possibility for incorporating regional labour standards into the 
integration framework, legislative activity in this area is largely undeveloped in ECOWAS 
despite its impact on the Trade Liberalisation Scheme (TLS) of ECOWAS.
547
 
Borrowing from Ajulo’s bracketing of sources of ECOWAS law, substantive values of 
human rights within the community are easily identifiable. Most of the human rights 
instruments identified all have a common feature in that they restate human rights obligations 
already incumbent on Member States. 
 
3.6 RELATIONAL ISSUES: UNTANGLING A COMPLEX WEB 
Amidst fears of fragmented proliferation of international human rights law, the African 
human rights system is grappling with countless issues of normativity particularly as the AU 
strives to achieve the African Economic Community. Frimpong refers to this conundrum as a 
‘complex web’ in the relationship between the national, sub-regional and regional systems of 
                                                          
538
 See status of ratifications of ILO convention at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11001:109842738022709::::P11001_COUNTRY_SORT:2#Africa 
(accessed 15 April 2014). 
539
 Convention No. 87 (1948) ratified by 14 ECOWAS Member States with the exception of Guinea-Bissau. 
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 Convention No. 98 (1949) ratified by all Member States. 
541
  Convention No. 29 (1930) ratified by all Member States. 
542
 Convention No. 105 (1957) ratified by all Member States. 
543
 Convention No. 100 (1951) ratified by 14 States with the exception of Liberia. 
544
 Convention No. 111 (1958) ratified by all Member States. 
545
 Convention No. 138 (1973) ratified by 13 Member States with the exception of Cape Verde and Liberia. 
546
 Convention No. 182 (1999) ratified by 14 Member States with the exception of Sierra- Leone. 
547 The TLS which seeks to improve community trade by lowering tariff and non-tariff barriers does not create 
any commitment on the part of the Member States towards protecting workers rights and labour standards.  
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law.
548
 Numerous questions arise from the inter-relationship between these three levels. 
Which system should be a subsidiary to the next and how are issues such as forum shopping 
and non-implementation handled? Are these overlapping networks mutually reinforcing and 
complementary, or are they in competition with one another and constitute a needless 
duplication?  How would the vertical, horizontal and vertico-horizontal relations between all 
three spheres be better co-ordinated as part of an African human rights system? This section 
examines relational issues between the regional and sub-regional systems. This discussion is 
important bearing in mind that the African Economic Community is the final destination of 
the African integration experiment. 
 
3.6.1 RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
There is an obvious absence of a continental or region-wide human rights system. The word 
‘African security architecture’ has been utilized to refer to the region-wide framework for 
peace and security with relative guidelines and standards in the AU peace and security 
mechanism. However same term has not been employed to describe the African human rights 
system. This would be inappropriate given the lack of clarity on the relationship between the 
AU/AEC human rights institutions and the sub-regional human rights institutions.
549 Viljoen 
argues that the African human rights system was designed to fail. His reason is that OAU/AU 
system contains numerous elements suggesting that the system had been designed to enhance 
state sovereignty and to weaken effective inspection of human rights record of member states 
that guarantee human rights per the relevant UN treaties.550 Therefore, his position is, that 
there are no sub-regional human rights systems existing in Africa but that there are simply 
sub-regional intergovernmental groupings with human rights as a concern within their 
mandate.
551
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 R.F Oppong, ‘The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Regional Economic 
Communities: Untangling a Complex Web, 18 African Journal of International and Comparative Law (2010) pp. 
92 – 103. 
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 ‘System’ here represents a holistic perspective of the regional and sub-regional human rights apparatus 
including all other norm creating and implementation institutions directly or remotely concerned with the 
recognition, promotion and protection of human rights. 
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 Vijoen (2011), p.199. 
551
 Viljoen, (2007), p.10. 
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The 1998 Protocol on Relations between the African Economic Community and the Regional 
Economic Communities
552
 (Protocol on Relations) is instructive on the relationship between 
the regional and sub-regional organisations as constituent parts of the proposed AEC. Article 
6 of the protocol stipulates that the AEC is responsible for strengthening existing RECs and 
also establish RECs where none exist towards the actualisation of the proposed African 
Common market. From the wordings of Article 6 it is clear that RECs cannot be outside of 
the overall framework and are wrongly examined in isolation of the overarching AU system. 
The revised treaty which came into existence before the Protocol on Relations outlines the 
position of ECOWAS as a pillar for the AEC by stipulating that ECOWAS was established 
‘for the purpose of economic integration and the realisation of the objectives of the African 
Economic Community’.553 Article 78 of the revised treaty also provides that the community 
shall constitute an essential component of the African continent and that member states 
undertake to facilitate the harmonization of policies with those of the African Economic 
Community.  The Protocol on Relations also envisages coordination to avoid duplication of 
efforts and action that jeopardize AEC objectives,
554
 exchange of information and cross-
participation at meetings.
555
  
The AEC treaty itself is naturally silent on the issue of co-ordination in the area of human 
rights and only outlines the step by step economic objectives targeted for the realisation of 
the African Common market. This is understandable as the AEC is a destination which is yet 
to be reached and issues of co-ordination can be addressed through subsequent protocols. In 
2007 the AU adopted the Protocol on Relations between the African Union and the Regional 
Economic Communities
556
 (AU/REC Protocol). The AU/REC protocol aims amongst other 
things, to ‘formalize, consolidate and promote closer co-operation among the RECs and 
between them and the Union through the co-ordination and harmonization of their policies, 
measures, programmes and activities in all fields and sectors’.557 The AU/REC protocol does 
not do much to clarify the loopy interface between the AU/REC and is generally silent on the 
issue of human rights. This is especially true when it is borne in mind that the RECs are legal 
systems in their own right with separate legal personality. Accordingly, there is the need to 
                                                          
552
 Signed in Addis Ababa, 1998  OAU Doc. Annex III-4. 
553
 Article 2(1) of the revised treaty. 
554
 Article 4 of the Relations Protocol. 
555
 Ibid., Article 17. 
556
 When this protocol enters into force, it will replace the Relations Protocol. 
557
 Article 3 of the Relations Protocol, supra. 
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structure and manage the relations between the AEC and the RECs’ legal systems as well as 
among the RECs. 
While ECOWAS documents are silent on how community institutions relate with the AU 
institutions on the issue of human rights, certain documents of the AU seek to outline crucial 
aspects of the relations between the both levels. For example, as previously observed, the 
PSC recognises regional security mechanisms as part of the ‘overall security architecture of 
the Union’.558 These provisions are however not enough. Other instruments that hint at co-
operation between both levels include the African Charter
559
, the Protocol on the African 
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights560 and the African children Charter561 all make general 
provisions for competence of continental human rights supervisory bodies to receive requests 
from ‘African Organisations’ for advisory or interpretative opinions on the applicable human 
rights instruments.  
From a judicial perspective the creation of courts around RECs with human rights jurisdiction 
naturally de-monopolizes the exclusive competence of the African Commission on the one 
part and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to interpret and enforce the African 
Charter.
562
 This is a result of the African Charter coming into existence before the RECs and 
their supranational courts. The adoption of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice
563
 (Protocol on the African Court of Justice) marked an avenue through which some 
salient relational issues could have been addressed, particularly the hierarchy of sub-regional 
courts and AU organs for the enforcement of human rights (African Commission and the 
African Court of Justice). However, the Protocol limits its provisions to the operation of the 
new court which when operational would give the African Court of Justice human rights 
jurisdiction transforming it into the African court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR).  
                                                          
558
 Article of the PSC Protocol. 
559
 Article 45(3) of the African Charter. 
560
 Protocol on the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the establishment of an African Court of 
Human and Peoples’ Rights available at http://www.au.int/en/content/protocol-african-charter-human-and-
peoples-rights-establishment-african-court-human-and-peop (accessed 4 April 2013), Article 4. 
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 Article 42(c) of the African Children’s Charter. 
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 Of the 14 different sub-regional institutions in Africa only 6 have explored the potential for human rights 
realisation and only EAC, ECOWAS and SADC courts have entertained human rights cases. See generally, ‘S. 
Ebobrah, ‘Human Rights Realisation in the African Sub-Regional Institutions’, in M. Sseyonjo (2012), n.259 
supra. 
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 Adopted in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, on 1st July 2008 available at http://www.au.int/en/content/protocol-
statute-african-court-justice-and-human-rights (accessed 15 April 2014). 
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Currently, individuals and NGOs do not have direct access to the African Court of Justice. In 
Femi Falana v. The African Union
564
 the Court insisted that it had no jurisdiction rationae 
personae to entertain cases of human rights breaches so long as a Member State does not 
expressly declare that such a case is heard by the court.
565
 So far, only six States (Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali, and Tanzania) have made an express declaration 
accepting the Court’s jurisdiction to hear cases of human rights violations against them. As 
soon as the Merger protocol
566
 enters into force, all cases being heard by the African Court 
shall  be transferrable to the human rights section of the ACJHR while other cases will 
remain in the general section of the Court.  Scholars have expressed fears that this merger 
could potentially relegate human rights to the background and member States could shift their 
attention to other ‘high state’ issues such as border disputes and other constitutional issues 
that fall under the general section of the court. 
The need for the clarification of hierarchy is even more important in the light of plans by the 
some sub-regional courts to establish an appellate division.
567
 This changes the dynamics of 
human rights enforcement in Africa creating even more room for forum shopping. The 
African Charter provision on the decisions of the African Commission is important in this 
respect. Article 56(7) of the African Charter provides that the African Commission may not 
admit for consideration cases which have been settled by the states involved in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations, the Charter of the OAU or the African Charter. 
This provision embodies the principle of res judicata to the extent that it excludes a matter 
which has been ‘settled by the states’ involved.568 It however does not preclude the 
consideration of matters that are before another judicial or quasi-judicial forum, and hence 
leaves an opening for judicial forum shopping.
569
 In the absence of a prohibition of 
concurrent proceedings on the basis of the principle of lis pendens in the ‘other forum’, it is 
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 Application No. 001/2011 (26 June 2012). 
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 Vijoen (2007), p.336. 
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 Some scholars argue that concerns over forum shopping in Africa are perceived rather than real and if well 
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in A. Bösl & J. Diescho (eds.), Human Rights Law in Africa: Legal Perspectives on their Protection and 
Promotion, (Windhoek: MacMillan Education, 2009), p. 283. 
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possible for a litigant to institute concurrent proceedings before a REC court and the African 
Commission or Court. 
The concern that arises here is whether one whose case has been heard and determined by a 
REC court can approach the African Commission or Court for redress in the same case. This 
depends on the provisions of the REC regarding the finality of their decisions and the 
approach of the African Court or Commission to such matters. However, it could be argued 
that allowing an unsuccessful litigant at the sub-regional level to pursue a remedy at the 
regional level would be tantamount to establishing the African court as an appellate body, 
which it is not.
570
 
So far the relational issues above are left undefined, the question lingers as to whether is there 
is an African human rights system and precisely what place does sub-regional human rights 
institutions and norms play.  It is widely accepted amongst human rights scholars in Africa, 
that the African human rights system  revolves solely around the African Charter, the African 
Commission on Human Rights and, the African Court of Justice.
571
 On the strength of this 
scholarship, the emerging ECOWAS human rights system clearly is not a part of the African 
human rights system as it does not have a direct link with the African Charter.  However, 
sub-regional human rights mechanisms offer some practical benefits to the regional apparatus 
for human rights enforcement. 
As mentioned, earlier sub-regional mechanisms are more likely to address legitimate 
sociological concerns. The small number of states constituting RECs allows them to address 
issues with particular detail to peculiar circumstances. For example, the scourge of human 
trafficking which is most prevalent in West Africa is a crucial issue that constitutes a recent 
challenge to good governance for the entire sub-region.
572
 Recent data reveal that 100 per 
cent of the human trafficking cases in parts of West Africa involve children.
573
 Hence 
jurisprudence on the issue of enforcement of child rights is necessary at the sub-regional and 
national levels under the applicable regional instrument. Additionally, judges of an REC 
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court are more likely to have a better appreciation of the issues affecting a sub-region than 
those at the broader regional level. 
Finally, the African Charter is widely recognized as a standard for rights in the RECs which 
makes it an instrument that serves as the normative source of rights. This is the link between 
the regional and sub-regional human rights apparatus. Article 60 and 61 of the African 
Charter provides that the African Commission shall “draw from” other international 
instruments “adopted by the United Nations and African countries” and take into 
consideration… legal precedents and doctrine”. This provision of the Charter is in itself an 
admission that the legal precedents and doctrines established by national courts of African 
countries or by proxy sub-regional courts form part and parcel of the African human rights 
system, at least for interpretative reasons.
574
 The attitude of the African Commission in some 
of its cases has given correctness to this argument. In Purhoit & Anor. vs Gambia 
575
 the 
African Commission said that it was: 
more than willing to accept legal arguments with the support of appropriate and relevant international 
and regional human rights instruments, principles, norms and standards taking into account the well 
organized principle of universality which was established by the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action of 1993 and which declares that ‘All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent, 
and interrelated’. 
 
The submission of the African Commission above displays openness at the regional level of 
human rights protection and enforcement. The mere fact that the Commission accepts 
alternative bodies of human rights instruments, principles and norms in the spirit of 
universality, is testament to its pragmatic approach in ensuring the enforcement of human 
rights in the region. The only real limitations that might cause frictions between the regional 
and sub-regional regional systems have been highlighted. Certainly, ECOWAS and her sister 
RECs are connected to the regional human rights system and interface on the basis of a 
uniform catalogue of rights but are independent of each other in practice. 
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3.7 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter establishes the movement towards human rights under the 1993 constitutional 
epoch. The essence is to demonstrate the normative legitimacy of the organisation in the area 
of human security. In the process, human rights activities of the community under the current 
constitutional epoch are traversed. Human rights’ understanding under the current ECOWAS 
regime is divided into three dimensions. These dimensions are peace and security, democracy 
and good governance, and human rights and fundamental freedoms.  
It is revealed that the ECOWAS peace and security architecture was necessitated by a 
combination of external and internal factors. The early conflicts that plagued the community 
under the first regime, led to the adoption of a robust interventionist norm under the second 
regime. With regards to the normative incompatibility of ECOWAS’s MCPMRPS with the 
UN Charter, it is submitted that the MCPMRPS remains an important development in solving 
the long term problem of conflicts, which have devastated the sub-region. The ECOWAS 
peace and security architecture is vital in delivering the economic integration objective of the 
community. 
It is also established that the ECOWAS framework is incomplete in certain areas. The 
Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance for example provides for sanctions as one of 
the coercive mechanisms against a Member State which has violated the provisions of the 
protocol. However, the protocol does not prescribe in concrete terms the steps that constitute 
a sanction. Even more disappointing is the fact these coercive mechanisms are heavily 
dependent on political circumstances in a Member State. Nonetheless, the protocol is a 
welcome addition to ECOWAS law as it reflects current legal thinking on the importance of 
ensuring a democratic culture as foundation for a stable and conflict-free continent. 
Amidst fears of fragmentation of international human rights law, the universal human rights 
system is contrasted with the regional and sub-regional human rights systems to identify 
possible areas of convergence and divergence. This fear is given further impetus by the 
emergence and continued growth of regional systems such as the African and European 
human rights systems. The European convention of Human Rights and jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR have led to the perception that the European value system trumps the international 
value system.  
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It is submitted that regional and sub-regional norm creation in the area of human rights is 
justified not because it attempts to deviate from universal standards or the international value 
system, but because of the need to address regional specifities. However, there remains a 
cloud of uncertainty hovering over the relationship between sub-regional and regional human 
rights systems. The issue of hierarchy of norms and institutional competence especially as it 
affects the proposed African Economic Community which is the final destination of the 
integration process of all RECs which are pillars for African integration lingers on. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ROLE OF THE ECOWAS COMMUNITY COURT IN THE NORMATIVE 
LEGITIMACY OF ECOWAS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It has been established that the new human rights regime of ECOWAS falls within the legal 
boundaries of the organisation. The competence of ECOWAS in this regard as discussed is 
enmeshed in the community treaty and protocols on the one part and by adoption of regional 
and universal human rights instruments. While it is worth emphasizing that the new human 
rights regime gained traction primarily due to the creation of supranational institutions and 
the revision of the 1975 treaty, the competence of the organisation still rests delicately on the 
sovereignty of member states. This complementary disposition of ECOWAS and the 
sovereignty question may create possible areas of friction between community institutions 
seeking to exercise their mandates and national institutions which are the natural custodians 
of the nation-state and its subjects. Questions over the descriptive legitimacy of ECOWAS 
still remain and may be better understood after a careful examination of the organization’s 
human rights activities through its institutions in Member States.  
This chapter examines the human rights mandate of the ECOWAS Community Court of 
Justice (ECCJ) and the implications of its activities in Member States. The need for 
symmetry in the vertical, horizontal and vertico - horizontal relations between community 
institutions, their municipal equivalents and the continental system cannot be over 
emphasized. This is especially true to the extent that the human rights protection under the 
new regime can only be meaningful in the presence of a harmonious co-existence within all 
institutions involved at all levels. Central to the actualization of the integration initiative 
under the new regime is the interface between community institutions independently 
exercising its human rights mandate and their municipal counterparts. Hence, this chapter 
examines the inter- and intra-institutional relations between the community court and its 
municipal counterparts. A thematic approach is utilized in part to better explain the 
impediments that stand in the way of the court in its quest to enforce human rights in member 
states.  
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The Community Court is given priority amongst other community organs because it is the 
only organ with a clear mandate for human rights protection under an enabling protocol. 
Another justification for this approach is that the ECCJ is a prototype of emerging 
International Courts(IC) that has gained increased attention recently. The new generation of 
ICs are vested with judicial competence in a variety of areas that exercise jurisdiction over 
subjects as diverse as human rights, criminal law, trade, investment and environmental 
protection. The expansion of this new breed of ICs, their swelling dockets and the widening 
political impact of their jurisprudence has created a burgeoning field of scholarship dedicated 
to the study of international adjudication.
576
 However, the growing political importance of IC 
rulings continues to generate increased scrutiny over their legitimacy. The implication of this 
shift in paradigm is an expansion of IC authority and the perceived diminution of national 
autonomy.  Therefore, this chapter would start off with the ECCJ placed top of the 
institutional hierarchy of ECOWAS in the area of human rights protection and enforcement. 
The normative legitimacy of ECOWAS as a regime is largely dependent on the ECCJ 
because ICs have the unique capacity to confer legitimacy on the institutions of a regime.
577
 
 
4.2 THE BIRTH OF A COMMUNITY COURT 
As has been pointed out in previous chapters, the transformation of ECOWAS under the 
constitutional epoch of the revised treaty of 1993 led to an eventual shift in community 
objectives from economic integration to peace and security and human rights. The protocol of 
Non-Aggression and the Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defence provided the legal basis 
for the task of promoting regional security and eventually spilled over to human rights. The 
Liberian civil war and subsequent civil wars that followed increased the political salience of 
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ECOWAS security and human rights activities. The resultant effect was the eventual 
adoption of the MCPMRPS which underscored the importance of human rights, and put 
regional intervention on a firmer legal footing.
578
 
The re-alignment of community objectives towards human rights protection necessitated the 
creation of a court or tribunal to oversee the enforcement of rights and basic freedoms under 
the legal framework of the community. The founders of ECOWAS ‘envisioned a tribunal to 
‘ensure the observance of law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions of [the 1975] 
Treaty’ and to ‘settle such disputes as may be referred to it’ by Member States.579 But the 
tribunal was never created and this is understandable considering the fact that the priority of 
the community at the time was solely focused on economic integration. Additionally, the 
legal underpinnings for a community court were lacking. Community protocols did not have 
direct effect in national law,
580
 and as noted earlier, most were not implemented during that 
constitutional epoch. In such hostile environment of non-implementation of and non-
compliance with community rules, a supranational court would have been ‘largely 
redundant’581 and out of place. 
The revised treaty in Article 15 introduced a community court of justice as part of the newly 
created institutions. However, the 1991 protocol on  ECCJ,
582
 authorized the court to 
adjudicate on two types of cases, both relating to “the interpretation and application” of 
ECOWAS legal instruments: (1) “disputes referred to it…by Member States or the Authority, 
when such disputes arise between the Member States or proceedings one or more Member 
States and the Institutions of the Community; “ and (2) proceedings instituted by a member 
state “on behalf of its nationals… against another Member State or Institution of the 
Community… after attempts to settle the dispute amicably have failed”.583 The provisions of 
the protocol appeared to have mirrored the constant power tussle between the Francophone 
and Anglophone countries on the one hand and the suspicion that surrounded Nigeria’s role 
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as a hegemon in the sub-region. Member States intended to use the ECCJ to resolve disputes 
that might arise over the meaning of ECOWAS rules by issuing legally binding 
judgements.
584
 
The Court remained inoperative until December 2000 when Member States appointed seven 
judges that were eventually sworn into office on January 31, 2001. The jurisdiction of the 
Court remained the same as defined under Article 76 of the revised treaty. The primary 
function of the Court under the treaty was the interpretation and application of the ECOWAS 
Treaty. Individuals could only approach the Court under Article 9(3) of the Protocol which 
provides that a Member State may, on behalf of its nationals, institute proceedings against 
another Member State or Institutions of the Community relating to the interpretation and 
application of the treaty. As it turned out, this provision was insufficient as no Member State 
brought any action to the Court on this basis. 
  As soon as the Court commenced preparation for its take off, the vision and mission were 
set out. These included: 
a) Encouragement of fundamental Human rights observance. To achieve this, the Court 
will undertake a process of creating awareness among the populace of Member States 
regarding the existing Treaties among the Member States and the fact that individuals 
can have access to the Court through their Member States if they feel aggrieved. 
b) Encouragement of the Member States to amicably settle disputes among themselves 
through alternative dispute resolution processes. 
c) Harmonization of relationships with relevant International Organisations such as the 
European Community Court of Justice, the International Court of Justice and other 
International Institutions 
d) Speedy dispensation of justice, dissemination of information, easy access to 
proceedings and judgements of the Court.
585
 
Despite the mission statement of the Court, demonstrating its awareness of its role in 
human rights protection, the Court’s initial task after it was constituted was convincing 
                                                          
584
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Member States about “the need to seek [the Court’s] advice with respect to the different 
problems they will be facing, arising from interpretation of the Treaty and Protocols.”586 
This task was imperative for the Court to establish a trusted relationship with Member 
States and also position itself as a truly supranational court in the sub-region. The Court 
remained stagnant for three years after opening its doors for business.  
 
4.3 THE AFOLABI CASE: THE TURNING POINT 
The ECCJ did not entertain any inter-state cases and since individuals were not granted locus 
standi except through Member States, the Court had no opportunity to test the waters of 
judicial interpretation of the revised treaty – to expand its powers.587 The opportunity finally 
presented itself in 2004 in the case of Olajide Afolabi v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.
588
 
Olajide was a Nigerian trader who had entered into a contract to purchase certain goods in 
neighbouring Benin Republic, with the intention of transporting them to Nigeria. Afolabi was 
unable to complete the transaction when Nigeria unilaterally closed the border between the 
two countries. Afolabi argued that Nigeria’s action was a clear violation of the economic 
freedoms guaranteed under the revised treaty,
589
 the ECOWAS protocol on free movement of 
persons and goods,
590
 and Article 12 of the African Charter.
591
 Afolabi demanded reparation 
from the Court in form of an order of injunction to Nigeria to refrain from future border 
closures and compensation for his financial loss and litigation costs. 
Nigeria responded on the ground that the Court lacked the jurisdiction or the competence to 
entertain the suit. The defendant also challenged Afolabi’s standing to bring the suit on the 
ground that only a Member State may bring an action on behalf of its citizen under the 1991 
protocol of the court. Afolabi countered Nigeria’s argument invoking Article 9(3) of the 1991 
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587
 An inevitable uproar followed the court’s idleness with NGOs canvassing an expansion of its powers to the 
area of human rights protection. The NGOs exploited Article 39 of the Democracy and Good Governance 
Protocol, which suggested that the not-yet-operational ECOWAS Court might one day hear “cases relating to 
violations of human rights, after all attempts to resolve the matter at the national level have failed”.  
588
 ECW/CCJ/APP/01/03 – ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/04 (2004-2009) CCJELR. 
589
 Article 3(2) (d) (iii) identifies the “aims and objectives” of ECOWAS as including “the removal, between 
Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, service and capital, and to the right of 
residence and establishment”. 
590
 1979 Free Movement Protocol, Article 2 (granting Community citizens a “right of entry” to other ECOWAS 
member states). 
591
 Article 12(1) of the African Charter decrees that “Every individual shall have the right to freedom of 
movement and residence within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law.” 
135 | P a g e  
 
Protocol that permits Member States to bring actions on behalf of their citizens. Afolabi 
further argued that the use of “may” permits states to raise such cases but did not preclude the 
ECCJ from directly receiving applications from individuals.
592
 In addition, Afolabi argued 
that the ECCJ’s review of complaints from private actors was especially appropriate “where a 
party is instituting action his Country”. In such cases, Afolabi claimed, “the Member state 
cannot represent the party because the Member State cannot be both the plaintiff and the 
[defendant]”.593 Lastly, Afolabi relied on “the principles of equity”594 as enshrined in the 
1991 protocol to support an expansive interpretation of the Court’s jurisdictional rules on 
locus standi for individuals. 
After examining the argument of both parties, decided that the issue before it is that of 
competence to adjudicate on the proceedings instituted by the applicant against the 
respondent and not on locus standi per se. The ECCJ dismissed the arguments of both sides 
and dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. However, the judges 
acknowledged that Afolabi’s case “raised a serious claim touching on free movement and 
free movement of goods and his rights to challenge an infringement upon his person.”595 The 
Court stated that Article 9 of the 1991 protocol is “plain” and “unambiguous” and only states 
can institute proceedings on behalf of their nationals.
596
 Hence, the provision must be 
“applied as written,” even if the result- effectively insulating member states against suits by 
their own nationals alleging violations of ECOWAS rules – seems “repugnant”, “absurd” or 
“harsh.”597 
The interpretative authority delegated to ICs is politically important because it introduces an 
independent outside actor with the legal authority to give meaning to international law.
598
 The 
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judges of the ECCJ failed to apply teleological or constructive methods of judicial 
interpretation in their capacity as independent outside actors but chose to tread carefully and 
apply the law to the letter. The ECCJ ‘s judicial restraint seemed somewhat contradictory 
because the Court had actively publicized its existence to potential litigants and encouraged 
filing of cases only to be faced with complaint from a highly sympathetic plaintiff involving a 
serious obstacle to intraregional trade and then shying away from a pronouncement that 
would have set straight community law.  
It is worthy to note that the ECCJ is not the only sub-regional court to face the question of 
determining a human rights case without express judicial powers. In Mike Campbell & 78 
others v Zimbabwe
599
 the SADC tribunal adopted a teleological approach to the interpretation 
of its treaty mandate. The Claimant a Zimbabwean registered company instituted a case 
before the SADC Tribunal to challenge the expropriation of agricultural land in Zimbabwe by 
the government. At the time of application, the matter was pending in the Supreme Court of 
Zimbabwe. As a result, an application was brought before the Tribunal for an interim 
measure prohibiting the government of Zimbabwe from evicting Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Limited and others from the land in question until the pending case has been determined. The 
claimant’s main argument was that the Zimbabwean government’s land acquisition process 
was racist and illegal on the basis of Article 6 of the SADC Treaty
600
 and the African 
Charter.
601
 
  
The SADC Treaty provides that Member States shall act in accordance with the principles of 
human rights, democracy and the rule of law as well as equity, balance and mutual benefit 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes.
602
 However, the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on 
the Tribunal do not expressly grant the Tribunal any competence over cases of human rights 
violations. The Tribunal held that the respondent state is in breach of its obligations under 
articles 4(c) and 6(2) of the SADC Treaty and that the applicants were discriminated against 
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on the grounds of race and that they were entitled to fair compensation on their land.
603
 
Furthermore, the Tribunal directed the Republic of Zimbabwe to take all necessary measures 
to protect the possession, occupation and ownership of the lands of the applicants who had 
not yet been evicted from their lands, and to pay fair compensation to the applicants who had 
already been evicted from their farm lands. 
 
In the aftermath of the Campbell decision, the SADC Tribunal was faced with opposition by 
Zimbabwe. Implementation of the decision of the Tribunal was a no-go area by the actions of 
the Zimbabwean government.
604
 The Tribunal was eventually suspended by the Summit,
605
 
even after a review of the Tribunal was carried out where it was concluded that SADC 
Member States were, by suspending the Tribunal, in violation of their international legal 
obligations.
606
 The Tribunal is yet to be re-constituted although the SADC Summit after 
considering the Report of SADC Attorney Generals, have issued a resolution stating that a 
new Protocol for the Tribunal should be drawn up with the Tribunal’s activities to be 
‘confined to interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 
Member States’.607 
 
Similary, the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) in Katabazi vs. Secretary General of the 
East African Community (Katabazi case)
608
 entertained its first human rights case. The 
applicants were a part of a group of 21 charged with treason and misprision of treason. The 
application claimed inter alia a breach of articles 6, 7(2) and 8 (1) (c) of the EAC treaty 
relative to the fundamental principles of the EAC, the operational principles thereof and the 
general undertaking of the partner states to implement the treaty.
609
 Counsel for the applicants 
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sought the EACJ to regard the matter as an application for determination of whether the 
conduct of the State of Uganda was in breach of the fundamental principles of the EAC. 
Counsel for the respondent on the other hand argued that the claims of the applicants related 
to a question of human rights over which the Court had no jurisdiction under article 27(2) of 
the EAC treaty. The Court held that 
 
Does this Court have jurisdiction to deal with human rights issues? The quick answer is no it does 
not… It is very clear that jurisdiction with respect to human rights requires a determination of the 
Council and a conclusion of a Protocol to that effect. 
Both of these steps have not been taken. It follows, therefore, that this Court may not adjudicate on 
disputes concerning violation of human rights per se… while the Court will not assume jurisdiction to 
adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of 
interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights 
violation.
610
 
 
The SADC Tribunal and the EACJ have bravely adopted a liberal approach to treaty 
interpretation when faced with the challenge of human rights adjudication, albeit with 
varying consequences. The SADC Tribunal lost its powers completely while the EACJ did 
not face crushing political backlash from Member States. The case of the SADC 
demonstrates the power-oriented nature of the relationship between regional organizations in 
Africa and Member States. The SADC Tribunal read the political landscape of its region 
wrongly. The Tribunal should have borne in mind that state practice in Africa tilts towards 
protection of sovereignty and leaves little room for judicial activism that exceeds express 
powers stated in constitutive documents.  
The SADC tribunal and the EACJ were perhaps encouraged by the example of the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The foundations for the protection of fundamental human rights in the 
EU have been largely attributed to the decisions of the ECJ.
611
 In Van Gend & Loos
612
  the 
ECJ adopted a purposive interpretation of its founding treaty to grant individuals direct 
access, further expanding the powers of the court. Here the Court held that: 
The Union constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have 
limited their sovereign rights, albeit in limited fields… [Union law] therefore not only imposes 
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obligations on individuals, but is also intended to confer upon them rights which become part of their 
legal heritage.  
This decision gave birth to the principle of direct effect of European community law in 
Member States and established the primacy of the European legal order over national law in 
agreed areas. Although it has been claimed by a section of European scholars that the 
decision of ECJ was not revolutionary, but a continuation of earlier established principles,
613
  
the ECJ finally established a constitutional approach to European law through that decision. 
 
 The revolutionary effect of the ECJ’s decision in Van Gend en Loos lies in the fact that the 
court was able to differentiate European law from international public law by declaring the 
supremacy of the former, and got national governments to accept a fundamental 
transformation in the European legal order.
614
 The entry of fundamental human rights in the 
discourse of community law appeared to be necessitated by the need to protect the efficacy of 
direct effect and primacy of community law as instruments for effective economic 
integration.
615
 This fact was not lost on the ECJ, which realised its importance to the overall 
progress of the community. 
 
Contrary to other sub-regional courts, the ECCJ strictly interpreted the 1991 Protocol, 
concluding that ECOWAS political bodies must expressly grant it jurisdiction to hear suits 
from private actors. Perhaps the court was weary of the political backlash it would have to 
face from Member States and possible disharmony in the organisational hierarchy of 
ECOWAS. It is possible that the arduous journey of gaining its own freedom as a community 
institution played on the mind of the judges. Another possible determinant factor for the 
Court’s attitude is the political leadership of Member States at the time which was 
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dominantly ruled by military dictatorships, except a few democratically elected governments 
that were still autocratic in character.  
Bearing the above factors in mind, the Court sought political avenues to expand its powers. 
The judges launched an advocacy campaign to convince member states in this wise by 
publishing a booklet that summarized the legal arguments of both parties in the Afolabi case. 
The booklet was distributed widely, both to show that they had finally issued a decision and 
to highlight the serious flaws in the ECOWAS legal system.
616
 This sensitization effort not 
only cast the court in a transparent light but also helped support the court’s campaign to 
expand its jurisdiction. 
Civil society also played a crucial part in the eventual expansion of the court’s powers.  
Around the same period, while the court was vehemently campaigning, civil society groups 
in the sub-region were beginning to mobilize outside of the security context which they 
initially exploited, and instead, capitalized on a shift to more democratically-oriented 
governments and strengthening their ties to transnational NGOs such as Amnesty 
International. Shortly after the Afolabi decision, leaders of the West African Bar Association 
(WABA) met with ECCJ judges and officials of the ECOWAS Commission to develop a 
proposal to revise the ECCJ’s decision. All stakeholders came together in Dakar, Senegal in 
October 2004 at a “Consultative Forum on Protecting Rights of ECOWAS citizens through 
the ECOWAS Court of Justice” organized by the Open Society Initiative for West Africa.617 
The Forum, amongst other resolutions, “proposed a Declaration on the proposed amendments 
to the ECOWAS Court of Justice Protocol” which urged member states “to ensure access to 
justice to citizens” of the Community and to bring the Protocol into force urgently.618 
The group extended its campaign to key officials from the Ministries of Justice and Ministries 
of Integration in several states. They were further supported by ECOWAS officials, 
particularly the ECOWAS Legal Affairs Directorate, which was preparing a draft of the new 
protocol. A commentator has observed that the decision to focus the reform campaign on 
human rights may have been a strategic one. It is perhaps a reflection of the implicit 
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understanding that the political climate in the sub-region would not absorb the power of 
review of noncompliance with ECOWAS economic rules by the court. This might be 
responsible for the prioritization of human rights concerns over economic issues.  
 
4.4 THE ECCJ’s HUMAN RIGHTS JURISDICTION 
Less than nine months after the ECCJ dismissed Afolabi’s suit, ECOWAS Member States 
adopted the 2005 Supplementary Protocol.
619
 The Supplementary Court Protocol significantly 
broadened the ECCJ’s authority by conferring jurisdiction to determine cases of human rights 
violation.
620
 Concomitantly, the new article 10 of the supplementary protocol created the 
possibility for individuals to access the ECCJ to seek relief for violations of their human 
rights. To quote the relevant sections of Article 10 verbatim, access to court is given to: 
c) Individuals and corporate bodies in proceedings or the determination of an act or inaction 
of a community official which violates the rights of the individuals or corporate bodies; 
d) Individuals on application for relief for violation of their human rights; the submission of 
application for which shall 
i) Not be anonymous; nor 
ii) Be made whilst the same matter has been instituted before another international court for 
adjudication. 
The expansion of the Court’s mandate to human rights giving individuals access is rather 
expansive and affects every aspect of the Court’s jurisdiction (material, personal, temporal 
and territorial). It is noteworthy that the new jurisdiction did not replace its original 
jurisdiction. Collectively, the jurisdiction of the ECCJ comprises competence to interpret the 
revised treaty from an economic integration perspective in disputes involving Member States 
and Community institutions, determination of community obligation of Member States. 
Essentially, the ECCJ is a prototype of European-style ICs (Hybrid courts) that combine the 
‘multiple roles’ of enforcement, dispute settlement, constitutional and administrative 
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review.
621
 The human rights jurisdiction of the court is specialised because it is relatively 
new. Ebobrah notes that the ‘express conferment of competence by the proper authority 
prevents the employment of judicial activism or general principles of law as a basis for 
finding human rights jurisdiction’.622 His reason for this emphasis is the aversion of the threat 
of indeterminacy, as the product of a considered decision of the Authority, legislative 
conferment he argues, provides the opportunity to ensure proper definition of competence.  
The competence of the court is clearly not in doubt. But the court faces some crucial 
challenges mostly attributable to non-compliance by member states. Some questions also 
hang over the future of the court due to its hybrid nature.  One crucial feature of the Court’s 
human rights mandate is the lack of a human rights catalogue. This gamut makes the human 
rights mandate less than certain. The next section examines the practice and jurisprudence of 
the court to enhance the understanding of the Court as a human rights court and to highlight 
the critical practical issues facing the court as a supranational entity. 
 
4.4.1 MATERIAL JURISDICTION 
Generally, both the 1991 Protocol and 2005 Supplementary Protocol of the ECCJ empower 
the Court to adjudicate on disputes bordering on the interpretation of the Treaty of 
ECOWAS, the Protocols and Conventions and all other legal instruments of the 
organization.
623
 In the same vein, the new Article 9 gives the Court jurisdiction on matters 
relating to the legality of regulations, directives, decisions and other subsidiary legal 
instruments of the Community,
624
 the failure of Member States to honour their obligations as 
contained in the Treaty, Protocols, Conventions and other legal instruments of ECOWAS
625
 
and on cases of human rights violations that occur in Member States.
626
 
From the individual human rights perspective, this wide, boundless mandate of the Court can 
be problematic. This implies that the jurisdiction of the court extends to all cases of human 
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rights violations that occur in Member States. The absence of an ECOWAS human rights 
catalogue further accentuates this problem. Instead, as highlighted in Chapter 3 of this study, 
references made to human rights promotion and protection under the African Charter and (to 
a lesser extent) the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) suggest a link to these 
instruments. This indeterminacy in the mandate of the Court leaves open the question 
whether  it is exclusively ECOWAS instruments such as the Treaty, Conventions, Protocols 
and other subsidiary instruments that are applicable to human rights cases or whether the 
ECCJ is free to rely on international instruments. Considering that there are numerous rights 
provided for in community legal instruments, the rights contained in any of those treaties may 
be the basis for a human rights case before the ECCJ. At least the jurisprudence of the ECCJ 
in the past few years suggests this. The ECCJ in Keita v. Mali
627
 set the record straight that: 
“As regards material competence, the applicable texts are those produced by the Community for the 
needs of its functioning towards economic integration: the Revised Treaty, the Protocols, Conventions 
and subsidiary legal instruments adopted by the highest authorities of ECOWAS. It is therefore the 
non-observance of these texts which justifies the legal proceedings before the Court.” 
As Ebobrah notes, the effect of the ECCJ’s submission is three-fold.628 Firstly, it could mean 
that only those rights relevant for movement towards economic integration can base 
complaints of human rights violation. Secondly, the dicta could also mean, as long as a right 
or group of rights are present in any of these instruments adopted for the functioning towards 
economic integration, they form part of ECOWAS legislation and can be applied.
629
  
An interpretation of article 9(4) of the 2005 Court Protocol gives a third angle to this 
conundrum. The provision of this article could imply that all human rights reflected in any 
instrument referred to in community legislative instruments is sufficient to found an action 
for human rights before the Court.
630
 Consequently, any reference to human rights 
instruments in preambles and statements of fundamental principles of ECOWAS instruments 
would suffice as a source of rights under ECOWAS law. This approach was confirmed by the 
Court in the Ugokwe case where it interpreted article 4(g) of the Revised Treaty as requiring 
the application of the African Charter in the context of articles 9 and 10 of the 2005 
Supplementary Protocol. The Court affirmed:  
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“In articles 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Protocol, there is no specification or cataloguing of various 
human rights but by the provisions of article 4 paragraph (g) of the Treaty of the Community, the 
Member States of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are enjoined to adhere 
to the principles including ‘the recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in 
accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights… the inclusion 
and recognition of the African Charter in Article 4 of the Treaty of the Community behoves on the 
Court by Article 19 of the Protocol of the Court to bring in the application of those rights catalogued in 
the African Charter.”
631
 
The Court has so far not given similar justification which it offers for the African Charter for 
its use of the UDHR. However, a few cases have been brought before the Court based on the 
UDHR, and the Court it has relied on it to reach its decisions.
632
 The numerous references to 
the African Charter and the UDHR arguably indicate that both instruments form a crucial 
source of human rights before the Court. This view gives credence to the interpretation of 
article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol above. This view inevitably augurs well for 
litigants who can rely on both rich human rights instruments. 
Other human rights instruments worthy of mention that have litigants have founded actions 
upon include the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR),
633
 the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
634
 and the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
635
 
The ECCJ hinges the applicability of international covenants on constitutional convergence
636
 
common to Member States. In its recent judgement in SERAP v. Nigeria the court remarked 
thus: 
“The rights set up in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and other international 
instruments shall be guaranteed in each of the ECOWAS Member States; each individual or 
organisation shall be free to have recourse to the common or civil law courts, a court of special 
jurisdiction, or any other national institution established within the framework of an international 
instrument on Human Rights to ensure, to ensure the protection of his/her rights. 
Thus, even though ECOWAS may not have adopted a specific instrument recognizing human rights, 
the Court’s human rights protection mandate is exercised with regard to all the international 
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instruments, including […] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, etc. to which Member States of ECOWAS are 
parties.”
637
 
While the use of the constitutional convergence clause in the Protocol on Democracy and 
Good governance is arguable, the Court made clear that all international instruments of 
human rights, especially the African Charter and the international covenants apply to it. 
However, its assumption that an instrument adopted by Member States in their capacity as 
States automatically applies to it is questionable because ECOWAS as an organization is a 
separate entity. The only justification for this approach is the fact that these instruments 
constitute universal standards on human rights protection and the individuals whom the Court 
seeks to protect are those of the Member States. To a lesser extent, the ECCJ has rarely relied 
on national constitutions. There are very few cases before the ECCJ to the knowledge of this 
author that has relied on the constitutions of Member States.
 638
 It is not clear if national 
constitutions could constitute a source of community law as the ECCJ clearly confirmed in 
SERAP that ‘the sources of law that the Court takes into consideration in performing its 
mandate of protecting Human Rights are not the Constitutions of Member States’.639 
There are positives to the Court’s liberal interpretation of articles 9 and 10 of the 
Supplementary protocol. Certainly, this gives all classes of litigants the leverage to approach 
the court drawing from a wide array of human rights instruments. However, there is a 
reservation on this approach. It is dependent on the ability of the ECCJ to achieve results 
while acting within the limits of its competence as required by article 6(2) of the revised 
treaty. Article 6(2) limits the competence of community institutions and by implication the 
Court to powers expressly conferred by the community’s treaty and protocols. As a result, the 
ECCJ is constantly under the microscope with the question currently hanging over it as to 
whether it acts legitimately due to the indeterminacy of its mandate under the Supplementary 
Protocol. The downside to this approach is that ‘it puts the Court at risk of developing 
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jurisprudence that has the potential of being in conflict with the jurisprudence of the 
supervisory bodies of these treaties just as much as it raises questions of forum shopping’.640  
On the basis that the African Charter is arguably the most important human rights instrument 
before the ECCJ,
641
  and the Charter makes no distinctions between the different generations 
of rights, the Court is yet to make such distinctions on its own. Thus from the perspective of 
civil and cultural rights, the EECJ has received complaints on a variety of rights ranging from 
personal liberty, life, dignity and fair hearing,
642
 the right to property,
643
 to freedom from 
slavery,
644
 fair hearing and political participation.
645
 Economic, social and cultural rights 
(ECSR) which are more problematic for national courts have not featured much before the 
ECCJ. A rare case where such rights have been sought before the ECCJ is SERAP v Nigeria. 
The plaintiff brought an action against Nigeria seeking the protection of the economic rights 
of the oil rich Niger Delta region. The plaintiff alleged that the activities of oil companies in 
the region have led to massive oil spillage that had polluted the environment and denied the 
indigenes their means to livelihood which is fishing. The plaintiff relied on rights contained 
in the ICESR and the ICCPR, which Nigeria denied where justifiable or enforceable under 
the Nigerian constitution.
646
 The Court argued thus:  
“As to the justiciability or enforceability of the economic, social and cultural rights, this Court is of the 
view that instead of a generalistic approach recognizing or denying their enforceability, the appropriate 
way to deal with that issue is to analyze each right in concrete terms, try to determine which specific 
obligation it imposes on the States and Public Authorities, and whether that obligation can be enforced 
by the Courts.”
647
 
The Court cast its mind on the possibility that an international court may not possess the 
technical competence or legitimacy necessary to interfere with allocation of national 
resources. In this regard, the court stated: 
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“Indeed there are situations in which the enjoyment of the economic, social and cultural rights depends 
on the availability of State resources. In those situations, it is legitimate to raise the issue of 
enforceability of the concerned rights. But there are others in which the only obligation required from 
the State to satisfy rights is the exercise of its authority to enforce the law that recognizes such 
rights…”
648
 
Since the socio-economic rights which Nigeria is alleged to have abused fall well within the 
provisions of the African Charter, the ICCPR and the ICESR, Nigeria had no defence on the 
account that they fall within the Directive principles of State policy. The Court relying on its 
earlier decision in SERAP v. Nigeria & Universal Basic Education Commission
649
 held that 
once the concerned right for which the protection is sought by an individual is enshrined in an 
international instrument that is binding on a Member State, the domestic legislation or 
Constitution cannot prevail on an international instrument. Hence, Member States cannot 
violate their international obligations as contained in international instruments. 
In a nutshell, the collective approach which the ECCJ adopts to protect rights is significant 
because it provides the opportunity for Member States to be held to their international 
obligations as enshrined in the African Charter and other international instruments. This can 
only be beneficial to the Community citizen. It is also significant for direct application of the 
African Charter where domestic constitutional principles require national legislation before 
the Charter becomes applicable. However, this approach may raise challenges for intra-
organizational relations as would be revealed subsequently in this chapter. This unfettered 
material jurisdiction of the Court arguably reflects its nature as a supranational court but can 
be cause for clash with national courts and could potentially threaten the future of the court. 
This is true when it is considered that the membership of the organisation relates to limitation 
of sovereignty in specific agreed fields. 
 
4.4.2 TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION  
Article 9(4) of the Supplementary Protocol provides that the human rights jurisdiction of the 
Court covers violation of human rights ‘that occur in any member state’ of the Community. 
The choice of the word ‘member state’ as opposed to ‘state party’ suggests that the 
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jurisdiction of the Court covers non-state parties to the Court’s Protocol.650 However, this is 
insignificant considering that Member States of ECOWAS are also parties to the Court. In the 
same vein, the human rights complaints mechanism of the ECCJ is applicable to the 
territories of all fifteen Member States currently parties to the ECOWAS Treaty and the 
Court Protocol (as amended by the 2005 Supplementary Protocol).
651
 As article 9(4) of the 
Supplementary Protocol currently stands, there is nothing to restrict the jurisdiction of the 
Court over a Member State of ECOWAS for any rights violation that such State allegedly 
carries out against any community citizen in the territory of another Member State. 
As the ECCJ, national courts (each in their states), the African Court on Human Rights and 
African Commission all have human rights jurisdiction, the potential for forum shopping is 
high. Within the African Charter, the only provision that could possibly stem this problem of 
jurisdictional conflicts are article 56(7) of the African Charter and article 109d)(II) of the 
Supplementary Protocol of the ECCJ. But the possibility of the ECCJ adhering to the former 
provision is remote as the Court does not consider itself to be bound by secondary rules in the 
African Charter.
652
 
Another challenge of the ECCJ with respect to its territorial jurisdiction is its location. The 
Court is located in Abuja, Nigeria.
653
 It is not hard to imagine that those at the receiving end 
of human rights violations are citizens at the lower end of the economic spectrum and as a 
result, would have problems accessing the Court in a timely and affordable manner. The 
Court has most recently sat in Ibadan, Nigeria in its attempt to spread its tentacles.
654
 In the 
same year, in Valentine Ayika v. Liberia,
655
 the ECCJ sat in Cotonou, Benin Republic. The 
Court has also held sessions in the premises of the apex courts in Niger,
656
 Benin,
657
 and 
Burkina Faso and Mali.
658
 This would go a long way in dispelling the perception that the 
ECCJ is a Court used by only Nigerians. Admittedly, this problem is down to funding by 
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Member States but can only hamper the court as individuals with strong cases from other 
Member States might be shut out.
659
 
 
4.4.3 LOCUS STANDI BEFORE THE COURT 
Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol of the Court grants access to the Court to Member 
States, the Executive Secretary, the President of the ECOWAS Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, individuals, corporate bodies and staff of any Community institution.
660
 As 
previously argued, in relation to failure to fulfil a Community obligation, it appears that any 
Member State or the President of the Commission (as legal representative of ECOWAS) are 
competent to bring a human rights case against a Member State.
661
 Since the objective of the 
revised Treaty and the relevant protocols is to guarantee promotion and protection of human 
rights set out in the African Charter in community states, there is no limitation of this 
obligation to rights of citizens of the violating Member State. Accordingly, access to the 
ECCJ against any Member State under Article 10 need not be only where the victim of the 
violation is a citizen of the offending State.
662
 There has been no case between Member 
States before the ECCJ seeking the protection of citizens against each other. 
Regarding access to ‘corporate bodies’ before the ECCJ, the Supplementary protocol omits to 
describe what organizations qualify as corporate bodies. It is expected that use of the term 
corporate bodies includes non-governmental organizations (NGOs). However, the wording of 
the provision of Article 10(c) to the extent that such actions should be in determination of 
acts or inactions of a Community official which violates the rights of individual or corporate 
bodies’, creates the impression that any action brought upon the facts that do not show the 
violation of the rights of the corporate body may not succeed.
663
 
                                                          
659
 In this wise, Ebobrah has suggested the provision of pro bono services for indigent litigants. This is an 
obvious omission in the Rules of Procedure of the Court. See Ebobrah (2010), p. 11. 
660
 See, Article 4 of the Supplementary Protocol. 
661
 See, Article 9(3) of Protocol A/P1/7/91 and the new article 10(a) of the Supplementary Protocol. It is 
noteworthy that  by article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol, only provisions of Protocol A/P1/7/91 that are 
inconsistent with the Supplementary Protocol are null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. However, 
article 9 of Protocol A/P1/7/91 is defunct as it has been repealed by article 3 of the 2005 Supplementary 
Protocol. 
662
 In a handful of cases, individuals from other Member States have brought actions against an offending 
Member State. See, Djot Bayi & 14 ors. vs Nigeria & 4 ors (Unreported Suit No: ECW/CCJ/JUD/01/09); Ocean 
King Nig. Ltd vs Senegal (Unreported Suit No: ECW/CCJ/APP/05/08); Femi Falana & Anor vs Republic of Benin & 
2 ors (Unreported Suit no: ECW/CCJ/APP/10/07); Ayika supra. 
663
 See Articles 3 and 4 of the Supplementary Protocol. 
150 | P a g e  
 
The Supplementary Protocol is also silent on the class of defendants before the Court. 
However a combined reading of the new Articles 9 and 10 of the Supplementary Protocol 
suggests that Member States, the Community, Community institutions and Community 
officials all qualify as defendants before the Court. In relation to paragraph (d), the Protocol 
does not specify against whom the individual right of access can be exercised. A look through 
the case law of the Court shows that reasonable numbers of human rights cases have been 
brought against Community institutions and Community officials.
664
 The most obvious 
defendants however, remain Member States of ECOWAS in actions for failure to fulfil 
human obligations enshrined in the ECOWAS Treaty, Protocols, Conventions and other legal 
instruments that Member States are party to.  
Another effect of the imprecise couching of articles 9(4) and 10(d) of the Supplementary 
Protocol is the possibility to bring human rights action against non-state actors before the 
ECCJ. By granting jurisdiction to the ECCJ to determine all cases of human rights violations 
that occur in Member States and grant access to individuals for applications for relief for such 
violations, the Supplementary Protocol appears to have granted a ‘blank cheque’665 for 
human rights protection. In SERAP v. Nigeria, the Court was presented with an opportunity 
to lay a marker on the activities of non-state actors in Member States that violate the human 
rights of community citizens. But the ECCJ held that it had no jurisdiction over the co-
defendants that are multinational corporations, but enforced the violation of the rights against 
Nigeria as a Member State of ECOWAS. The Court’s decision is justifiable, as corporations 
are not parties to international human rights instruments and as such have no human rights 
obligation under international law. Current legal scholarship seeks to fill this gap in 
international human rights protection and hold non-state actors accountable for their activities 
that lead to human rights violations.
666
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Third parties who consider that their interest may be affected by ongoing human rights 
proceedings are allowed to intervene under the Supplementary Protocol.
667
 While this 
provision was originally designed for States, since the introduction of the Supplementary 
Protocol individuals have relied on it to join proceedings as co-respondents with a State or an 
individual.
668
 
Clearly, the ECCJ’s human rights jurisdiction extends over the territories, citizens and 
institutions of ECOWAS Member States as well as its own institutions. While it is imperative 
that its mandate cover the above subjects and entities, it potentially evokes concerns over the 
effectiveness of its mandate, particularly as it relates to Member States and their institutions 
on the one hand, and other continental human rights institutions on the other. The 
organizations may be faced with the task of properly defining its relations with these 
institutions in future. The positive side to this ‘complex web’ is the fact that the ECCJ like 
other RECs with human rights mandate augments the efforts of the over-burdened African 
Commission, and the newly established African Court on Human and Peoples Rights before 
which individuals and NGOs still lack locus standi.
669
 The emergence of the human rights 
mandate is therefore, a welcome development for human rights protection in the sub-region 
and the larger continent. There is no evidence to point to the ECCJ’s jurisdiction affecting the 
submission of cases to the African Commission. However, it must be borne in mind that the 
risk of jurisdictional conflicts in the horizontal and vertical relations with other institutions 
remains. These relational issues may be resolved through cooperation and coordination,
670
 or 
constitutionally as would be revealed below. 
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4.4.4 PROCEDURE BEFORE THE ECCJ 
Procedure before the ECCJ is contained in the Rules of Procedure of the Court and the 
protocols of the Court.  The Court adopted its rules of procedure in August 2003 on the basis 
of the authority granted in article 32 of the 1991 protocol. At the time of adoption of the rules 
of procedure the Court was yet to obtain its human rights mandate and as such could not 
entertain cases from individuals. The Supplementary Protocol of 2005 is an improvement on 
the 1991 protocol and contains most provisions that are contributory to the human rights 
procedure before the ECCJ. Under article 10(d), the two conditions that must be fulfilled 
before individual applications are accepted are that the application should not be anonymous 
and should not have been instituted before another international court for adjudication. 
The most conspicuous and perhaps the most controversial omission from the rules of the 
court is the question of exhaustion of local remedies. The Court has consistently insisted that 
the requirement to exhaust local remedies does not apply to human rights cases brought under 
the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/01/05.
671
 In Ocean King vs. Senegal
672
  the Court stated 
thus: 
“ … The rule on exhaustion of local remedies is derived from customary international law which 
requires the exhaustion of local remedies before a claim may be brought before an international court. 
However it is not an inflexible rule.  
Under Article 10 of the Supplementary Protocol of 2005, any provision of a prior Protocol which is 
inconsistent with the provisions of the 2005 Supplementary Protocol is to the extent of the 
inconsistency null and void. Thus, Article 39 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, 
which is clearly in conflict with the provisions of Article 4(d) of the Supplementary Protocol of 2005 
with respect to the exhaustion of local remedies as a condition precedent to the institution of an action 
in human rights, is null and void to that extent.”
673
 
The Court rightfully stated that the rule of exhaustion is a customary international law one 
but also a flexible one. Being that the Supplementary Protocol does not require the 
establishment of the rule for institution of an action in human rights, it overrules an earlier 
community law in the form of Article 39 of the Protocol on Democracy and Good 
Governance which is still in operation. However correct the dictum of the Court appears to be 
in this regard, a rejection of the rule to exhaust local remedies has adverse implications not 
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only on the procedure of the Court, but also has the potential to sour its relationship with 
municipal courts and may have consequences for the application of res judicata between both 
levels. The Court could be seen as unduly asserting its authority on municipal courts. What 
makes the position of the Court more surprising is that the African Charter which the Court 
has constantly relied on in these cases expressly proclaims the rule.
674
 Given that the Court 
has jurisdiction to interpret and apply the Treaty and the same treaty in Article 4(g) alludes to 
the ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights in accordance with 
the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, is the ECCJ bound by 
this provision to exhaust domestic remedies?  
Admittedly, the exhaustion of local remedies is a procedural requirement, one which the 
Court has held that the Supplementary Protocol does not require and as a secondary rule of 
another Court would not apply to it.  If the jurisprudence of the African Court is of persuasive 
effect, it would be important to see what it says on this requirement. In Urban Mkandawire vs 
Malawi
675
  the African Court reaffirmed the centrality of the requirement to exhaust local 
remedies in human rights cases before it. Relying on Mariblanca Staff Wilson and Oscar E. 
Ceville v. Panama E. Ceville vs Panama
676
 before the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights (IACHR), the court held that ‘the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies is 
fundamental in the inter-action between State parties to both the Protocol and the Charter, 
and their national courts, on the one hand, and this Court, on the other hand”.677  
The exhaustion requirement is the ‘procedural pivot of human rights redress procedures’678 
and the ECCJ seems to under estimate the adverse implications of its position on the rule on 
its human rights mandate. There is a double barrel effect to the non-applicability of the rule 
of exhaustion. One effect is that the ECCJ is forced to become a court of first instance which 
opens the possibility of forum shopping, thereby opening the flood gates for every single case 
of injustice from the 15 ECOWAS member states. The other effect is that majority of human 
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rights cases are treated first at national courts thereby barring those cases afterwards from 
reaching the ECCJ. 
It appears that the reason to leave out the rule of exhaustion was strategic. Alter et al notes 
that three design features of the supplementary protocol – direct access by individuals, open-
ended legal norms, and non-exhaustion of domestic remedies collectively gave the ECCJ 
much broader authority than other human rights tribunals.
679
 The open ended legal norms are 
viewed by the judges as an ‘opportunity to define and delimit the scope and legal parameters 
of its human rights mandate in its own image.’680  These features dramatically enhance the 
legal and political salience of the ECCJ in West Africa. The advantage of this omission is 
steeped in the fact that litigants can bypass national courts and immediately file suits at the 
ECCJ, enabling ECCJ judges to adjudicate complaints within months or even weeks after the 
alleged violations occur. Connected to this reality, is the fact that dispensation justice in most 
West African countries is slow, particularly Nigeria where the ECCJ is headquartered.
681
 
The requirement that cases should not be brought twice is a codification of the principle of lis 
pendens. In terms of the horizontal relations with other international mechanisms and Courts 
exercising competence in the sub-region, this is an important provision. One uncertainty in 
this regard is whether quasi – judicial bodies such as the African Commission and the 
African’s Children Committee may qualify as international courts. Other than these specific 
concerns, the current rules of procedure seem adequate for the purpose of human rights 
competence of the ECCJ, at least at this stage in the court’s life. 
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4.5 OTHER CRITICAL ISSUES FACING THE COURT 
 4.5.1    QUALIFICATION OF JUDGES  
Article 3 of the 1991 protocol on the Community Court of Justice stipulates that the 
qualification for appointment as a judge of the ECCJ is “high moral character and… the 
qualification required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial 
offices” or by being a “jurisconsult of recognized competence in international law”.682 This 
provision was subsequently amended by the Supplementary Protocol, but the only addition in 
terms of qualification for the office of a judge of the ECCJ is that “jurisconsults of recognized 
competence in international law” should be versed “particularly in areas of community law or 
regional integration”.683 Because factors shaping IC decision-making are more likely to be 
legal and/or related to the professional background of judges, it is important that community 
judges are well versed in community law. This way, they possess an international outlook, 
devoid of the undue influence of member states and are able to better protect their ‘strategic 
space’684 from which they make sound decisions for the furtherance of community objectives. 
Experience or qualification in human rights is not a consideration for appointment as a judge 
of the ECCJ. An argument could be espoused that national judges are not required to possess 
any special human rights qualification to be appointed, yet they are the first port of call in the 
event of an alleged human rights violation. However, the ECCJ as a post-national human 
rights institution requires some ‘specialized –knowledge and expertise’685  in the field of 
human rights. The practicality of this requirement stems from the need for ICs to provide 
leadership and guidance for national courts in the application of human rights instruments. 
The leadership of the ECCJ is even more relevant when the normative legitimacy of 
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WTO: Discursive, Constitutional and Political Constraints’, 98 American Journal of International Law, (2004), 
249. See also, T. Ginsburg, ‘Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking’, 45 Virginia Journal of 
International Law (2005), 631. 
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ECOWAS is taken into context. Appended to this leadership argument is the gap between 
international judges and direct domestic mandates. This specialised knowledge it is believed 
would aid the in-depth analysis needed for supranational courts to decide most human rights 
cases which often have political implications in member states. In this wise, the original 
composition of the ECCJ may pose potential challenges for the credible exercise of its human 
rights mandate in terms of not requiring any specific human rights qualification for 
appointment of judges.
686
 
 
4.5.2 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE ECCJ: THE UGOKWE CASE 
Judicial Independence strikes at the heart of what is different about a world with ICs and also 
very important in the African regional integration context. There are a multitude of 
definitions of judicial independence, but most scholars agree on a common element. Most 
scholars agree that judicial independence allows judges to develop legal opinions 
unconstrained by the preferences of other actors.
687
 Helfer and Slaughter maintain that 
independence is the key to the legitimacy and effectiveness of ICs.
688
 As a result it is 
pertinent to examine the extent to with ECCJ judges who are crucial players in the new found 
human rights mandate of the court are independent. At the international level, the Bangalore 
Principles of Judicial Conduct
689
 recognizes judicial independence as a ‘prerequisite to the 
rule of law and a fundamental guarantee to a fair trial’.690 Moreover, the African Charter 
places a duty on State parties to guarantee the independence of courts.
691
 This underlines the 
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indispensability of an independent court as a determinant variable for normative legitimacy of 
the Court and the organization.
692
 
 As events in the currently suspended SADC tribunal continue to unfold, regional courts in 
Africa are yet to be totally perceived as independent actors in the integration process.
693
 Even 
more disturbing is the culture of disregard for rule of law amongst African heads of state and 
the intergovernmentalist overweight which characterizes the institutional design in most 
African RECs’. The ECCJ is certainly not immune to this power tussle between governments 
and ICs and the Ugokwe case provides ample evidence of this. The new human rights 
mandate of the ECCJ even further distends the possibility of a cat and mouse game between 
both actors as the SADC tribunal’s predicament has recently demonstrated. 
The fall out of the Ugokwe case raises some salient questions about the independence of 
ECCJ judges and the lack of human rights qualification of judges. It is important to expatiate 
the facts of the case in question in order to highlight the issues that formed the basis of the 
dispute between the ECCJ and Nigeria. The applicant, Mr Ugokwe, lost an election into the 
Nigerian Federal House of Representatives. He was initially declared the winner by the 
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). His opponent, Christian Okeke, 
appealed the decision to the Nigerian Elections Tribunal, arguing that Ugokwe was not a 
legitimate candidate for office. The Elections tribunal annulled Ugokwe’s election, and the 
Federal Court of Appeal- the final arbiter for all election disputes – upheld that decision. The 
applicant thereafter brought the case before the ECCJ contesting amongst other things  an 
infringement upon his right to fair hearing- a right guaranteed by Article 7 of the African 
Charter on the one hand, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the other hand; and 
finally, by Section 36 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
Ugokwe requested the ECCJ to issue a special interim order preventing the Nigerian 
authorities from invalidating his initial election victory or from seating his opponent. In his 
plea for a special interim order, he enjoined INEC to refrain from (a) invalidating his election 
or (b) taking any steps towards his replacement; and (2) the Federal National Assembly from 
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relieving him of his seat.
694
 The President of the ECCJ, Justice Donli issued the interim order 
barring the National Assembly from swearing in Okeke while Ugokwe’s complaint was 
pending.
695
 Nigeria challenged the suit and asked for a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and 
because Ugokwe’s appeal to the high court was still pending. The government accused the 
applicant of “forum shopping” with courts.696 The ECCJ’s response was to renew the interim 
order before it left for a recess. President Donli justified the court’s action as necessary to 
preserve “the res” until the ECCJ could review Ugokwe’s allegations.697  
Despite the dissent displayed on the part of the government, Nigerian officials complied with 
the ECCJs directives. The Attorney general and Minister of Justice informed the Speaker of 
the Federal House of Representatives of the Court’s order “not to swear [Okeke] in until the 
case is fully settled by the [ECCJ]. A massive uproar trailed the Attorney general’s order with 
Nigerian lawyers, activists, and citizens characterizing the dispute as a matter outside the 
ECCJ’s authority.698 They noted that the ECCJ had breached the Nigerian Constitution which 
clearly states that “decisions of the Court of Appeal in respect of appeals arising from 
election petitions shall be final.”699  
The ECCJ eventually threw the case out after it reasoned that “no provision whether general 
or specific, gives the court powers to adjudicate on electoral issues or matters arising 
thereof.”700 The court also asserted that it “is not a court of Appeal or cassation” over 
municipal courts. As a result, the court declared that it lacked authority to intervene against 
the execution of the judgement already made by the Federal Appeal Court of the Member 
State of Nigeria. The ECCJ judges failed to explain why the case was entertained in the first 
place but instead sent clear signals that it would not entertain or intervene in electoral matters 
in the future. The ECCJ was clearly in the right to entertain the case because the applicant 
claimed that his right to fair hearing had been breached but the electoral nature of the dispute 
and the subsequent ‘intervention’ of the court left a bitter taste in the mouth of the 
government which felt that the court was over-reaching into the judicial autonomy of 
domestic courts. 
                                                          
694
 Ugokwe supra, para 14.2 – 14.3. 
695
 L. Okenwa, ‘Election Petition: ECOWAS Court Stops Ugokwe’s Successor, This Day (Nig.), June 2, 2005, 2005 
WLNR 8843638. 
696
 FG Asks ECOWAS Court to Dismiss Ugokwe Suit, Vanguard (Nig.), June 17, 2005, available at 
http://allafrica.com/thread/comment/main/main/pkey/aans:post:200506170727.html (accessed 15 April 2014 
697
 Okenwa supra. 
698
 Alter et al (2013), p.759. 
699
 Article 246(3) of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
700
 Ugokwe supra, para 19. 
159 | P a g e  
 
In a move indicative of Nigeria’s discontent at the manner the Ugokwe case was handled, 
member states created a community Judicial Council
701
 to ensure that the Court is endowed 
with the best qualified and competent persons, by virtue of their quality and experience, to 
the establishment of Community laws capable of consolidating and accelerating the regional 
integration process.
702
  It came as no surprise that member states took this corrective step as it 
was obvious that the intervention of the ECCJ somewhat exposed what was arguably a lack 
of experience on the path of the judges. 
The Judicial Council increases the influence of national judges in the selection of ECCJ 
judges. The Council is made up of chief judges from member states not represented on the 
seven members ECCJ.
703
 ECCJ Judges are appointed by the Authority and consist of seven 
members, no two of whom may be nationals of the same State.
704
 The Authority makes a 
political determination as to which country is next in line to appoint a judge. The ECOWAS 
Legal Affairs Directorate then advertises the position and collects applications. Every 
application that meets specified criteria is forwarded to the Judicial Council, which vets 
applicants and interviews candidates. The Council then selects three candidates and forwards 
their names, together with point-based rankings, to the ECOWAS Authority, which decides 
which candidate to appoint to the Court. As of 2012, only one set of appointment had been 
made using the new procedures. It is expected that appointments will become more frequent 
since the reforms that created the Judicial Council also reduced the tenure of ECCJ judges – 
from five years with the possibility of one reappointment to a single four-year non-renewable 
term.
705
 
In addition to this new selection process, the Judicial Council oversees the procedures under 
which ECCJ judges can be dismissed for malfeasance.
706
 The procedures of the Council 
might come across as problematic to an observer, in that they contemplate dismissals for 
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psychological impairments and public statements.
707
  The Judicial Council might also appear 
as a ‘control mechanism’ by the member states robbing the court of its independence. As 
Bradley and Kelley observe: 
Independence […] depends on the control mechanisms that a state has over the decision-making body 
through its representation on the body, the body’s rules and procedures, other institutional features such 
as oversight mechanisms, the permanence of the delegation, and authority over finances
708
 
In response to this, ECOWAS officials and lawyers explain that detailed dismissal procedures 
of this kind are standard for government positions and judgeships in West Africa. Seen from 
this perspective, the fact that a council of chief judges from unrepresented member states 
oversees the application of judicial disciplinary proceedings nullifies to an extent the 
possibility to punish ECCJ judges for embarrassing rulings. 
It is unlikely that the deadlock in the SADC would manifest in ECOWAS although the 
situations in both cases are different, hence the difference in outcomes. The Mike Campbell 
case concerns land reforms in Zimbabwe,
709
 a politically sensitive matter, and the decision of 
the Tribunal was a final judgement against the member state.
710
 In Ugokwe, the issue in 
contention was an order of court in an electoral case already determined by national courts 
and which the Nigerian constitution covers. The fact that the applicant claimed an 
infringement of his right to fair hearing does not entitle the court to order a halt in swearing in 
the applicant’s opponent – declared winner by the Appeal court.  The Nigerian government 
perhaps perceived that wrestling powers from the ECCJ would adversely affect the 
legitimacy of ECOWAS and would also lead to distrust on the part of smaller member 
states.
711
 Instead, the Judicial Council was created to appoint the best qualified and competent 
judges to oversee the court and make better legal judgements.   
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The court also faced enormous political backlash from the Gambian government after its 
decisions in Chief Ebrimah Manneh v. Republic of Gambia,
712
 and Musa Saidykhan v. 
Republic of Gambia
713
 respectively. In both cases, the ECCJ ruled in favour of the applicants, 
exposing in the process, the flagrant violation of human rights occurring in the Gambia 
particularly directed towards journalists. The Gambian government ignored the ruling of the 
court on both occasions and carried out a political attack on the ECCJ. In 2009, the Gambia 
called for a revision of the 2005 Supplementary protocol and a restriction of the Court’s 
authority.
714
 The ECOWAS Commission posed the proposal to the ECOWAS Committee of 
Legal Experts who recommended against revising the Supplementary Protocol. In October 
2009, the Council of Justice Ministers endorsed the Committee’s recommendations, which 
had the effect of shelving the proposal. The Gambia’s proposal provided a clear opportunity 
for member states to review the 2005 Supplementary Protocol and revise the ECCJ’s 
jurisdiction. That they turned down this opportunity is striking and arguably hints at a 
willingness to maintain a supranational court with a human rights mandate. The defeat of 
Gambia’s judicial reform campaign further ‘bolstered the Court’s legitimacy’.715 
Independence of an IC does not necessarily imply effectiveness. There appear sufficient 
institutional guarantees for judicial independence of the ECCJ. At least at this stage it appears 
that the judges of the ECCJ are independent of Member State influence in reaching its 
judgements. However, the past record of some Member States in terms of obeying the rule of 
law in their various States and the political backlash it has received in the above instances 
might play somewhat on the mind of the judges. The judges seem well aware of this risk and 
have continued to forge strong political relationships with community citizens, civil society 
and other actors in the integration process. This would certainly legitimize the Court and 
place it on a strong footing irrespective of the power of politicians over it. 
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4.5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ECOWAS COURT AND MUNICIPAL COURTS 
Based on the postulations of Hay
716
 and Weiler
717
 earlier examined on supranationalism, 
organization’s normative powers only qualify as supranational, where there is a direct 
binding effect of law emanating from it on natural and legal persons in member states. In the 
greater context of this study, the normative legitimacy of the ECCJ is directly connected to 
the effectiveness of its decisions in Member States, represented in this case by enforcement 
through national institutions, particularly the courts. The ECOWAS treaty already provides 
that the judgments of the ECCJ are binding on Member States.
 718
  In addition, the ECCJ 
procedurally relies on national courts for enforcement.  
Any examination of the relationship between a supranational court and its national 
counterparts would imply investigating the nature of such a relationship. Are there are 
procedural mechanisms that ensure that both spheres interface? In practice, is such a 
relationship one that shapes cooperation or collaboration? These are salient questions that 
define and ascertain the nature of the relationship between the ECCJ and national courts. 
 The first channel of legal and jurisdictional relationship between both spheres is the 
preliminary reference procedure.
719
 The Supplementary Protocol in Article 10(f) provides 
that ‘where in any action before a court of a Member State, an issue arises as to the 
interpretation of a provision of the Treaty, or the other protocols or regulations, the national 
court may on its own or at the request of any of the parties to the action refer the issue to the 
Court for interpretation’. While this mechanism should prima facie enhance greater ties 
between the ECCJ and national courts, there are loopholes in the manner in which it is 
couched and this makes its operation problematic.   
Firstly, Article 10(f) refers solely to the interpretation of the ECOWAS treaty and other laws 
enacted in the framework of the Community – Community law. A literal interpretation of this 
provision implies that the mechanism does not apply to the interpretation of provisions of the 
African Charter which forms the normative basis of the ECCJ’s human rights jurisprudence. 
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This can be problematic as it poses the risk of inconsistent interpretation between the ECCJ 
and national courts in human rights cases. 
Another reason is the fact that the preliminary reference procedure provided under Article 
10(f) is only optional.
720
 Municipal courts may, therefore, choose not to refer interpretation of 
Community law to the ECCJ. The use of this mechanism to strengthen ties between both 
spheres appears far-fetched as a result. As one commentator rightly points out, the 
relationship ‘will eventually depend mainly on the spirit of cooperation of domestic courts.721 
As at the time of writing, there is still no request for a preliminary ruling from domestic 
courts. The lack of preliminary ruling requests before the ECCJ has been attributed to the 
limited economic interaction among ECOWAS countries, which in explains the poverty of 
related litigation and by human rights matters overwhelming the ECCJ’s docket since 
2005.
722
 
Irrespective of the above limitations, the preliminary reference procedure could potentially 
improve the relationship between both levels and enhance the influence of the ECCJ. One 
benefit of the mechanism, related to the question of competence, is that it creates a clear 
demarcation on the role of the ECCJ and municipal courts in human rights protection. In 
other words, the ECCJ as mandated by the treaty will interpret and domestic courts will apply 
community law. More importantly, despite the impression that the relationship between the 
ECCJ and national courts is a horizontal one, municipal courts cannot set aside an 
interpretation of the ECCJ in a preliminary ruling. As the former President of the Court 
explains: 
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The ECCJ’s role here is to give preliminary ruling as to the interpretation or validity of the Treaty 
provision or community Act, while the National Courts shall apply the ruling to the facts of the case. In 
other words, the Court’s role is to interpret, while the National Court’s role is to apply’.
723 
The use of ‘shall’ indicates that national courts must apply the ruling of the facts of the case 
as interpreted by the court without challenging it. In this regard, the use of the permissive 
language ‘May’ in Article 10(f) may be misleading. However, the same wording ‘may’ is 
used in UEMOA and OHADA Court rulings, even though the procedure is compulsory.
724
 
The roles are clearly defined such that, interpretation is left to the supranational court while 
domestic courts will only apply the ruling from above. 
In trying to harmonize the ‘integrated community legal order’ and balance both systems for 
efficient enforcement of ECCJ judgements, one system has to make certain concessions. In 
this case, it is the national system that needs to accept the Community Court’s jurisprudence. 
On the ECCJ’s side, to avoid clashes the Court must exercise caution in adjudicating cases 
that have been examined by national courts before making its way to Abuja. A look through 
the Court’s case law suggests that the ECCJ has made reasonable progress in this regard.725 
The difficulty in this legal harmonisation or ‘judicial monism’726  which the ECCJ strongly 
calls for is its ostrich approach towards national courts. Domestic norms and court 
pronouncements inconsistent with ECCJ case law may subsist because the position of the 
court is uncertain.  
The Court may be excused for threading with caution to avoid adversity from Member States, 
especially in its reluctance to make findings that might contradict the precedent of national 
courts. A trend which has currently been discovered in the Court’s jurisprudence is that it 
finds in its arguments that domestic law and practice fall short of international standards 
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while at the same time failing to draw the relevant consequences and making corresponding 
orders in the operative part of the decisions.
727
 
In the main, the status of the ECCJ’s decisions in the domestic order suggests an implied 
jurisdictional superiority stemming from supranationality and jurisprudential authority. In this 
regard, the Supplementary Protocol states that “only the Community Court may suspend a 
writ of execution issued in enforcement of its decisions”.728 It is therefore sustainable that the 
ECCJ due to the binding nature of its decisions on Member States and courts appears to be 
superior in human rights protection and may potentially exert influence in this respect. It is 
worthy of mention that the refusal of national courts to recognize that the ECCJ’s decisions 
are enforceable despite contrary national decisions are sanctionable under the revised 
treaty.
729
  It is argued that this hierarchical ordering of the ECCJ is essential to ensuring 
consistent interpretation of African human rights law, and this necessitates the need for 
constant interaction between the continental human rights bodies, the ECCJ and national 
courts.
730
 
 
4.6 THE POSITION OF MEMBER STATE CONSTITUTIONS ON COMMUNITY LAW: A 
LOOK AT  SELECT MEMBER STATES 
A corollary to the relationship between the ECCJ and national courts is how to manage the 
limitation of national judicial sovereignty of Member States to ensure that community law is 
recognized as superior to national law and is accordingly applied and interpreted by national 
courts at the instance of community citizens.  The revised treaty and Protocols of the 
Community or general community law certainly qualify as capable of influencing domestic 
legislation and the decisions of national courts.
731
 However, this does not appear to be the 
case in practice. A situation where West African national judiciaries regard the Revised 
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Treaty to be of persuasive authority in the absence of domestication would open up a crucial 
angle for the direct enforceability of ECCJ judgements and community law in general.  
Having stated the above, the crucial question remains, how receptive are the constitutions of 
member states to the novelty of the Community Court within the framework of the 
administration of justice. In another word, how willing are Member States to ‘lift the veil of 
nationality to enable their citizens explore the window of transnational jurisdiction presented 
by the Community Court, in practical terms?’732 Regional Integration makes constitutional 
demands, and member states must be prepared to rethink or amend existing constitutional or 
legislative provisions to accommodate community law and the community itself within their 
respective states.  
The ECJ in Costa v ENEL
733
 was of the opinion that EC law would be wholy ineffective if 
subordinated to the national law of members. Furthermore, the ECJ was of the view that 
European Community law cannot be overridden by domestic law without the legal basis of 
the community itself being called in the question. If the ECJ in Costa established the direct 
effect and applicability of EC law in member states, it further went ahead to Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft
734
 to declare that the  EC law has supremacy over the constitutions if the 
member states.  In line with these submissions, the European legal order was created with the 
consequence being the super-imposition of community law over national law. 
Article 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Benin, 1990; Article 4 of the Constitution of 
Gambia, 1997; Article 1 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992; Article 2 of 
the Constitution of Liberia, 1984; Section 1 (3) of the Constitution Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 1999; made their various constitutions supreme and binding on all persons and 
authorities within their respective spheres of influence. Any law that is inconsistent with the 
provisions of the respective constitutions is null and void to the extent of its inconsistency. 
These provisions are an extract of the principle established by the Chief Justice Marshall of 
the US Supreme Court in Madbury v. Madison when he declared: 
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Certainly all those who have framed written constitutions contemplate them as forming the 
fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently, the theory of every such government 
must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void.
735
 
 
The implication of these provisions is that nothing which has been prohibited by the written 
constitutions can take effect within the municipal sphere. 
 Rett Ludwikowski observes thus: 
The coherent and well-integrated legal system cannot digest the concept of more than one supreme 
element… In the situation in which the Constitutions of all Member States were either amended or left 
flexible enough to accommodate the principle of the supremacy of Community law, the argument that 
they are still the supreme laws of these countries cannot bring us too far.
736
 
 
While Ludwikowski’s remark holds sway and is largely the traditional position of 
international law, it must be borne in mind that community law may be supreme in agreed 
areas outlined in the treaty. For cohesion to take place in a well-integrated legal system 
municipal law must make certain concessions in form of constitutional amendment to give 
community law supremacy – making national law subsidiary to community law in certain key 
areas. As Dorwick observes in the context of the EU, one of the salient features of the EU 
legal order is that ‘for the most part it is essentially a co-operative, a consensual system, not a 
coercive order’.737 Certainly, there must be room for encroachment of the sovereignty of the 
nation-state in certain areas especially regarding law, for integration to take place. It is not so 
much of one replacing the other, but a co-operative relationship between the two spheres. 
Typically, there is no uniformity in the way that states seek to introduce international law into 
their municipal systems. In ECOWAS the legal systems lie predominantly along two axis; the 
monist and dualist systems of law.
738
 In the monist system, treaties are directly incorporated 
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into the legal system. Such treaties take precedence over and are superior to municipal law 
except a contrary intention is provided in the constitution of the country. Monism envisages 
that national law must be in conformity with international or else it is a nullity. Dualism on 
the other hand is steeped in legal positivism. It sequestrates municipal law and international 
law into separate realms regulating different subjects. Consequently, international law does 
not form part of municipal law. Therefore, the rule of one system cannot trump the other; 
neither can the question of supremacy arise since they are not related.  
The dualist approach shifts the power of implementation of community law to national courts 
that operate on the notion that the national legal order is supreme and that every other legal 
order, including the international legal order, is subordinate to it, except a municipal 
legislation provides otherwise. This problem is evident even when both systems are made to 
operate under a common field and regulate a common subject. In this case, the African 
Charter, under the same substantive provisions. Under this system judges cannot take 
cognizance of international law, without an enabling national legislation to that effect. 
ECOWAS Member states share in the monist/dualist dichotomy, with some countries 
(francophone countries) operating a mixed system in practice. Article 147 of the Constitution 
of the Republic of Benin;
739
 Article 149 of the Constitution  of Burkina Faso 1991 as 
amended; Article 85 of the Constitution of Cote d’Ivoire; Article 75 of the Constitution of 
Ghana; Article 77 of the Fundamental Law of Guinea; Article 114 of the Constitution of 
Mali; Article 130 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic of Niger 1999; Section 12(1) of 
the Nigeria Constitution 1999; Article 78 of the Constitution of Mauritania, 1991; Article 96 
of the Constitution of the Republic of Senegal 2001;
740
 Article 138 of the Constitution of 
Togo, 1992 are all dualists in nature; they all require legislative action to pass treaties into 
law before such treaties can take effect in their respective domestic legal order. 
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The Lusophone countries of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau generally follow the monist 
tradition. Article 11(1) of the Constitution of Cape Verde, 1992 as amended in 1999, makes 
international law an integral part of Cape Verde legal system. Article 11(3) stipulates 
specifically that ‘The legal acts emanating from the relevant organs of the supranational 
organisations of which Cape Verde is a member, shall enter directly into force in the 
domestic legal order…’ Based on this provision, a treaty such as the Revised Treaty is 
superior to the national laws of Cape Verde. Thus article 11(4) of the constitution further 
provides that the rules and principles of general or common international law and of 
conventional international law, validly approved or ratified, shall prevail, after entry into 
force in the international and domestic legal orders, over all legislative and domestic 
normative acts of an infra-constitutional value. 
The constitutions of Liberia, The Gambia, Republic of Guinea Bissau, make no categorical 
provisions on this issue. Consequently, resort would be had to the legal culture of these 
countries i.e whether they are civil law or common law countries. Civil law countries usually 
adopt the monist approach while common law countries adopt the dualist approach.
741
 Liberia 
is a common law country, the same as the Gambia while Guinea Bissau is a civil law country.  
The lack of uniformity in the mode of implementing the community treaty creates a bleak 
prospect for the application of the revised treaty and more importantly, the Protocol of the 
ECCJ. It is therefore not difficult to imagine national legislations and other measures that 
undermine the objectives and the norms which are contained within the treaty.
742
 
Furthermore, this makes human rights protection difficult to achieve when decisions of the 
ECCJ are not enforced in member states. So far the ECCJ’s judgements in Hadijatou Mani 
Koraou
743
 and Amengavi Isabelle Manavi v. Togo
744
  have attracted the quickest compliance 
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from Member States.
745
  Member states with high human rights violations record (Nigeria 
and Gambia), have the most cases before the court and have continually ignored the 
judgements of the ECCJ.
746
 
 
4.7 EXPLORING THE POTENTIAL OF NATIONAL LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN 
ENHANCING GREATER HORIZONTAL ENFORCEMENT OF COMMUNITY LAW  
Judicial philosophies that inform the decision of national courts are equally important 
regarding disputes in which community law is involved. As highlighted above, the 
constitutions of Member States have the final word on the applicability or not of international 
law in municipal space. However, courts may be guided by certain philosophies or ways of 
thinking that might be at odds with the grund norm.
747
 Judicial philosophy that is attuned to 
the goals and demands of economic integration, but is irrespective sensitive to national 
constitutional limits on the exercise of judicial power, especially on issues of foreign policy, 
is fundamental to ensuring the effectiveness of community law in Member States. Courts 
seldom act unrestrained in intervening or judicially reviewing the direction of state relations 
or policies. In instances where individual rights are involved, judicial intervention, including 
a criticism of the direction of state relations, may be appropriate. Other than criticizing 
government policies adverse to economic integration, judicial philosophy which takes 
cognizance of the goals of economic integration, can be relevant in the approach of national 
courts to the principle of consistent interpretation, and general reliance on foreign laws. 
As mentioned earlier, in dualist States, community laws cannot command the force of law 
unless and until it is enacted into law through executive or parliamentary act. However, it is 
legally possible for courts to give domestic effect to a treaty, and by effect community law, 
even though it is yet to scale the incorporation hurdle. In most African countries, reliance on 
unincorporated treaties has been very visible, particularly in human rights treaties. Courts 
have also had recourse to unincorporated treaties in interpreting ambiguous statutes.  In 
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Registered Trustees of National Association of Community Health Practitioners of Nigeria v. 
Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria,
748
 both the Nigerian Court of Appeal and the 
Supreme Court held that the International Labour Organisation Convention cannot be applied 
in Nigeria because it has not been domesticated by the National Assembly.
749
 
In Dow v. Attorney General of Botswana
750
 the applicant challenged the constitutionality of 
provisions of Botswana’s Citizenship Act as being discriminatory and an infringement on her 
constitutional rights and freedoms. The High Court relied on the fact that Botswana was a 
signatory to the OAU Convention on Non-Discrimination, even though Botswana had not 
ratified it, a fact expressly acknowledged by the judge. On appeal, even though it was held 
that international human rights instruments do not have automatic application in Botswana, 
the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s use of unincorporated treaties. It further held 
that, despite the fact that treaties and conventions do not confer enforceable rights on 
individuals within the state until enacted by parliament, they could still be used as aids to 
interpretation.  
In New Patriotic Party v. Inspector General of Police
751
 the court held that, the fact that 
Ghana had not passed specific legislation to give effect to the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ rights did not mean that it could not be relied upon in adjudication. In Abacha v. 
Fawehinmi,
752
 the Nigerian court of Appeal had no difficulties enforcing the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria since the treaty had been passed into law by the 
National Assembly. However, obiter dicta in this case suggest that the Nigerian Supreme 
Court accepts that an unincorporated treaty might give rise to a legitimate expectation that the 
government would observe the terms of treaty.
753
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172 | P a g e  
 
One important potential of judicial philosophy is the law-making power that the common law 
judges possesses. As one observer put it, ‘it is no longer especially controversial to insist that 
common law judges make law’.754 Majority of the community states operate a dualist system 
which is typical of common law countries, and pronouncements of apex court judges in 
member states can go a long way in solving the enforcement problem in member states. The 
doctrine of precedence
755
 guarantees that pronouncements of these judges may be acted upon 
by lesser courts and in some instances, political authorities. The problem however, is that 
judicial law-making is based on creative interpretation of foundational documents, as a result  
courts may not entirely possess autonomous power to create norms independent of the 
constitution of various member states.  
Despite the possibilities that may lie in the pronunciation of national judges, the fact remains 
that all components of a legal system must be congruous. This means that the first legal 
hurdle for the ECOWAS Community Court Protocol is for it to be passed into law by the 
legislative organs of the dualist Community States, which constitute the majority for it to take 
effect domestically. It is not inconceivable that a person or an institution against which the 
judgement or any other process of the court is sought to be enforced in the territory of those 
Community States, can plead the domestication of the Protocol by the legislature to evade the 
judgement of the court or any of its process. For instance, the court, as it stands, lacks the 
legal capacity to compel the appearance of anyone before it and enforce same in municipal 
courts or law enforcement agencies of dualist member states.
756
 
 Judicial philosophy of Member State courts provides an outlet through which the treaty and 
community protocols may be interpreted consistently by national courts. Consistent 
interpretation enables the ECCJ to escape the strictures of the monism/dualism approaches to 
the relationship between international and national law. It can be applied by national courts 
under either tradition. Since the ECCJ has decided to be more cautious in its approach, 
whether national courts be more proactive in stating a case for the enforcement of human 
rights decisions handed down by the ECCJ remains to be seen. 
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One of the options open to the ECCJ which the court is yet to exercise to compel member 
state to comply with its decisions is Article 37 of the revised treaty. The court is empowered 
to order sanctions, suspend community assistance and disbursement of funds to a non-
compliant member state or suspend its participation in the Community until it complies with 
the pronounced judgement. None of the punishments stipulated in Article 37 has ever been 
utilized by the ECCJ earning it the title of a ‘toothless court’.757  
 
4.8 ECONOMIC COURT OR HUMAN RIGHTS COURT? 
The transformation of the ECCJ from an economic integration court into a human rights court 
reflects the transition of the community from a regional integration project primarily aimed at 
promoting intraregional trade and economic development into an organization that also 
encompasses security, good governance, and human rights. The conflation of both 
jurisdictions into one appears to be a manifestation of the realization that economic freedoms 
and individual liberties are inseparable. ECCJ judges seem to support this view, and appear to 
favour private litigant’s access to the Court in both economic and human rights cases.  The 
ECCJ in its plea for ‘access to justice’ for both West African traders and human rights 
victims commented thus: 
“The development of the Community law and the interpretation and application of the 
ECOWAS Treaty would be a mere illusion if Community citizens, individuals and corporate 
bodies do not access justice. Without access to the Court there cannot be access to justice. We 
must therefore recognize that the right of access to the Court is the keystone in the 
development of the Community law. The promotion and protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of the Community Citizens cannot be ensured, if right of direct access 
to the Community Court of Justice is not guaranteed. A cardinal objective of ECOWAS Trade 
Liberalization Scheme is an important programme for the realization of the common market. 
It should however be noted that this scheme and the intended benefits cannot be realized, 
unless individuals, consumers, manufacturers and corporate bodies that are the prime movers 
in commercial transactions have direct access to the Court of Justice.”
758
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The ECCJ’s statement is illustrative of the broader tendency among ECOWAS officials, 
advocates and NGOs to conflate human rights and economic freedoms, an argument which 
has been previously explored in this thesis.
759
 The connection of the concepts of economic 
freedoms and individual liberties in the minds of key actors found expression in the campaign 
of human rights NGOs and attorneys during the campaign leading up to the expansion of the 
Court’s mandate. In contrast, trade and business associations did not participate in the court 
reform negotiations. The non-participation of trade and business groups in court reforms 
appears to be due to the non-profitability of economic integration as a negotiation tool with 
domestic and foreign donors.
760
   
The effect of this design flaw is the danger of relegating economic integration to the 
background and focusing solely on human rights protection alone. One may argue that human 
rights protection can take priority over cases covering other economic freedoms, or that both 
classes of action fall within the jurisdiction of the court under the revised treaty and the 
supplementary protocol. However, in practice the over-utilization of the ECCJ on the basis of 
human rights protection and by virtue the undermining of the original economic integration 
mandate defies the essence of the court, retaining doubts on the effectiveness of the court and 
by implication the legitimacy of the current ECOWAS regime. 
So what other explanation is there for the decision of member states to oversee the transition 
of the court into a human rights court at the expense of economic integration related disputes? 
Were member states willing to give up control in the area of human rights because perhaps 
they are unwilling to relinquish sovereign powers in economic integration? Rationalist choice 
theorists hold that states participate in, and support international regimes upon the condition 
that the regime furthers their narrowly conceived functional objectives.
761
 According to this 
approach, the expectation is that African leaders would jealously guard their sovereignty and 
tightly retain control of the ECCJ despite pressure from civil society, ECCJ judges and the 
ECOWAS secretariat in the aftermath of the Afolabi case. This obviously was not the case 
and does not adequately tell the whole story of the court’s transformation. 
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Historical institutionalists on the other hand operate from a different premise. The theory 
does not agree with rationalists argument that the primary goal of actors who populate 
institutions is to meet government demands. Instead, they posit that institutional change occur 
due to pressure such as economic crises, exogenous shocks, or policy failures. Initial design 
choices and vested interests interact with shifts in the environment to create path dependent 
change.
762
 Recent institutional studies focus on incremental shifts that occur through political 
contestation and realignments of coalitions which lead to institutional adaptation.
763
 Alter et 
al identify the incremental shifts that led to the court’s transformation into a human rights 
court as ‘layering’ of additional rules, goals, or priorities which eventually become the 
defining features of an institution.
764
 In the case of ECOWAS the outbreak of conflicts in the 
sub-region and the humanitarian interventions that followed created opportunities for wider 
overhaul of the Community.
765
   
These incremental shifts created the environment for non-state actors to convince states to 
give the ECCJ human rights jurisdiction. In line with historical institutional studies the 
Court’s ‘conversion’ or ‘redeployment’ is indicative of a change that allowed new actors to 
redirect the institution toward new goals, functions and purposes.
766
 Thelen argues that 
institutional adaptation and redeployment by non-state actors can produce changes that, over 
time, are more significant than “big decisions” made by governments in response to 
exogenous shocks. It therefore appears that the non-state actors in ECOWAS who have 
played a role in the reform of the court and by implication the community as a whole, may 
have a more influential role in further changes that might take  place in the court in future.
767
 
Another curious enquiry in the transformation of the court into a human rights court is the 
silence or non-participation of private groups in the restructuring of the court. These groups 
would have equally been decisive in ensuring that the economic integration mandate of the 
court is not dumped entirely. Groups such as the National Association of Nigerian Traders 
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(NANTs)
768
 have always existed and are knowledgeable about the ECOWAS legal system 
and aware of the obstacles to economic integration in the sub-region. To enhance their ability 
to challenge these violations of economic rules, NANTs recently asked West African 
governments to allow private firms direct access to the ECCJ.
769
   
However, NANTs, could not partake adequately in the 2005 court reforms chiefly because it 
was nationally organized, whereas ECOWAS rules only allow for participation by regional 
groups.
770
 But the question could be asked why ECOWAS officials did not facilitate the 
mobilization of economic groups at the regional level and why did human rights groups 
benefit to the exclusion of trade groups? Perhaps the answer is in the fact that West African 
governments appear to benefit from maintaining barriers to intraregional trade and that, these 
benefits, at least in the current political, outweigh the advantages of achieving a functional 
common market.
771
  While this position is arguable, the recent impasse between Nigerian 
Traders in Ghana (represented by NANTs) and the Ghanaian government certainly validates 
this argument to some extent.  The new Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC) Act 
which bar foreigners from engaging in retail trade in the country’s markets,772 were 
challenged by NANTs as a violation of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement. The ECCJ 
threw the case out, in the face of arguments by the Ghanaian government that the law only 
sought to protect the country’s domestic interests.773  
Key salient questions that persist despite these developments include what role would non-
state actors play in further changing the human rights landscape which they have played a 
key role in establishing? What role can non-state actors, along with ECCJ officials and judges 
play in reversing the trend of non-implementation of court judgements in member states? 
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Transnational legal mobilization may be theoretically relevant in reversing the current trend. 
Considerable literature exists which examines how social movements use legal mobilization, 
litigation and rights-claiming strategies to achieve their goals.
774
 Law it is agreed, shapes 
social movements by facilitating the formation of collective ideas and interests, helps nascent 
movements anchor grievances in response to specific rights violations and most importantly, 
provides concrete mechanisms for group members to seek redress for those violations.
775
  
Keck and Sikkink explain how domestic advocacy groups pressure states to comply with 
international law. Where governments respond with repression, local groups can reach out to 
their international compliance partners or “transnational advocacy networks”776 that share 
their objectives. Linking with these transnational allies enables activists to create “boomerang 
patterns of influence” that pressure governments from above and below.777 Based on this 
theory, if there are any hopes of the Court being equally redeployed to its original mandate, 
while not abandoning its human rights mandate, there must be a concerted effort by all non-
state actors in the sub-region.  
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4.9 CONCLUSION. 
Despite the extant institutional shortcomings of the Court, it would not be unreasonable to 
imagine that it could succeed in the long term should crucial aspects of its mandate be 
addressed. The most important aspect of the court’s jurisdiction in need of urgent repair is its 
relationship with national courts. The ECCJ’s search for supranational status is unattainable 
should it fail to exercise impact on national courts. Key to solving this problem would be 
making the use of the exhaustion of local remedies agreement-specific. This is important in 
drawing a line in the jurisdictional margin of both spheres and would create some sort of 
acceptance of the ECCJ amongst member state municipal courts. If an atmosphere of 
cooperation is established, national courts are likely to be forthcoming in referring to the 
court and assisting procedurally in the enforcement of the court’s decisions. 
 The willingness of key actors (NGOs, civil society and ECOWAS Court judges and 
officials) to ensure that the court’s powers are continuously expanded is encouraging. The use 
of the court by community individuals would keep the option of further transformation of the 
court alive. The Court serves as one of the key determinants of the descriptive legitimacy of 
the ECOWAS as an institution, but its under-utilization as an economic integration court robs 
it of further legitimacy. The Court’s recent decision to throw away the case of NANTs may 
give the indication that the court is acting like a typical agent, which only acts to the extent of 
the powers delegated to it by the principal (member states). However, the court has always 
acted cautiously as the Afolabi case demonstrates, seeking to explore political channels 
instead. Whether this means that the Court is weary of the backlash of member states remains 
to be seen.  
However, the ECCJ has continued to deliver some equally ground breaking decisions, in 
high-profile human rights cases, signs it failed to show when it was newly established. In 
recent decisions such as SERAP, Koraou the ECCJ has displayed creativity and boldness in 
delivering judgements that have touched highly politically controversial issues in the member 
states. The court has maintained a high profile, through speeches, press releases, and 
meetings with bar associations, judges, and NGOs across the sub-region.
778
  Most recently, 
                                                          
778
 The most notable of these events was in 2011 when the court celebrated its 10
th
 anniversary amidst a flurry 
of activities, including a conference with national Supreme Court judges and government officials. See, ‘The 
Court of Justice of ECOWAS welcomes the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of Member States and other 
regional courts of Africa’, July 6, 2011 available at 
http://www.courtecowas.org/site2012/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=106:tenyearspressr
elease (accessed 15 April 2014).  
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the Court has agreed to hear a case against the Gambia involving its decision to impose death 
sentences on two Nigerian inmates.
779
 It would be recalled that the Gambia has in the past 
been belligerent towards the Court, but this has not in any way inhibited the Court. These 
events reveal that the court while not a completely legitimate entity continues to play its part 
in the legitimisation of the community. The court is in itself becoming a layer of legitimacy 
in the ECOWAS institutional hierarchy. 
 
It could be argued that the court is only bold enough to act in its essence as a human rights 
court and is not equally comfortable to act as an economic integration court is evidence of its 
realization that member states are unwilling to promote economic integration in the sub-
region. However, a look at earlier experiences of other ICs such as the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Interv-American Commission for Human Rights (IACtHR) 
reveal similar issues of non-compliance from Member States. It took a while for these courts 
to establish authority in Member States.  While the conditions and environment are different 
in the respective regions, recent studies also suggest that partial non-compliance is the norm 
for human rights tribunals.
780
 This is also the same for national courts in parts of the world 
that are not ordinarily synonymous with disobeying community law.
781
 Whether the ECCJ 
would live up to expectations, depends largely on the political will of member states to 
comply with its decisions. Equally, key jurisdictional issues of the Court need to be urgently 
addressed, because the Court is central to the legitimacy of ECOWAS. 
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Gambia’ (April 15 2013), available at http://hrbrief.org/2013/04/ecowas-court-agrees-to-hear-case-brought-
by-inmates-on-death-row-against-the-gambia/ (accessed 15 April 2014).  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE ROLE OF OTHER COMMUNITY ORGANS IN LEGITIMATION OF THE CURRENT 
ECOWAS REGIME 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The objective of this chapter is to examine the role of other community institutions in 
enhancing the normative legitimacy of ECOWAS. In the preceding chapter, the ECCJ was 
prioritized because community courts are gaining increasing scholarly attention due to their 
distinct role in enforcing the law of the community. The community court is backed by an 
enabling protocol. Hence, it carries the bulk of the mandate in human rights protection. Most 
international organizations possess a variety of organs set up to perform various distinct 
functions, and also, possibly keep each other in check. Although various standard functions 
are assigned to these institutions in the constitutive treaty, they may assume other functions 
as part of the larger organizational objective.  
In the preceding chapters it is established that the addition of broad security goals 
fundamentally shifted ECOWAS’s normative orientation. This greater emphasis on human 
rights necessitated institutional reforms to enable effectiveness.
782
 These reforms which 
ECOWAS carried out matched the suggestion of the Committee of Eminent Persons (CEP) 
that a transition should be made towards a people-oriented organization. An argument has 
been proposed that the quality of an institution transforming to match new realities without 
completely winding up or failing may suggest proper institutional design. One of such values 
of institutional stability or adaptability, Goodin refers to as robustness.
783
 According to him, 
institutions: 
                                                          
782
 Apart from the treaty revision in 1993, the community also carried institutional reforms in 2006. 
783
 Goodin propounds desirable principles of institutional design in the admittance that, “good institutional 
design is not just a matter of pragmatics. It is not just a matter of aesthetic or functional ‘goodness of fit’”. He 
proposes theories of middle range resting on both empirical and normative realms. The first of such desirable 
principle of institutionalism is revisability – the design of an institution to be flexible and evolve over time. The 
downside to revisability is that successive members of an institution may not be able to resist the temptation 
to deviate from binding agreements. The other principles are 1) Robustness; 2) Sensitivity to motivational 
complexity; and 3) Variability. R. E Goodin, ‘Institutions and their Design’ in Goodin R.E (ed.), The Theory of 
Institutional Design, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 40. 
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“… should be capable of adapting to new situations: not brittle and easily destroyed by them. But they 
should adapt to new situations only in ways that are appropriate to the relevant respects in which 
situations are new – changing fundamentally only where there has been some fundamental change in 
the factual or evaluative universe, and making only surface accommodations to changed circumstance 
where there has not.”
784
 
Along these lines, it is expected that the adaptation of other key community organs to include 
human rights could enhance institutional effectiveness in the long term.  It is important that 
the ECJ is not overburdened as the only community organ with human rights competence. 
While the Court focuses on judicial-protection of human rights, other community institutions 
can equally play a role, particularly in decision-making and policy-making aspects. 
Against this background, this chapter adopts an institutional approach to evaluate the role of 
other community organs in the normative legitimacy of the community. As norms are not 
value free, such values as good governance, accountability, public participation are also 
enmeshed in the discourse on human rights and the rule of law. 
  
5.2 THE PARADOX OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 
With the continued expansion of international organisations into complex institutional 
entities, international legal scholarship is yet to fully inform certain aspects of the operation 
of these entities, particularly the policy making aspect. The interaction among various organs 
of these organizations, state agencies, other actors, norms, ideas, values, policy choices, 
motivations, and influences on behaviour, is not readily reducible to a simple system of rules 
and rule-appliers. In the same vein, the field of international institutional law has begun to 
confront the demands for deeper conceptual foundations and more expansive theoretical and 
policy understanding. The difficulty in aligning international institutions into a particular 
discipline on the one side, and describing its activities through the lenses of a unified system 
of norms and principles on the other hand is captured aptly by Jan Klabbers. Klabbers speaks 
of a “paradox” within international institutional law: 
“As soon as organizations become more than debating clubs, as soon as they exercise public authority, 
it becomes possible and plausible to wonder whether they do a good job, or whether someone else 
would have done better. When organizations start to administer territory, or impose and monitor 
sanctions regimes, regulate markets, or set standards, discussions will start about how they do so, and 
                                                          
784
 Ibid., p.41.  
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whether they do so well enough to merit further support. They operate, so to speak, on the market of 
legitimacy, and legitimacy, however precisely conceptualized, is a scarce resource. And when this 
happens, the organization loses its character as organization and become something else – whatever the 
“something else” may be”.785 
Klabbers’s sentiments ring true when regional organizations such as ECOWAS are taken into 
context. Key decision-making organs of the community are difficult to understand because 
not so much can be made of the process of decision or policy making. A general sense of 
opaqueness surrounds the process of decision/policy making, and in the context of human 
rights the need is even more pertinent to adopt a variety of approaches to better understand 
their activities. Additionally, it appears that majority of scholarly works on regional 
organizations in Africa have mostly concentrated on the constitutional issues concerning the 
competences of these organizations and their various organs, leaving out the critical aspect of 
the relationships between community institutions on the one hand (intra and inter –
organizational relations) and between community institutions and Member States on the 
other.
786
 
Klabbers also explains:  
“First, to the extent that the law of an international organization covers only the internal legal order and 
is really residual (each organization is sui generis and has its own legal order), there cannot be said to 
exist any international institutional law. Second, the more active and successful organizations become, 
the less their existence will be seen as a specific branch of law; instead they will be subjected to general 
public international law, even without a plausible theory of obligation”.
787
 
The above observation goes to the heart of the institutional complexities of supranational 
organizations.
788
 Irrespective of the angle an organization such as ECOWAS is viewed from, 
there is an inherent difficulty in explaining the activities of decision-making organs such as 
the Assembly and the Council of Ministers, the sub-regional parliament and an administrative 
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 J. Klabbers, ‘The Paradox of International Institutional Law’, 5 International Organizations (2008), 151, 
p.169. 
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 A critical aspect of this relationship outside the scope of this thesis is the organizational procedures that 
hold the community and national institutions together such as the relationship between community 
departments and their national field offices. For a seminal work in this regard, see, J.C Senghor, ‘Institutional 
Architecture for Managing Integration in the ECOWAS Region: An Empirical Investigation’, in J. C Senghor and 
N.K Poku (eds.), Towards Africa’s Renewal, (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), pp.108-142. 
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 Klabbers (2008),p.169. 
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 The emergence of supranational organisations and the elusive quest for globally acceptable standards of 
good governance has increased the distrust of international institutions among contemporary scholars. See, D. 
C Esty, ‘Good Governance at the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law; 115 Yale Law Journal, 
(2006), p.1493. 
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organ such as the ECOWAS commission, all institutional components of the community 
legal system, under a specific branch of law. Whatever accurate analysis or explanations that 
may be offered for the effectiveness or lack off, of the institutional hierarchy of ECOWAS in 
the normative legitimacy of the organization would most likely involve a combination of 
approaches. Embedding the analysis of law and legal processes in the wider context of global 
governance while retaining the concept of law and its techniques should be ideal, but might 
be insufficient in explaining supranational or in this case quasi-supranational institutions. 
While some aspects of ECOWAS’s normative make-up earlier identified may differ from 
other international organizations, some other principles are sufficiently common across 
diverse international organisations to suggest the possibility of discerning a unified field. 
Values such as transparency in decision-making; due process in decisions that directly affect 
private parties; review mechanisms to ensure rationality and legality and a variety of other 
mechanisms to promote accountability are widely applicable across disciplines.
789
 These 
procedural principles might fall short of being widely applicable to institutions that have little 
or no governance function, but, in this case the ECOWAS Commission like other unelected 
organizations the world over have assumed wider decision making powers and have led to 
increased calls for principles and practices that make them accountable. 
As the emerging human rights regime of ECOWAS operates within the territories of member 
states and within the African human rights system, there is an overarching need for symmetry 
with both national and continental mechanisms. This need for correspondence necessitates an 
institutional analysis that reflects on issues of jurisdictional conflicts, inconsistencies and 
duplication that are sure to arise in international organizations with similar mandate as 
ECOWAS. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
789
 B. Kingsbury & L. Casini, ‘Global Administrative Law Dimensions of International Organization Law’, Institute 
for International Law and Justice (IILJ) Working Paper, 2009/9 (Global Administrative Law Series), p. 9. 
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5.3. THE AUTHORITY OF HEADS OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT: OVER-BEARING 
INFLUENCE? 
International organizations operate through primary and subsidiary organs. Primary organs 
are created in the founding treaty while subsidiary organs are often creations of a primary 
organ in exercise of express powers granted in a treaty.
790
 The highest primary organ of 
international organizations is often the plenary assembly.
791
 The plenary assembly most times 
consists of all member states represented by Heads of State and Government. The Authority 
of Heads of States and Government (herein ‘the Authority’) is established under Article 7(1) 
of the revised treaty as the ‘supreme institution of the Community’. The Authority is the 
highest decision-making body in the ECOWAS Community and is mandated to be 
‘responsible for the general direction and control of the community.’792 The Authority 
exercises its powers and functions by concluding treaties, issuing declarations and giving 
decisions.
793
 The ECOWAS instruments do not give any express mandate to the Authority in 
the field of human rights.   
The Authority has aided the growth of a human rights culture in the community by 
overseeing the adoption of documents with clear or implied human rights consequences. By 
adopting important community documents in human rights, and by implication, expanding 
the institutional capacity of the community the Authority has demonstrated the will to create 
supranational institutions to oversee the human rights objective of the regime. Intention is 
important here because it implies that on the part of the Authority as an organ of the 
community, it is aware of the implication of the community’s human rights mandate on 
national sovereignty.
794
 Based on the above, the most important role of the Authority as the 
intergovernmental organ of the community with respect to the normative legitimacy of 
ECOWAS rests in the area of law making and overall policy coordination in the 
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 Article 7(2) of the revised treaty. 
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 New Article 9 of the revised treaty. 
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community.
795
 These functions are however, subject to national constitutional law 
requirements and the specifics of treaty provisions 
In addition to the general obligation of the Authority to oversee general policy direction of 
the community, other specific, albeit limited obligations and powers of the Authority can be 
ascertained from other community legislations. The first and most important of such specific 
roles is the duty to ensure implementation of decisions with human rights implications 
through monitoring of Member States compliance with Community obligations. The duty of 
the Authority above to ensure compliance with Community obligations is doesn’t stop at the 
door of Member States. This duty also entails ensuring intra-institutional balance by ensuring 
that ECOWAS institutions act within the limits of their authority.
796
 If the duty that arises 
from the UN Charter is anything to go by,
797
 the Authority can be considered as having the 
responsibility to ensure that ECOWAS institutions act with respect for human rights. The 
duty of implementation of the Authority is two pronged. The first is the power to refer 
allegations of non-compliance to the ECCJ. The second aspect is the power of the authority to 
impose sanctions on member states’ when they fail to fulfil obligations arising from the 
ECOWAS Community law.
798
 The Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance also 
confers the power to impose sanctions on Member States for failure to comply with 
provisions of the protocol.
799
  
Other human rights obligations of the Authority also exist in the form of economic freedoms 
guaranteed under protocols of the community. For example, the Authority (through its 
Chairman) has a responsibility to intervene in the event of a ‘systematic or serious violations 
of the Provisions of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and 
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 Ebobrah (2009), p.124. 
796
 Under article 7(2) of the revised treaty, the AHSG Article 7(3) (g) enables the Authority to refer where it 
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797
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Establishment’.800 These provisions all make for effective implementation of community 
human rights obligations.  
 
5.3.1. GENERAL POLICY DIRECTIONS OF THE AHSG 
The Authority executes its responsibility mainly through Supplementary acts. An act of the 
authority, depending on the subject matter, may be adopted by unanimity, consensus or two-
third majority.
801
  Regrettably, the Authority are yet to adopt a protocol stating exactly what 
specific decisions would be made by unanimity, consensus or two-third majority. At the 
moment all decisions are reached by consensus. Some scholars have criticized the continued 
use of consensus and unanimity in decision making in sub-regional organizations, attributing 
some of the institutional failures during the OAU era to this system.
802
 This is a feature of the 
intergovernmentalist overweight that characterizes regional organizations in Africa, leading 
to the conclusion that there are no truly supranational organizations in the continent.
803
 
As indicated earlier, the most significant mandate of the Authority relates to its general policy 
direction giving function.
 804
  Thus the new human rights mandate of the organization is well 
within the powers of the Authority as the supreme institution of the community. Accordingly, 
the Authority may limit the powers exercisable by Community institutions in this area. 
Article 4(g) of the revised treaty lists ‘recognition, promotion and protection of human and 
peoples rights’ as ‘fundamental principle upon which Member States  will act in pursuit of 
the objectives of the community.
805
 This provision laid the foundation for the inclusion of 
human rights consideration in other documents of the community. Under the current regime, 
the Authority acting in its capacity as a community institution, rather than a collection of 
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 Amended Article 7 (in Article 2) of the Supplementary Protocol A/SP.1/6/89 Amending and Complementing 
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 G. Naldi, The Organisation of African Unity: An analysis of its role, (Mansell Publishing, 1999), p.19. 
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 Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure of the Authority of Heads of State and State and Government, Decision 
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Member States built on the provision of article 4(g), introduced aspects of human rights, 
democracy and humanitarian law in protocols. African leaders have in the past hampered the 
effectiveness of human rights and democratic institutions while acting in their capacities as 
Heads of States but the case of ECOWAS hint at a change of attitude.
806
 
A plausible implication of Article 4(g) is that, Member States of ECOWAS acting through 
the Authority intend to cooperate to ensure respect for human rights, in line with the UN 
Charter.
807
 As a result, the Authority arguably brings the Community in line with the duty 
already incumbent on UN Member States under article 103 of the UN charter to avoid the 
conclusion of other treaties that would negate obligations taken undertaken under the UN 
charter. Article 4(g) of the revised treaty falls under the “fundamental principles” of the 
community. Fundamental principles serve an important purpose in treaty interpretation under 
international law. International law scholars agree that fundamental principles form the “mass 
of matter or stone” on which the international legal system is built, but there is no theoretical 
or practical guide on its effect on integration treaties.
808
 In the context of the ECOWAS, 
fundamental principles may be understood as requiring the Authority to take human rights 
concerns into account in pursuit of community objectives. A purposive interpretation of 
Article 7(2) which gives the Authority leverage to ‘take all measures to ensure…progressive 
development and the realisation of …objectives’ of the community lends credence to the 
argument that human rights protection is a central objective of the Authority’s general policy 
direction mandate. Read together, Articles 4(g) and 7(2) of the revised treaty gives further 
credence to this argument. 
                                                          
806
 The contrast in attitude by African heads of States in their collective capacity as members of a regional 
institution on the one part, and their capacity in their various member states may be attributable to their 
excess constitutional powers. Prempeh writes of the survival of the imperial president despite what might 
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restraints on executive power… once installed in office and for the duration of his term, the contemporary 
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imperium long associated with presidential power in postcolonial Africa. The imperial presidency in African has 
been term-limited but not tamed.” See, H.K Prempeh, ‘Africa’s “constitutionalism revival” False start or new 
dawn?’ 5 International Journal of Constitutional law, (2007), 469, p.497. 
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As part of its attempt to direct general policy of the community in the area of human rights, 
the Authority has recently responded to local human rights problems of child trafficking, 
which is prevalent in West Africa.
809
 The Authority has adopted a regional plan of action to 
address the scourge of trafficking persons in West Africa.
810
 By focusing on establishing 
appropriate criminal justice responses to tackle the scourge while initiating protection and 
rehabilitation measures for victims of trafficking, the Authority has laid the foundation for 
Community to address one possible consequence of the free movement aspect of integration 
– a commitment which the ECOWAS Commission has recently re-emphasized.811 It may be 
argued that the engagement of the community in this area falls outside its treaty competence. 
However, the cross-border nature of human trafficking and its socio-economic implications 
justifies the intervention of the Authority.
812
  
 
5.3.2 CREATION, MODIFICATION AND CONTROL OF OTHER COMMUNITY ORGANS 
As part of its mandate to guide the general policy direction of the community, an executive 
institution as the Authority may establish secondary or subsidiary institutions to oversee the 
implementation of community policy objectives. Under international law institutional 
competences are expected to be described in treaties, but it is not unconventional practice for 
international organizations to create institutions to achieve specific objectives.
813
 There is no 
general clause in article 7 of the treaty enabling the authority to create institutions/bodies to 
carry out community objectives. However, specific articles empower the Authority to 
determine or modify the powers and functions of certain community institutions to the extent 
that the Authority may legislate on the functions, powers and organization of those 
institutions.
814
. 
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In exercise of its powers under the revised treaty, the Authority has established subsidiary 
institutions. Some of these institutions have human rights related powers that strengthen 
institutional cohesiveness in human rights policy-making and implementation. In this wise, 
the Authority, legislated on the 1991 Protocol on the ECOWAS Community Parliament, 
listing human rights as one of the issues over which the Parliament may exercise limited 
legislative competence.
815
 It would be recalled that it was through this means that the 
Authority enacted the supplementary protocol which expanded the mandate of the ECCJ into 
human rights protection.
816
 While the legislative competence of the Authority might be over 
bearing in certain instances, by empowering other community institutions to act in the field of 
human rights, the Authority removes the possibility of conflict that might arise if other 
institutions acted on implied powers. These institutions represent a participatory medium 
through which community citizens can interact regularly with the community. 
The Authority has been criticized for not considering the need to delineate Community 
competence from national competence on the one hand and the competence of other 
international organizations on the other hand.
817
 This, in addition to the undefined boundaries 
of the human rights mandate of some community institutions,
818
 may create room for tension 
arising from ‘over-involvement of ECOWAS in fields considered being outside its specific 
objectives. This may possibly lead to institutional overlap and conflicting jurisdictions in the 
institutional hierarchy of the community. Such institutional balances can be sorted by the 
exercise of extra care during the protocol making process through consultations and dialogue 
with community institutions and individuals.  
As part of the general revision of community laws and institutions in 2006, the Authority 
approved the transformation of the ECOWAS Secretariat into a Commission.
819
 The 
Authority approved the establishment of departments within the Commission with functions 
within the field of human rights. The Authority has also created subsidiary institutions such 
as the West Africa Health Organization (WAHO), the Council of Elders under the Conflict 
Management protocol and adhoc offices of Special Representatives of ECOWAS in certain 
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member states emerging from conflict. Most recently, the Authority created a tripartite social 
dialogue forum within ECOWAS.
820
  The forum would promote social dialogue in the 
framework of regional integration to resolve the problems of labour and employment. As 
demonstrated in chapter 3 the community legal framework is largely underdeveloped in the 
area of labour and employment rights despite its immanent effects on the economic 
integration objectives of the community. It is expected that the social dialogue forum plays a 
strategic role in developing the community framework in this area. The tripartite meetings 
would be convened by the Commission and would bring together representatives of member 
states, employers’ organisations and trade unions as well as representatives of civil society 
organisations and NGOs.
821
 
These subsidiary organs all have a role to play in human rights implementation in member 
states despite the fact that the revised treaty only allows primary institutions of the 
community to perform functions and act within the limits of powers defined in the treaty and 
protocols. Subsidiary organs are more issue-specific and operate only in areas where national 
mechanisms are non-existent or ineffective hence they may be more functional than 
community or national institutions in certain respect
822
 
 
5.3.3. DUTY TO IMPLEMENT COMMUNTIY LAW IN MEMBER STATES 
One of the expected advantages of the Authority is that, as heads of the executive of 
respective member states, they may invoke the mandate of national institutions – such as the 
police, customs and immigration – to enforce community law, or propose the enactment of 
laws giving effect to community law.
823
 As an institution, treaty power is conferred on the 
Authority to impose sanctions on member states who fail to fulfil their obligations to the 
Community.
824
 This duty is reinforced by the fact that each Member State by ratifying the 
revised treaty is obliged to abide by the decisions and regulations of the Community.
825
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In order to impose sanctions on erring member states, the Authority may refer a question to 
the Court to determine and confirm whether a member state has failed to honour its 
community obligations.
826
 At the time of this this study, there has been no record of any such 
referral to the Court to sanction a member state. Perhaps this is attributable to the fact that the 
Authority combines both legislative and executive powers and may act through other direct 
means which it considers more effective.
827
 Another plausible argument is that the Authority 
is made up of politicians who may seek political compromises rather than strict enforcement 
of laws.
828
 Political challenges in member states mean that heads of states and government 
are unable to forcefully implement community law through sanctions. The Authority has 
however aggressively exercised its power of implementation to exert pressure on member 
states in situations of humanitarian concern and in order to restore constitutional government 
in situations of unconstitutional overthrow of government,
829
 in line with the ‘trigger 
mechanism’ contained in the Democracy and Good Governance protocol.830 
One aspect where the Authority can be instrumental, which is omitted in community 
protocols, is the function to implement or enforce decisions of the ECCJ. The protocol of the 
Court makes no mention of the Authority, in enforcing its decisions in their various member 
states. The Authority possesses the highest legislative power, but the inclusion of an article in 
the Court protocol would give legal effect to the Authority in this regard. However, Article 
77 of the treaty may suffice, due to its general nature. The Manneh
831
 case presented the 
Authority the best opportunity to exercise this implementation power, an opportunity it failed 
to seize. In Manneh, the Gambian government went as far as proposing a total revision of the 
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Supplementary protocol and restriction of the Court’s authority.832 Most notably, the Gambia 
sought to limit the ECCJ’s human rights jurisdiction to treaties ratified by respondent States. 
The Gambian proposal provided a clear opportunity for member states through the Authority 
to make a clear statement on the implementation of ECCJ judgements in member states, 
especially as it affect human rights but the Authority never availed itself the opportunity to 
clarify a grey and yet fundamental aspect of ECOWAS Community law. The proposal was 
eventually defeated by the recommendation of the ECOWAS Committee of Legal Experts 
and the Council of Justice Ministers.
833
 
A commentator argues that the silence of the Authority and its general inactivity in this 
respect appears to have been predicated on a lack of clear guidelines on how individuals may 
kick start the process of implementation through the Authority.
834
 It may be beneficial for the 
Authority to set out the procedure in a protocol by which community citizens may invoke its 
power of implementation and enforcement.  The tripartite social dialogue forum may be 
enacted as an institution to oversee such applications that may come from community citizens 
to the ECCJ for cases of the Court that are yet to be implemented by a defendant Member 
State. 
The Authority is the highest body of the community and its role in ensuring the 
implementation of community objectives cannot be under stated because they represent the 
ultimate sovereign power of member states. However, it appears that Heads of States, past 
and present, tend to push a different agenda at the regional level and another at the domestic 
level. In the past, political pressure from domestic constituencies have caused governments to 
close national borders or expel foreigners, thus hindering trade and free movement of persons 
enshrined under various community protocols.
835
  A constant feature of regional institutions 
in Africa is the over-centralization of authority in the Assembly. Some scholars have 
suggested that the time is right for politicians to leave the decision-making process in African 
regional organizations to technocrats.
836
 This appears to be an attractive proposition, but any 
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hope of achieving this rests largely on political will of Member States and other socio-
economic factors too numerous to address here. 
 
5.4 THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS: MERELY A PREPARATORY BODY? 
The Council of Ministers of ECOWAS (the Council) is established under Article 10 of the 
revised treaty. The Council is comprised of two Ministers from each member state (including 
the Minister in charge of ECOWAS Affairs where such exists. Under the revised treaty, the 
main function of the Council is to bear responsibility for the ‘functioning and development of 
the Community’.837 To this end, the Council shall ‘make recommendations to the Authority 
on any action aimed at attaining the objectives of the Community’.838 In essence, the Council 
may be considered the policy-making hub of the community, feeding the Authority with 
necessary laws and policy trends for attaining community objectives. Therefore, the human 
rights role of the Council cannot be understated.  
In addition to the Council’s advisory role, the Council exercises other functions enumerated 
in the treaty which may have consequences on normative legitimacy of the community.
839
 
From a human rights perspective, the Council does not have any clear human rights mandate 
under community law, but its centrality to the decision-making process of the community 
necessitates its analysis. One of functions of the Council that may affect human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law is the responsibility to ‘approve the work programmes and 
budgets of the Community and its institutions’.840 The Council may exert its influence by 
refusing to grant approval for programmes that weigh too much in favour of human rights 
realisation. The Council may also reject the budget of Community institutions aimed at 
expanding the human rights agenda of ECOWAS. In the past, the supervisory authority of the 
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council has been challenged and the council accused of over stretching its supervisory powers 
over other community institutions.
841
  
Recently, in Odafe Oserada v. ECOWAS Council of Ministers
842
 a regulation of the Council 
allocating the post of Secretary General of the Community Parliament to a citizen of Ivory 
Coast was challenged at the Community Court by the applicant (a Nigerian) who was equally 
qualified for the position. The applicant, amongst other things, requested the court to declare 
the regulation unlawful because it violated provisions of the revised treaty regarding 
appointment of statutory appointees and rights guaranteed in the African Charter.
843
 While 
the applicant’s case was thrown out by the court for failure to prove that the regulation 
affected him directly, the case opens up an important angle in human rights protection within 
the community, at least regarding community officials. More importantly, it highlights the 
impact the Council’s decisions can have on human rights. 
Admittedly, the Council’s human rights mandate as contained in community law is relatively 
imprecise in comparison to other decision-making organs. However, the operation of Article 
4(g) of the revised Treaty on the processes and operations of ECOWAS institutions arguably 
places an obligation on the Council, to take human rights and the rule of law into account in 
the exercise of its powers. From a good governance perspective, the Council is expected to 
operate on the basis of procedural legitimacy because it exercises public governance over 
Member State’s ministries.844 The Odafe case opens up an important aspect of human rights 
arising from administrative procedures in regional organizations.
845
 Clearly, certain aspects of 
the Council’s operations touch on rights-related values, albeit not in its entirety. The need to 
keep eye on the activities of the Council is also to ensure institutional balance within the 
community. The Council further has powers to request for advisory opinion from the ECCJ 
on any legal question. This avenue has the potential to develop the jurisprudence of the Court 
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and essentially improve the human rights regime of the community. This can be set in motion 
by bringing cases on compliance with Community policies, programmes and budget with the 
principle of respect, promotion and protection of human rights.
846
 
Decision-making organs of African institutions have always been criticized for their lack of 
function, attributed largely to the over-bearing influence of Assemblies of government. As far 
back as 1972, Sundstrӧm observed that ‘in most African organisations the conference of 
heads of state dominates to the extent that ministerial committees often may be reduced to 
acting as preparatory bodies’.847 This stifles the possibility of supranational institutions 
thriving independently as their design and treaty powers suggest. This constant trait in 
African organizations not only dislodges any hint of institutional balance (legal or political) 
but also raises eye brows about the democratic legitimacy of African institutions. The 
resultant effect of this over-bearing power of Assemblies is a lack of transparency, public 
participation, and possibly, the absence of rule of law in the decision-making process of the 
community.
848
 This inadvertently has effects on the normative legitimacy of the community 
as it violates the democratic and participatory nature of policy making with social 
implications. The first step towards enhancing the overall effectiveness of the institutions of 
the community would be balancing powers between executive institutions such as the 
Authority that operate solely on political basis and technocrats that engineer the policies upon 
which the community runs. This would further enhance institutional effectiveness which is 
critical to achieving set community objectives built on human rights and good governance. 
 
5.5 THE COMMUNITY PARLIAMENT: MERELY AN ADVISORY BODY? 
The introduction of modern parliamentary institutions in international organizations is based 
on the need to establish some degree of participation, proper representation of peoples of 
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different groups aiming to achieve a common goal.
849
  This need has led to the 
institutionalization of traditional forms of parliaments as an organ of government, particularly 
in regional organizations.
850
 While the need for national parliaments are understood as 
carrying the supervisory power of the populace in the decision-making process of the nation-
state, the central idea of democracy, the same justification was not initially extended to 
international institutions. It is often thought that parliamentary control of the business of 
international organizations is unnecessary as no immediate link was seen to exist between the 
functions of these organizations and the citizens of member states.
851
  The logic behind this 
position is the fact that national parliaments directly impacted on citizens through the 
constitutionally stipulated processes which often required assent before the ratification of 
international agreements take effect.
852
 
Current legal scholarship reveals the challenges a lack of independent parliamentary organs 
in international institutions pose to global governance and the democratic legitimacy in 
international organizations. These challenges only become apparent from a global 
governance perspective.
853
 The most prominent of these challenges in international 
organizations is what has been termed the “legitimacy chain” of decision-making. The idea of 
legitimacy chain albeit rooted in European and North American constitutional theory, is 
relevant to regional organizations such as ECOWAS that operate a tripartite governance 
structure akin in certain aspects to the nation-state. The legitimacy chain argument is 
presented thus: All public servants receive their authority through a chain of orders and 
personal responsibility which can ultimately be traced back to decision of the electorate (i.e 
general election or popular vote). The electorate can then hold the governmental accountable 
for the actions of its civil servants. The acts of international organizations are hence 
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legitimised if decisions in the organization are taken by unanimity and if the authority of the 
representative can be traced back to the results of a general election at the national level.
854
 
Perhaps, it is premature to think of every international organization in these terms, or as 
having the possibility of any likely resemblance to democracy in the nation-state. However, 
the increasing sophistication of the processes of international organizations and the greater 
evolution towards Supranationality which causes the policies and acts of these organizations 
to by-pass national parliaments yet have direct effect in the national systems necessitates 
thinking along these lines.  
Thomas Franck in his seminal contribution on emerging right to democratic governance 
argued that in the light of the fundamental changes in the political landscape of the world, 
democracy was becoming a global entitlement.
855
 He claimed that the democratic entitlement 
be transformed from a moral prescription to a global entitlement.
856
 In similar vein, the 
uncertainty over the ability of the nation-state to function as an adequate constitutional 
legitimacy in the emerging global society means that ‘the development of global power 
[may]…never be seen as legitimate without some type of public interest oriented scrutiny of 
such power…’857   
Overall, international parliamentary bodies still fall short of national parliamentary functions, 
but an enhancement of their powers could placate some of the concerns over the democratic 
deficit in the decision-making process of international institutions. This could possibly 
enhance the democratic legitimacy of international institutions. Krajewski identifies three 
existing elements of democratic governance in international organizations as transparency 
and public scrutiny, parliamentary participation, and dialogue with civil society.
858
 While 
these elements are exercisable by other community institutions, it is the parliamentary body 
which most embodies these elements of democratic participation. 
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The ECOWAS community parliament (the Parliament), was established for the first time 
under the revised treaty.
859
 The idea of a functional ECOWAS Parliament was made a reality 
under the current regime which envisages greater popular participation of community citizens 
in the integration process. Article 4(h) of the revised treaty underlines the centrality of 
democracy to the achievement of community objectives by stating that Member States shall 
adhere to the principles of accountability, economic and social justice and popular 
participation in development. The democratic intention of the community is given further 
strengthened by Article 4(g) which also contemplates integration in an environment of 
recognition, promotion and protection of human rights. The Parliament has no direct human 
rights responsibility under the treaty, but some of its activities can impact on the rights and 
freedoms of community citizens enshrined in the treaty. The Parliament is considered a 
representative assembly of the people of the Community, serving as a forum for dialogue, 
consultation and consensus, and its powers are essentially of an advisory nature.
860
 Over the 
course of its existence, the Parliament has through its procedures, statements and actions 
attempted to reinforce its legitimacy, enhance its powers and also ‘consolidate its position as 
a specialized Institution amongst the Community Institutions.’861  
 
5.5.1 CONSULTATIVE AND ADVISORY POWERS OF THE PARLIAMENT 
Under Article 6(1) of Protocol A/P2/8/94 the Parliament may consider any matter concerning 
the Community, in particular issues relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
and make recommendations to the institutions and organs of the community.
862
 This places 
some human rights responsibility on the Parliament, although it is restricted to 
recommendations to other community institutions. Reading Article 6(1) on its own is not very 
enlightening. But if read jointly with Article 6(2) of the Protocol, the extent of the human 
rights mandate of the Parliament can be understood clearly. Article 6(2) provides that the 
opinion of the Parliament may be sought in, amongst other areas, ‘respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in all their plenitude’.863 Since the Parliament is allowed to 
‘consider any matter’, which includes human rights and fundamental freedoms, there is no 
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difference between matters which the Parliament may consider or those which it may be 
referred to it. However, being that the requirement to consult the Parliament rests on 
community institutions with decision-making powers, it could be deduced that the allowance 
to ‘consider’ rests on parliamentary initiative.864 Ascertaining whether human rights matters 
may be considered by the Parliament on its initiative or are presented through consultation 
from other community institutions does not take away the fact that the Parliament lacks the 
power to bind other community institutions. 
As part of the general revision of the community legal framework in 2006, the Protocol 
A/P2/8/94 on the Parliament was amended by a Supplementary protocol A/SP.3/06/06. It is 
expected that the competence of the Parliament would be progressively enhanced from an 
advisory to co-decision making capacity, and subsequently to a law making role in areas to be 
defined by Authority.
865
 Till date these areas of law-making are yet to be defined by the 
Authority. The progression of the Parliament to full legislative function appears hinge on the 
community’s successful transition from appointment of parliamentarians from national 
parliaments to election by direct universal suffrage.
866
  
The Parliament operates mainly through the Plenary, the Bureau, and the conference of the 
Bureaux. The Plenary is the highest body within the Parliament and its decisions are binding 
on other structures of the parliament. Additionally, the plenary adopts all the resolutions of 
the Parliament which are subsequently forwarded to the decision-making bodies of the 
community. The Bureau is the governing organ of the Parliament which comprises of the 
Speaker, the Deputy Speaker, the Second Deputy Speaker, the Third Deputy Speaker and the 
Fourth Deputy Speaker. The powers of the Speaker under Article 15 of the supplementary 
protocol are administrative at best and are limited to the internal procedures of the 
Parliament.
867
  
To facilitate its work, the Parliament operates through standing and adhoc committees under 
the Conference of Committees Bureau. The committees are granted personal responsibilities 
for the different aspects of the Parliament’s mandate.868 The committees most relevant to 
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human rights function of the community include: Education, Science and Technology, Youth, 
Sports and Culture; Gender, Employment, Labour and Social Welfare; Legal and Judicial 
Affairs; Health and Social Services; and Human Rights and Child Protection. The 
recommendations from the Parliamentary Committees are generally advisory but it is 
expected that human rights would get more detailed attention at the committee level.  
As earlier highlighted, the law and practice of international organisations seems to limit the 
powers of parliamentary organs. In regional organizations in Africa, parliamentary bodies are 
relegated to merely advisory bodies. At the AU level, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) 
lacks full legislative powers despite its envisaged role in providing a common platform for 
the grassroots in Africa to get involved in discussions and decision-making on problems and 
challenges facing the continent.
869
 The PAP seeks to, amongst other objectives, promote the 
principles of human rights and democracy in Africa, encourage good governance, 
transparency and accountability in member states, promote peace, security and stability, and 
facilitate co-operation among Regional Communities and their Parliamentary fora.
870
  Like its 
sub-regional counterparts, the PAP exercises advisory and consultative powers. It is 
inconceivable that the PAP, as the parent Parliamentary body in Africa, would play any 
decisive role in achieving the lofty ideal of an African Economic Community. 
Essentially, while international parliamentary organs traditionally do not play a decisive role 
in international organisations, they may offer an opportunity for mutual consultation and 
cooperation.
871
 In this light, the recommendations and other advisory inputs of the 
Community Parliament though not binding, should have a strong persuasive effect and can be 
leveraged to the advantage of Community citizens. The persuasive effect of the Parliament 
can also be exploited to influence national parliaments to put pressure on governments. A 
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look through the rules of procedure reveals some oversight functions of the Community 
Parliament which may be decisive in decision-making in the community. The Parliament may 
submit to the Authority its recommendations on any matter concerning the community for its 
consideration.
872
 Additionally, the Speaker of the Parliament shall have access to the 
Chairman of the Authority and shall periodically brief the Chairman on the activities of the 
Parliament.
873
 While this provision reflects the superiority of one community institution over 
the other, this presents a political avenue through which the Speaker of the Parliament can 
influence community decisions.  The Parliament may also on its own initiative, invite the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers to address the Plenary on any issues of relevance to the 
life of the Community.
874
 These provisions serve as probable means through which the 
institutional imbalance in the community can be relatively assuaged, particularly as it affects 
the decisive role of the Parliament. 
Despite the seeming efficacy of the Parliament’s oversight roles above, records of any 
parliamentary initiative in any matter relating to human rights are scarce. A recent study by 
the ECOWAS Commission in response to a Parliamentary resolution requesting for greater 
involvement in the integration process concluded that ‘the parliament has never addressed 
recommendations to the other ECOWAS institutions’.875 The role of the Parliament has since 
improved, albeit not to the desired extent. Recently, the Parliament has shown desire to 
enhance human rights standards in the Community. In a 2002 resolution, the Parliament 
requested for an increase in the degree of its involvement in the promotion of human rights, 
democracy, good governance and peace.
876
  The third legislature
877
 of the Parliament has 
been more vibrant and determined in its attempt to ensure that the powers of the Parliament 
are fully enhanced. The Parliament in its most recent strategic plan,
878
 acknowledges that: 
Despite limitations in the current Protocol, which confers consultative and advisory status to the 
Parliament, there is the need for the Institution to exercise its existing mandate to the fullest. In 
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873
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particular, the Parliament needs to devise people oriented programmes and actions that will impact 
positively and directly to the lives of the people…  Specifically, the agenda of the Third Legislature 
shall focus on … Democracy, Good governance and Human Rights.
879
 
In like manner, the 4
th
 Deputy Speaker of the ECOWAS Parliament, Hon. Simon Osei - 
Mensah remarked thus “We have an additional one which we may like to take on board like 
the ombudsman. Like something which require mandatory referral, may be issues concerning 
human rights in the Community…”880 This is a clear indication that given adequate powers, 
the Parliament would prioritize activity in the area of human rights, democracy and the rule 
of law. This has not however, prevented the Parliament from availing its consultative and 
advisory capacity in enhancing the normative legitimacy of the organization, particularly in 
the area of peace and security.
881
 
Another important outlet for the Parliament to positively affect human rights in the 
Community is the fact that parliamentarians also double as national parliamentarians in their 
various states.
882
 This should allow for greater coordination between national human rights 
policies and legislations and Community human rights initiatives. This gives a solid, 
transparent, and democratic base to the formulation of human rights policies at the regional 
level, in comparison to the continental level. 
 
5.5.2 INDIVIDUAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY STANDING BEFORE THE PARLIAMENT 
Despite the obstacles to its exercise of legislative powers, the ECOWAS Parliament has 
created an avenue for engagement with citizens of the Community by including a ‘right to 
petition’ clause in its rules of procedure. Under Rule 82:  
                                                          
879
 Ibid., para 33. 
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Parliament to their national parliaments. 
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“any citizen of the Community and any natural or legal person residing or having its registered office in a 
Member State, shall have the right to address, individually or in association with other citizens, a petition to 
Parliament on a matter which comes within ECOWAS fields of activity and which affects him, her or it 
directly.” 
Once such petition is declared admissible by the Parliament, it may be dealt with by the 
relevant parliamentary committee and could lead to a resolution or an opinion ultimately 
forwarded to the ECOWAS Commission for action.
883
  Although the procedure is potentially 
restrictive to the extent that it requires a petitioner to be directly affected by the subject-
matter of the petition, it provides the possibility of addressing human rights issues without 
judicial mechanisms. The link with the Commission in this regard, could translate to the use 
of good offices in the resolution of human rights matters. It is noteworthy that the limitation 
of the petitions to the Community’s field of activities narrows down the scope for conflict 
and inconsistency with national mechanisms of Member States and also those of the AU. 
Regarding the role of NGOs and Civil Society groups, it will be recalled that the revised 
treaty includes their participation in the integration process. The centrepiece of the revised 
treaty as far as social dialogue is concerned can be found in Articles 82 and 83, whereby the 
community not only commits to cooperating with non-governmental and socio-economic 
organizations, but also commits to setting up mechanisms for consultation with these 
organizations. Yet, beyond these commitments, the revised treaty does not specify how 
community institutions may consult with social bodies. Details about consultation are fleshed 
out in a separate Community decision
884
 which introduces a regulation granting observer 
status to NGOs to participate in the Community’s institutions. 
Under this decision, organizations are divided into two categories (A or B) depending on 
their level of interest in ECOWAS activities.
885
 The difference between the two designations 
is essentially that “A” observers have privileged access to the ECOWAS Council of Ministers 
whereas “B” observers are only accredited for other community institutions. It is under this 
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category that observers can be accredited as observers of the Parliament which may audit the 
sessions of the Parliament and contribute to the general process of decision-making in the 
community. As discussed previously, civil society in the sub-region is at its most vibrant in 
pushing the Community and Member States to meeting human rights obligations. Including 
civil society and NGOs in the decision-making process arguably strengthens the democratic 
legitimacy of the community. However, NGOs and civil society have not been as vibrant in 
canvassing for the expansion of the Parliament’s mandate in the same manner as they have 
campaigned in the case of the Court.  
The Parliament, potentially serves as a more realistic and legitimate channel through which 
the constitutions of Member States can be amended to give direct effect to Community law. 
Recently, the Parliament intervened in a dispute between the National Association of 
Nigerian Traders (NANTS) and Ghana over a new legislation which is unfavourable to 
Nigerian traders in Ghana and considered to be a breach of ECOWAS trade rules. The 
Parliament appealed to the Ghanaian government to adhere to the Revised Treat obligations. 
In doing so, it dispatched its members to Ghana to bring about a resolution that upholds the 
terms of the revised treaty.
886
 An expansion of the Parliament’s powers would accelerate the 
process of constitutional amendment, making enforcement of Court decisions easier. 
 
5.5.3 FACT-FINDING AND OTHER MISSIONS 
Article 16(8)(b) of the supplementary protocol of the Parliament empowers the Bureau to 
authorize meetings, hearings, hold fact finding and study tours of committees away from the 
headquarters. Although this was not originally included in Protocol A/P.2/8/94, the 
ECOWAS Parliament is recorded to have undertaken various fact-finding missions while the 
old protocol was in operation. During the tenure of the second parliament, fact finding 
missions were made to the Mano River Union as well as reconciliatory visits during the 
Liberian crisis. Such visits turned out to be crucial in preventing the escalation of crisis and 
were eventually decisive in resolving the conflicts which would have had further devastating 
human rights consequences in the troubled areas and the entire sub-region.
887
 Recently, 
members of the ECOWAS Parliament have also been included in ECOWAS observer 
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missions for the purpose of monitoring and observing elections in ECOWAS member states 
in accordance with article 12(3) of the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.
888
 
Such missions of the Parliament can be useful for human rights realisation.  The ECOWAS 
Parliament may not have co-decision making powers with other organs of the Community or 
budgetary approval powers. However, the current procedures and practices of the Parliament 
are potentially viable tools for the promotion of community objectives without clashing with 
national systems.  For example, the Parliament’s fact-finding mission to Ghana in the NANTs 
case enabled the Parliament identify specific issues relating to the Protocols on Free 
Movement and its implications on regional integration. The parliament reinforced the efforts 
of the ECOWAS authorities in evolving cooperation and integration within the region.
889
  
Since the methods of the parliament as shown above are not adversarial, the goodwill of 
Member states ought to be greater in this regard.  Parliamentary actions have so far, shown no 
potential of disrupting national or continental mechanisms. Instead the means applied by the 
Parliament could be instrumental in enhancing symmetry with national systems. 
 
5.6 THE ECOWAS COMMISSION: A MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGAN 
Traditionally, states reserved the right to exclusive management of international 
organizations by conferring powers on the plenary organ composed of government 
representatives who had to approve every important decision unanimously. However, the 
non-permanence of plenary bodies necessitated the creation of an organ with administrative 
powers, most often called a Secretariat.
890
 It was envisaged that this administrative entity in 
executing the will of the organization, which differs from that of member states, had at least 
the right of requiring from member states submission and exchange of useful information for 
the functioning of the organization. This incidentally also required the right of monitoring 
compliance with obligations of the organization.  
Although the administrative role of the Secretariat varies according to organization, some of 
their main functions include general administrative and clerical functions, budget 
preparations, collection of reports and information, representing their organizations in legal 
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proceedings and rendering technical assistance to member states. With the expansion of 
international organizations into “multiple issues”891 entities with supranational powers, it has 
become practically impossible to restrict the role of the classical Secretariat to purely 
administrative functions.  Secretariats have become more than just administrative organs, but 
have grown into, arguably, the engine room of most international organizations. Hence, in 
some organizations, secretariats have engaged in election observation, carrying out executive 
functions and initiating policies.
892
 The variance in the institutional capacity of Secretariats in 
international organizations has led to diversity in nomenclature. 
Some international organizations have expanded secretariats to become ‘Commissions’,893 
while a handful still operate through general Secretariats.
894
  As earlier highlighted, the 
administrative organ of ECOWAS came into existence as the Executive Secretariat with 
merely secretarial functions under the 1975 treaty.
895
 The secretariat was largely 
incapacitated during the first regime, a general feature of community institutions under that 
regime. However, in 2006 the ECOWAS Secretariat was transformed into a ‘Commission’ 
(Commission of the Economic Community of West African States)
896
 ‘with a view to 
adapting it to the international environment and to making it more effective in the 
accomplishment of its regional integration assignment’.897 The new Article 17 of the 
supplementary protocol of the revised treaty establishes the ECOWAS Commission 
furnishing it with nine commissioners namely: the President, the Vice President, and seven 
other commissioners.
898
 The Supplementary protocol A/SP.1/06/06 also expanded the 
functions of the Commission, significantly transforming it from an administrative vetting 
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entity to an organ with some policy-making competence.
899
  The responsibility of the 
Commission to ‘exercise its powers to ensure the smooth functioning of the Community and 
protect the overall interest of the Community’900 plausibly entails authority to act in human 
rights, democracy and the rule of law since these have been demonstrated as community 
objectives. 
In practice, the Commission has become deeply involved in the activities for the promotion 
and protection of human rights due to its duty to comply with instructions from other 
decision-making organs of the community vested with human rights mandate. However, it is 
not all of the Commission’s activities are rights-based stricto sensu. Some of these activities 
are incidental, but still institutionally relevant for the protection of rights in the Community. 
It is impossible to discuss the functions of a pre-dominantly administrative body without 
reference the procedural aspects of its operation. The Commission’s new authority in this 
issue area entails responsibility in ensuring legitimate policy-making.
901
 It is within these 
rule-making procedures that underlying issues pertaining to human rights can be resolved 
with sound policy-making. More so, a procedurally legitimate Commission also enhances 
careful analysis of such policies and engages interested national departments dialogue on 
methods/mechanisms of implementation. The following section examines the policy-making 
process and procedure of the ECOWAS Commission that enhances the legitimacy of the 
community. 
 
5.6.1 MEETINGS AND CONFERENCES 
In its capacity as an administrative body, the Commission has convened or facilitated 
meetings and conferences that have impacted positively on the human rights and the rule of 
law in the Community. In most cases, the Commission may draw its powers from the 
provisions of the revised treaty, in other cases, the Commission acts in accordance with 
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directives of the Authority or the Council. 
902
 The President of the Commission is responsible 
for the coordination of the activities of the community institutions as the legal representative 
of the community
903
, he may on his own volition organize meetings and conference aimed at 
addressing specific policy objectives of the community which may have human rights 
implications. Whether the convening of meetings are strictly on the initiative of the 
Commission or in collaboration with other actors (e.g. national institutions from which it may 
request information), the actions of the Commission has the potential to improve the rule of 
law in the Community.  
One of such powers conferred on the Commission by a community document is Article 35(2) 
of the Protocol on Democracy which provides that the Commission (then Executive 
Secretariat) may provide a framework for independent human rights institutions in the sub-
region.  The framework would be organized into a regional network in order to enhance 
national capacities to protect human rights. To carry out this function, the Commission 
through directorate of Political Affairs facilitated the establishment of the ECOWAS 
Network on Human Rights, a network of human rights bodies, in 2006.
904
 In 2012, two 
meetings were held by the Commission adopting the Network’s constitution and a three year 
plan of action that would enhance the performance of national human rights institutions, 
including those of civil society organizations, in the protection and promotion of human 
rights in West Africa.
905
 This provides a platform for national institutions to compare notes 
on human rights situations in various member states, and the inclusion of NGOs and civil 
society further authenticates the legitimacy of the Commission. 
The Commission has made remarkable strides in other aspects of the ECOWAS human rights 
regime. In the area of peace and security, the Commission has most recently been 
instrumental in bringing stability to Mali and Guinea Bissau. The Commission organized four 
extraordinary sessions of the Mediation and Security Council at the ministerial level and five 
Extra-ordinary summits of Heads of State and Government towards finding a solution to the 
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crisis in both countries.
906
 To ensure the sustenance of democracy and good governance the 
Commission regularly facilitates meetings of national Electoral Commissions through its 
Network of National Electoral Commissions (ECONEC). The ECONEC promotes peer 
learning among Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs).
907
 The Commission regularly carries 
out observation missions through this arrangement and has facilitated peaceful elections in 
Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Sierra Leone, Ghana,
908
 and most recently Togo.
909
 
The Commission has scored reasonably in the area of humanitarian law and Gender. The 
Commission holds annual workshops on the Implementation of International humanitarian 
Laws in West Africa and has recently commenced implementation of the International 
Humanitarian Laws approved by Member States and presented to Ministers of Justice.
910
. The 
policy is expected to be approved by the Heads of States. Regarding Gender and Childs 
rights, the Commission has approached this aspect of the Community’s human rights 
objectives with careful planning.  The Commission realising the importance of women to 
economic success has held series of meetings on finalising a study on Gender and trade 
dynamics in the West African sub-region.
911
. 
Through a plethora of meetings and conferences the Commission has demonstrated its 
commitment to the institutionalization of transparency and public participation in the policy-
making process. The Commission is arguably the only community institution which ensures 
an all-inclusive approach to its operations. Through these meetings, workshops and 
conferences the possibility of upsetting intra-organisational institutions are low. The 
Commission as part of its drive to be accountable to domestic interests
912
 has worked closely 
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with the West African Civil Society Forum (WASCOF). The Commission has developed a 3-
year Action Plan aimed at enhancing civil society organizations’ contribution to the 
ECOWAS integration process.  The Commission has also provided financial support to 
WACSOF and other regional society organizations ‘whose primary foci are in tandem with 
ECOWAS Vision 2020 and ECOWAs Strategic  Action Plan’.913 
The Commission (then the secretariat) is on record as playing an instrumental role in the 
expansion of the human rights mandate of the Court.  The Commission was always in support 
of adding a human rights mandate to community legal texts and institutions.
914
 The 
Commission felt the need to give the judges and staff enough work to justify the large 
expenditure of Community resources.
915
 The Commission’s backing of civil society and 
ECCJ judges in the aftermath of the Afolabi decision ‘greatly increased the likelihood that 
ECOWAS Member States would approve the protocol advocated by ECOWAS judges and 
NGOs’.916 
The Commission appears to be the most visible community institution in member states, 
earning it positive acclaim as embodying “the brand” of ECOWAS.917 There appears to be 
little signs of intra-organizational friction with member state institutions despite some gaps 
that currently exist in the institutional mechanism particularly in implementation of 
community policies.
918
 It could be argued that the efforts of the Commission in these areas 
undermine that of parallel continental human rights institutions like the African Commission. 
This is particularly true given the expectation that there should be symmetric alignment of 
policies towards a continental framework in key areas such as human rights. However, 
challenges facing the African Commission such as shortage of financial and human resources 
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can arguably be ameliorated by the efforts of sub-regional administrative organs in this area. 
Cohesive administrative strategies enhance efficient resource management at both levels due 
to information sharing. This reduces the risk of duplication. 
 
5.6.2 TRAINING PROGRAMMES 
The functions of the Commission do not stop at meetings and conferences. The Commission 
also carries out various training programmes amongst its staffs and also across national 
institutions. These trainings are carried out either in conjunction with external bodies or as 
part of its inter-institutional arrangement. The aim of these programmes is often to build 
capacity of national institutions of member states to enhance and improve Community 
intervention is given area. From a human rights perspective, the Commissions’ training 
programmes contributes to human rights education in the Community.
919
 
As part of its efforts to improve humanitarian crisis management in the community, the 
Commission established the ECOWAS Emergency Response Unit (EERT). The EERT has 
held simulation workshops for EERT member on civilian protection during crisis situations. 
Members of the EERT were also trained on the use on of Geographic Positioning System to 
enhance humanitarian missions in the sub-region.
920
 EERT specialists have in addition 
received training on the essential policies and legal documents of the ECOWAS Commission 
backing response in Member states. The importance of an efficient emergency response unit 
in the sub-region cannot be understated considering the recent devastating results of natural 
disasters in some member states where national emergency units have been unable to cope 
with the high number of casualties.
921
 As an anticipatory institutional strategy for disaster 
management and humanitarian access, the Commission has also carried out training 
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workshops on International Disaster Response Laws (IDRL) for West African Disaster 
Managers with the International Federation on Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) 
in Dakar, Senegal in 2012.
922
 The training aims to promote measures in ensuring 
humanitarian access by foreign relief assistance agencies in the sudden onset of emergencies 
which might exceed the coping capabilities of Member States. 
Bearing in mind the importance of a politically stable environment to the actualization of 
economic integration, the Commission has sought to strengthen the ECOWAS Early Warning 
System by recently holding a Regional Policy Seminar on the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P). The Forum organized in collaboration with the Global centre for R2P, ‘provided an 
opportunity to share experiences of ECOWAS in implementing its collective security 
mechanism as a model for implementing the concept, especially, the very controversial third 
pillar of R2P’.923  In line with building staff capacity in this regard, the Commission held a 
training on International Humanitarian Response and Humanitarian response System and 
Contingency Planning in July 2012 for staff of its Early Warning, Humanitarian and Social 
Affairs Directorates. As a means of proactively engaging member states in information 
sharing, the Commission introduced field visits of analysts in the same year.
924
 
In a bid to enhance Good Governance in the sub-region, the Commission has undertaken a 
string of training workshops that aim, in particular to develop the capacity of national 
institutions. In this regard, subject to the ECOWAS Protocol on Corruption, the Commission 
has recently carried out training of Operational Investigators in Anti-Corruption Institutions 
in Member States, and also plans for staff exchange programme among governance 
Institutions in West Africa. The Commission also plans to provide more technical and 
capacity support for the Implementation of the work of Regional Networks on Human Rights, 
Anti-Corruption, Political Parties and the ECOWAS Network of Electoral Commissions 
(ECONEC).
925
 
Through these trainings the Commission appears to have made the most impact in effective 
human rights protection in the Community. This is true to the extent that, through training of 
community and member state officials, human rights topics are geared toward specialized 
areas. This enables a more direct approach towards addressing rights-related problems in 
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member states, even to the grass-root level. Additionally, through training of member state 
officials international human rights strategies are exchanged with skill-development. Tibbits 
agrees that, it is within the accountability model of human rights training that ‘social change 
is necessary and that community-based, national and regional targets for reform can be 
identified’.926 Hence, human rights education presents an all-inclusive platform for every 
level in effective human rights protection across the continent – almost in a harmonization 
style to suit practical reality.  
 
5.6.3 INITIATION OF POLICIES  
As already indicated, the Commission aside from its administrative functions bears a sizeable 
proportion of the policy-making responsibility in the Community.  This policy-making 
function is however, subject to the approval of the Council of Ministers and the Authority. In 
practice, policy proposals of the Commission are mostly adopted by the decision-making 
organs without little amendment.
927
 As would be demonstrated below, the Commission has 
since its transformation initiated policies that have potential long-term impacts on human 
rights in the Community.  
After years without a framework for Conflict Prevention, the Commission instituted the 
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF) which was adopted in January 2008 by 
the Mediation and Security Council.
928
 The Framework eventually attracted funds from major 
international organizations and European governments.
929
 The ECPF covers several 
components of the Community’s operations, including: Democracy and Political Governance; 
Natural Resource Governance; Women, Peace and Security; Security Governance; Media; 
and Preventive Diplomacy.
930
 Despite the success of the ECOMOG experiment in Sierra-
Leone and Liberia, questions still remain on the legitimacy of that intervention.
931
 Complaints 
regarding the actions of the soldiers that were tantamount to gross human rights violations led 
to criticism over the training of the peacekeeping forces. To avoid similar scenario in future 
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peace-keeping missions, the Secretariat shortly before its transformation into a Commission 
undertook the task of formulating a code of conduct to guide armed forces.
932
  
Another important area where the Commission has initiated policies on its own is Gender and 
child rights. The Commission has developed a Child labour plan of Action in conjunction 
with international partners. In the same vein, a validation workshop has been held on the 
Draft ECOWAS Monitoring and Evaluation Framework for Child Protection system in West 
Africa.
933
 Apart from policies initiated on its own, the Commission can also formulate 
policies on the direction of the decision-making organs of the community to complement 
extant community legislation. 
The expansion of the ECOWAS secretariat into a Commission has improved the institutional 
capacity of the Community. The implication is a broader framework for effective policy-
making and implementation. This also implies a cautious willingness, at least, from member 
states to support supranational institutions to implement community policies and deepen 
integration. A look at some of the regional organizations in Africa that operate through 
Secretariats  may reveal restrained institutional capacity, as the ECOWAS Commission and 
the African Commission have so far expanded the activities of the AU and ECOWAS, 
especially in the area of human rights, democracy and good governance. However, this may 
not directly determine the level of implementation. It is not within the purview of this thesis 
to establish the ‘implementation management capacity’934 of the ECOWAS Commission, but 
its activities certainly impact immensely on human rights objectives of the community and 
also complement that of the African Union Commission at the continental level.  
 
5.7 OTHER SUBSIDIARY/SPECIALIZED ORGANS OF THE COMMUNITY 
It is trite that international organizations may establish subsidiary organs for furtherance of 
set objectives or as a matter of expediency to address a specific institutional issue.
935
 These 
subsidiary organs are usually not created at inception and as a result may not necessarily 
appear in a treaty. However, they may be established by subsequent legislation stating 
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specifically its functions and termination, if necessary. These specialized organs may exercise 
advisory powers or play some more tangible role in the day to day function of an 
international organization. These organs are often not the primary focus of intellectual 
inquiry into African regional organizations, perhaps due to their temporary mandates or as a 
result of their non-decision making powers.  The political salience of these specialized organs 
to the functioning of regional organizations may have just come to the fore in recent years, as 
the case of ECOWAS would reveal.  
One of such specialized organs that have played little role in the community institutional 
framework but has the potential to enhance the normative legitimacy of ECOWAS is the 
Economic and Social Council of ECOWAS.  Established under section 14 of the revised 
treaty, the Council has an advisory role and its composition shall include representatives of 
the various categories of economic and social activity. Article 14(2) provides that the 
composition, functions of the Council shall be defined in a Protocol relating thereto. Till date, 
there has been no protocol in this respect. It is not clear if the expansion of the secretariat into 
a Commission and the subsequent adoption of Committee system are in any way connected to 
the redundancy of the Council.  At the continental level the Economic, Social and Cultural 
Council (ECOSOCC) of the African Union is much more visible. In essence, specialized 
organs of this type, though advisory in nature, are arguably ‘the most important… in respect 
of activities relating, directly or indirectly, to the intended establishment of the AU’.936 The 
distinctive character of the ECOSOCC is that it provides a platform for African civil society 
to play an active role in charting the course of the region.
937
 The ECOSOCC was established 
under articles 5 and 22 of the AU constitutive act. The statute of the ECOSOCC has been 
adopted by the Heads of States and Government and it defines it as an advisory organ of the 
African Union composed of different social and professional groups of Member states.
938
 
It is intended that the ECOSOCC would provide the people-oriented platform for Africans 
from all works of life and background to express their opinion on issues that border on 
aspects of their lives and societies. The CSOs that may liaise with the ECOSOCC include: a) 
Social groups such as those representing women, children, the youth, the elderly and people 
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with disability and special needs; b) Professional groups such as associations of artists, 
engineers, health practitioners, social workers, media, teachers, legal professionals, social 
scientists, academia, business organizations, workers, employers, industry and agriculture as 
well as other private sector groups; c) NGOs, community-based organizations (CBOs) and 
voluntary organizations; d) Cultural organizations and e) social and professional groups in the 
African Diaspora in accordance with the definition approved by the AU Executive 
Council.
939
 The benefit of ECOSOCC to effective human rights protection in the continent is 
immediately apparent when taken into context the democratic nature of an organ of this 
nature. The advantage of the Council when fully established
940
 would be drawing every 
stakeholder together to touch on human rights issues that affect the lowest or most vulnerable 
in every society. As earlier demonstrated, one of such groups that may have a greater role to 
play in human rights in developing countries is corporate entities. By involving them in the 
integration process and outlining policy strategies, certain issues that stem from the activities 
of these entities that touch on the rights of individuals may be better addressed. 
As already discussed, the Conflict Prevention Protocol established four main specialized 
organs to oversee the community mechanism for conflict prevention.
941
 The chief organ, the 
Mediation and Security Council continues to play an all important role in the maintenance of 
peace and security in the continent. The MSC holds the key to intervention in cases of 
conflict in member states as it is the primary body responsible for initiating the 
mechanism.
942
 Thus, its willingness to react to situations where there are threats of 
humanitarian disasters, threat to general peace and security or where there is the presence of 
gross violations of human rights in member states, makes it an indispensable body in the 
community. 
The Council of the Wise which was originally called the Council of Elders under the Conflict 
Prevention Protocol
943
 also plays a vital role in human rights protection in the Community. 
From a conflict resolution perspective, the Council of the Wise plays an all-important role in 
the application of good offices to end conflict. The Council which comprises of eminent 
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politicians, traditional rulers, and religious and women leaders may intervene in conflict 
situations as mediators, conciliators and facilitators of peace. Additionally, the Council is also 
central to the maintenance of democracy and good governance in the sub-region. Members of 
the Council also double as members of election monitoring teams.
944
 The ECOWAS Early 
Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN) established by Article 23 of the Conflict 
Prevention Protocol also plays a crucial part in peace and security and humanitarian law 
aspects of the Community’s human rights mandate.945  By closely observing and analysing 
socio-economic and political situations that could potentially develop into conflict, 
ECOWARN plays the role of a conflict threat-perception censor.
946
 As a monitoring tool, its 
threat perception analysis is vital to containing and eliminating conflict and humanitarian 
crises before they escalate.  
Another specialized organ whose activities are incidental to humanitarian intervention in the 
community framework is the Special Representative of the President of the ECOWAS 
Commission. Established under Article 32 of the MCPMRPS, the Special Representative 
plays an important role in peace and security. The Special Representative is the coordinator 
of humanitarian relief and peace-building activities during conflicts. It is expected that the 
presence of the Special Representative on the ground during conflicts would regulate the 
conduct of armed forces and officials of the Community.
947
 
Other specialized organs that are worthy of mention here due to their relevance to the rights 
to health and Gender are, the West African Health Organization (WAHO) and the ECOWAS 
Gender Development Centre (EGDC) respectively.
948
 WAHO was created to ensure a 
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regional approach to some of major health challenges that are prevalent in West Africa. The 
work of WAHO is central to the implementation of policies that enhance the right to health in 
Member States.  The objective of WAHO is the attainment of the highest standard and 
protection of health in the sub-region through harmonisation of policies.
949
 In line with this 
objective, WAHO which started operation in 2000, developed a regional programme on the 
prevention, treatment and care of people living with HIV and AIDS in 2005. It also 
developed a sectoral 3-year plan on HIV and AIDS control among the Armed forces of 
Community Member States and in addition, formulated a regional strategy for the reduction 
of maternal and pre-natal mortality.
950
 These programmes may not represent a concerted 
effort at ensuring the enforcement of the right to health in member states, but they are vital in 
keeping a strategic regional policy to assist national institutions in this respect. Alternatively, 
this approach potentially qualifies as a regional and international accountability and 
monitoring mechanism envisaged at the UN level. All these subsidiary organs engage in 
activities that impact greatly on human rights in the community. As a matter of fact, their 
activities have the potential for greater impact, since they occur at the field level. Key 
decisions are made by the main community institutions, but the activities of subsidiary organs 
are equally as impactful.  
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5.8 CONCLUSION 
While the ECCJ is saddled with the responsibility of interpretation of the treaty provisions 
and also the judicial protector of human rights in the community, it is supported by other 
community organs. This responsibility of decision-making as entrenched in other community 
organs makes the actualization of community objectives a practical reality. This Chapter has 
explored the role of other community organs in the normative legitimacy of the organization. 
In the course of discerning the performance of each organ, it is established that the plenary 
Assembly which is the highest authority in the community while representative of the interest 
of state possesses excessive powers which may inhibit the function of other community 
organs. While there is little evidence of friction between the Authority and other community 
institutions, the inter-governmental over-weight in the community hierarchy undermines the 
role of other equally vital community organs such as the parliament. 
It is argued that increased authority of supranational organizations in a wide variety of forms 
elongates the legitimacy chain of governance. While the governance impact of ECOWAS is 
not comparable to that of other international organization such as the EU, there is little 
intellectual inquiry to shine light on the governance role of other community organs. This gap 
is exacerbated by the fact that global governance lacks any legal patterns of public or 
democratic participation (democratic deficit in international organizations). It is therefore 
important that a parliamentary body such as the ECOWAS parliament is granted full 
legislative powers. The ECOWAS parliament bears some semblance to more traditional 
forms of parliamentary assemblies at the national level although lacking the feature of direct 
election which is a key determinant of democratic legitimacy.
951
 However, it represents the 
most viable platform for any form of deliberative attempt at law-making in the community. 
Admittedly, democracy above the nation state above the nation state is not in sight, although 
not theoretically unthinkable. In regional integration in Africa, parliamentary bodies may 
hold the key to ensuring that norms are legitimized through a process of participatory 
arrangements ensuring the involvement of civil society actors, stakeholders, and the public, in 
the arguing, bargaining and reasoning process of decision-making. The Parliament has 
continued to play its role in human rights protection within the Community while 
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continuously canvassing for an expansion of its powers from advisory body to one with full 
legislative powers.  
More positively, the Commission has come up leaps and bounds and carries a sizeable 
portion of the responsibility by initiating sound policies with human rights implications in 
member states and coordinating the implementation of policies in member states. While the 
Commission is still a long way from fully implementing key policies of the community, 
largely due to failure on the part of the Member States, its policies have so far laid the 
groundwork for the adoption of uniform policies that address human rights challenges that 
are peculiar to the sub-region. The Commission (then the Secretariat) was equally 
instrumental in providing a platform for NGOs and judges of the ECCJ to organize and 
canvass for an expansion of the human rights mandate of the Court. The Commission is the 
community institution which clearly exercises public governance over member states 
institutions. It is pertinent that the Commission ensures the adoption of key values such as 
transparency, accountability and public participation in its policy-making processes as these 
values ensure that the democratic legitimacy of the Community is further strengthened. As 
discussed above through workshops, meetings, and programmes the Commission has 
arguably entrenched some of these norms in the institutional practice of the Community.  
It would be recalled that the ECCJ has become under-utilized as an economic integration 
court causing a lack of focus on the implementation of economic rules in the community. 
This gap is being filled in the meantime by other community organs such as the Parliament 
and the Commission. The recent ordeal of NANTs is an example of the vital role which the 
Parliament has assumed to ensure the implementation of economic rules in member states. 
While the issue of discriminatory trade laws are far from being a misnomer in ECOWAS 
states, the verve shown by other community organs, particularly in ensuring fair domestic 
trade policies which conform to community objectives will only augur well for the 
organization in the long run. The current president of the Parliament is aware of the vital role 
of the Parliament and has argued that the best way for ECOWAS to improve trade and 
investment and compete favourably in the global economy is for the powers of the Parliament 
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to be expanded.
952
 The Parliament also proposes an electoral college to elect ordinary citizens 
as representatives of ECOWAS Parliament.
953
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION  
 
6.1SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
This study set out to ascertain the value of the ECOWAS by examining its current practices 
along the lines of normative legitimacy. The aim is to show that ECOWAS although not 
completely capable of delivering on primary economic integration mandate may possess 
certain attributes that justify its continued existence. Put differently, although ECOWAS is 
making relative strides in other areas which are equally as important to the realization of her 
long term mandate of economic integration, protection of individual’s rights and guarantee of 
their economic freedoms equally enhances the long term success of the organization. 
Consequently, the study examines the legal and institutional practices of ECOWAS in her 
new found human rights mandate with the aim of ascertaining its effectiveness and 
relationship with international, continental and national institution.  
To achieve its objectives, this thesis has adopted mainly a descriptive analytical approach 
supported by a multi-disciplinary conceptual framework to explore the theoretical basis for 
any legitimacy claims that may be made with respect to the current ECOWAS regime, assess 
institutional practices of legitimation and its link to effectiveness. This analysis approach 
aided the discovery of challenges that might hamper the practical realization of an effective 
and legitimate regime. Also, during the course of the analysis, institutional practices in other 
regional bodies around the world with similar wide mandates are concurrently highlighted in 
applicable areas. This chapter presents a summary of the findings of this study, outlines key 
observations and recommends steps towards setting the organization on the path to 
legitimacy. 
Under international law, the expectation is that the literary properties of a treaty induce a 
sense of obligation in states to which they are addressed. This is the main presumption upon 
which international law operates. Textual determinacy is a sine qua non for determining the 
legitimacy of the rule-making process of an international regime.
954
  In fact, the authority of 
an international organization is usually derived from express or implied powers laid out in the 
treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and state practice all 
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demonstrate the constancy of treaty provisions and the obligatory nature of express treaty 
provisions.
955
  However, international organizations may also introduce new laws and 
practices through secondary laws and legislations. This means that the source of an 
organization’s power need not stop at treaty level. At the same time, treaty provisions are the 
clearest indication of the intentions of an organization’s members and the direction which 
they intend to move to, particularly from a normative standpoint.  
 
 In the case of ECOWAS, the revised treaty makes reference to the African Charter but does 
not clearly state that human rights protection is a definite issue area which the organization 
would pursue. The statement of fundamental objectives suggests that the activities of the 
community must be carried out with the provisions of the African Charter and other 
international human rights instruments in mind. However, fundamental objectives do not 
place any concrete obligations on Member States. The statement of fundamental principle 
urging member states to pursue integration on the basis of respect for the African Charter is 
only of aspiratory effect. As the political landscape of the region and the larger continent 
began to change, that fundamental principle to respect human rights was given concrete legal 
effect through protocols and other legislations that further outline the specifics and modes of 
implementation of human rights. By creating a framework for human rights protection  and 
establishing supranational institutions to act in the protection of human rights, it became self-
evident that Member States not only sought to legitimise the regime but also apply ECOWAS 
as the main organization to achieve a stable and successful sub-region. 
 
Consequently, his study attempted to establish a wider link between respect for human rights 
and legitimacy. It is argued that an organization that respects human rights does not only 
enhance its normative legitimacy as a matter of the moral right to rule, but also enhances its 
descriptive legitimacy or the widely held belief in its right to rule. It is also established that 
there is a clear link between social and economic rights and the obligation to ‘raise the living 
standards of its peoples’ which ECOWAS has placed on Member States. Furthermore, 
economic integration is only achievable in a stable environment.  It is no surprise that the 
organization opted for a more robust approach to human rights protection, encompassing 
peace and security, democracy and good governance, although this evolution towards a was 
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propelled by a combination of internal conflicts and a global demand for a stable international 
community in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
The conclusion in this regard is that human rights protection does not go against the 
economic integration objectives of the community. Rather effective human rights protection 
in all its ramifications enhances the actualization of economic integration. The reality of 
practice in ECOWAS is that the move towards human rights realization has somewhat 
distracted the economic integration objective of the organization. The layering of economic 
integration with human rights is most evident in the use of the ECCJ. As earlier revealed, the 
expansion of the court’s jurisdiction into human rights although sparked originally by a case 
touching on economic integration has led to a decline in economic integration disputes. 
Perhaps, this is a result of the nascent nature of the ECOWAS human rights regime, also 
evident in the gaps that exist in the African human rights system. 
In relation to the gaps that exist in the current ECOWAS human rights regime, crucial aspects 
of ECCJ’s rules of access are still unresolved. In particular, the omission of the established 
international customary rule to exhaust local remedy is evidence of weak design. This flaw in 
the access rules of the court has the potential of harming the court’s relationship with 
municipal courts and this does not bode well for the pursuit of effective human rights 
protection in the community.  The ECOWAS human rights regime borrows from the African 
Charter-based system, which poses seven admissibility requirements including the exhaustion 
of local remedies. This is one of the few instances where the practice under the sub-regional 
human rights regime goes against the African human rights architecture, further derailing the 
constitutional convergence often desired in African integration. Additionally, the 
constitutions of member states and national judicial philosophies still impede the direct 
applicability of community law frustrating the legal integration process. Continued 
uncertainty over these crucial aspects of the integration process will continue to hamper the 
effective enforcement of community law. 
From a policy perspective, the activity of other community organizations in human rights is a 
positive sign that would further legitimize the current ECOWAS regime. This is a distinct 
feature of ECOWAS and reveals effectiveness of sub-regional human rights regime more 
over continental institutions in some areas. Unlike the African Commission and other 
continental institutions, which bear the bulk of the responsibility for human rights in the 
continent, ECOWAS by mainstreaming human rights in and around its organisational 
225 | P a g e  
 
structure has the ability to implement human rights programmes at all levels.  Additionally, 
since RECs have the potential to reach the grassroots, NGOs and civil society can play an 
active part in agenda-setting at the sub-regional level. ECOWAS has so far set the pace in 
this regard. The role of civil society in the expansion of the ECCJ in the aftermath of the 
Afolabi decision proves this point. As advised by the CEP, the new ECOWAS regime has 
created a more determinate role for civil society in community organs, particularly the court 
and the parliament. 
The current ECOWAS regime has further legitimized the organization by institutionalizing 
the role of NGOs. As indicated earlier, NGOs and civil society constitute an important 
audience for international organizations’ legitimation practices, because through their 
advocacy and lobbying efforts, their ability to mobilize networks of activists, and their 
promotion of particular norms they can legitimize organizations.
956
 In the case of ECOWAS, 
civil society in the sub-region leveraged the outbreak of conflict in the sub-region and the 
global demand for human rights at the time to push an agenda on the organization. 
Consequently, the human rights movement overtook an agenda for implementation of 
economic rules. It is crucial to the long term success of the organization that equal emphasis 
is placed on the economic rules which also create rights in most instances. 
On the quest for the attainment of supranationalism, ECOWAS only possesses indicators of 
supranationalism in some aspects. The dynamics of supranationalism as represented in the 
EU are not present in ECOWAS. Transnational forces of integration (cross border 
transactions and communications) which can transform and transfer governance from the 
state to the supranational level are not present in Africa. This is evident in the low-level of 
intra-African trade. Furthermore, two aspects of state sovereignty often affected by 
Supranationalism (the exclusive competence of the state in its territory and the relative 
independence of law-making institutions from external intervention) are largely absent, 
particularly with regards to courts.   Hence, the variables for supranationalism are re-defined 
in context. Global dynamics and internal conflicts have propelled supranational evolution of 
ECOWAS in the political and security policy sectors. These changes have imposed on 
community organs and member states certain agenda that drive integration in certain aspects. 
The expansion of ECOWAS mandate to include the prevention and resolution of intra-state 
conflict is considered ‘a major shift in site of governance from national to supranational 
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level’.957  The supranational indicators that are currently present in ECOWAS are determined 
by a different set of factors. The influence of changing global context, the adaptation of 
ECOWAS institutions, and the role of civil society organizations and ECOWAS development 
partners are the determinant factors towards supranationalism in ECOWAS. However, the 
non-implementation of key community policies in Member States and non-compliance with 
ECCJ decisions continue to undermine the effectiveness of the current regime crucially 
shading its legitimacy.  
While the ECCJ has recorded compliance with some of its decisions,
958
 the overall attitude of 
Member States in enforcing the court’s judgements is far from impressive.  In relation to 
other community organs the lack of independence in law making is evident in the decision-
making process of the community which lies overwhelmingly in favour of the Authority. The 
fact that the Parliament lacks full legislative powers exacerbates the democratic deficit that is 
present in African organizations but which is less covered in intellectual discussions on 
African integration. With regards to the Commission, it has so far played a vital role in 
sustaining the organization as the case of the ECCJ demonstrates. However, it can do no 
more than initiate policies. Implementation of these policies is dependent on the effectiveness 
of national institutions.  
The suspension of the SADC Tribunal reveals the reluctance of African governments to move 
from power-oriented to rule-oriented regimes. This is manifested in the lack of political will 
to support the evolution of regional institutions towards supranationalism. The ratification of 
treaties, protocols and other legal instruments which mandate regional organizations to carry 
out all broad mandates is not paralleled by sufficient desire to match obligations. Non-
compliance with obligations is the greatest impediment to regional integration in Africa. 
While socio-political change has substantially altered the dynamics of integration in Africa 
knocking the tide towards greater respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law, 
the over-all picture still leaves much to be desired.  
Compared to Europe, the destructive effect of the Second World War caused the socio-
political reawakening of European political elite. This impacted positively on the European 
arrangement creating a fertile ground for the supranational radicalism of European integration 
and the establishment of a supreme legal order represented by the European Court of Justice. 
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The antecedent conditions prior to African integration are quite different. African integration 
was build on a different set of values. The initial aim was to strengthen the political 
stronghold of the newly independent states and banish the remaining vestiges of Colonialism. 
Subsequently, Africa witnessed conflicts, but these were mostly internal conflicts and 
fratricidal wars. Africa is yet to witness inter-state conflicts of the same magnitude as Europe 
with defining consequences. Perhaps this is impossible due to the still extant political 
influence of the European powers and the forces of globalization and liberalization. These 
forces support sovereignty because they benefit from the state protection. These pro-
sovereignty interests have the continued effect of stunting integration. This is manifested by 
the scramble to control domestic markets by opening them up and practicing rent-seeking 
behaviour, which in turn weakens regional organizations. 
The continued non-implementation of key economic rules and the slow process of integration 
paint a grim picture. However, supranational institutions, although operating in a quasi-state, 
are fundamental to the long term success of regional organizations. Kufour argues that 
supranational institutions and organizations serve little purpose within ECOWAS.
959
 He 
provides a number of reasons to support his stance. While some of his arguments are 
considerable, the evolution of some community organs particularly in the Conflict Prevention 
Mechanism and the recent resurgence of the ECCJ and the Parliament give a different 
perspective. These institutions are effective to an extent, even though a combination of 
actions of Member States and an incomplete legal framework may hamper its effectiveness. 
Can ECOWAS be considered a legitimate organization? Normatively, ECOWAS is 
legitimate to a certain degree. Some aspects of its human rights mandate particularly its right 
of intervention has been welcomed by Member States and has become a trend amongst 
regional organizations. But, in practice, this new interventionist norm has proven to be 
incompatible with the UN charter system in some areas. This clash suggests that the 
ECOWAS regime has fallen short in international legality/formal legitimacy.
960
 On the other 
hand, the descriptive aspects of its legitimacy depend largely on the perception of the 
organization by the citizens. The acceptance of the current regime by NGOs and civil society 
arguably hint at a high level of descriptive legitimacy. However, this is not conclusive 
evidence of ECOWAS’s as NGOs may drive certain agenda that do not necessarily reflect the 
opinion of the majority.  
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The acceptance of the current regime by Member States could also suggest a normatively 
legitimate regime. But the low level of compliance with community law by some of the 
regional hegemons like Nigeria also mean that the organization may not reach reasonable 
outcomes on certain issues. This inadvertently costs the EOWAS system its effectiveness. 
However, the problem of compliance is inherent in the international legal system as there is 
no sovereign to whip states into obedience.  Mechanisms exist to ensure compliance with 
international norms, but as state practice reveals, compliance with the central rules of 
international organizations can be problematic.
961
 But noncompliance is not a bad thing all 
together. Henkin argues that, sometimes noncompliance is a medium for change in 
international law. States seek to change certain unfavourable aspects of international law by 
not complying with laid down rules. This noncompliance is then widely practiced or 
accepted. Thus, noncompliance can be a ‘purposeful invitation to others to join to make, 
unmake or remake a norm.
962
 
Finally, the legal and institutional shortcomings already discussed leaves question marks on 
the normative and descriptive legitimacy of the current ECOWAS regime. By prioritising 
human rights, the organization has attempted to enhance its legitimacy. Whether the 
organization is subsistent in the long run, would be determined by the willingness of Member 
States to effectively implement key policies while creating a favourable atmosphere for 
institutions to operate independently. The attempts at legitimation are laudable and point to a 
slow transition towards institutionalizing norms that are beneficial to the community citizen. 
It is imperative that Member States do not take too long in achieving community objectives. 
A change in attitude or political will is indispensable to the effective functioning of the 
organization and by implication the economic progress of states and their citizens. 
 
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
The previous sections of this chapter, has summarized the research findings and drawn 
conclusions on the practice of legitimacy of ECOWAS. The main argument is that both 
objectives of economic integration and human rights should be given equal attention and 
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pursued with concerted vigour at all levels. Additionally, legal and institutional impediments 
that frustrate the process of integration need to be addressed to give further legitimacy to the 
ECOWAS regime, although the will to do so is ultimately that of Member States. The 
following section outlines practicable ways of strengthening the ECOWAS regime. It 
considers mechanisms and concepts that if implemented, will enhance the human rights 
mandate of the community and at the same time improve the economic integration in the sub-
region. 
 
6.3.1 STRENGTHENING THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
An ideal model of sub-regional human rights regimes is not yet in sight. The African human 
rights architecture is a few practical steps away from attaining the desired level. The first step 
is establishing a culture of judicial law-making and independence of sub-regional courts. The 
strangulation of the SADC tribunal and the challenges of the ECOWAS and EAC courts 
reveal the fear to engage in expansive judicial law-making. The judges of the EAC court have 
been equally brave in the face of threats to have their powers knocked back. The ECCJ on the 
other hand opted to exploit diplomatic avenues to enhance its authority. The predicament of 
regional courts is compounded by the provision of human rights as only an objective of the 
community in the treaty. Stipulating human rights as fundamental objectives is not conclusive 
evidence of the right of community organs to act in that area. 
Hence, it is desirable that Member States expressly provide for human rights jurisdiction for 
community courts. This is achievable through further legislative action such as protocols, 
where member states outline the specific details of the community’s human rights mandate. 
This would prevent African states from challenging the competence of REC to engage in the 
field of human rights.  African states are reputed for jealously guarding their sovereignty, as a 
result it is incumbent on RECs to make express provisions to determine human rights 
competency.  
With regards to the supremacy of the African Charter, it is imperative that it is incorporated 
by RECs in clear terms as a common African standard. While international human rights 
instruments provide common international standards, it is preferable that the African Charter 
is the minimum common African standard. The African Charter is the most representative 
and legitimate source of reference to ensure the unity of the African human rights law. To 
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address regional specificities, RECs may adopt region-specific human rights catalogues on 
given thematic areas.
963
 To prevent the risk of fragmentation in practice, these human rights 
catalogues should be tied to the African Charter by reference to the Charter in the instrument. 
Also in relation to fragmentation, it is important to ensure that RECs are complementary to 
the existing institutions of the African human rights system. This means an adoption of 
mechanisms that regulate the RECs relationship with national and continental human rights 
institutions. This is achievable by the introduction of the principles of limited competence 
and subsidiarity in the areas of norm-creation, in the establishment if institutions with human 
rights mandates and the implementation of human rights policies.
964
  This approach also helps 
protect the system against duplication functions as well as jurisdictional conflicts and 
inconsistencies.  
Regarding locus standi before sub-regional courts, it is ideal to expressly permit individual 
and NGOs access. However, jurisdictional competence in this regard should be subject to 
international customary law sifting mechanisms such as the requirement to exhaust local 
mechanisms before admissibility in relation to national courts, and respect for the principles 
of res judicata and lis pendens with respect to continental judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. 
Currently, apart from the African Commission for human rights, the African Court is still not 
fully functional. Nearly 15 years since the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the 
African human rights court was adopted in June 1998 (Protocol),
965
 only 27 States have so 
ratified the Protocol establishing the Court. In addition, only a small number of State Parties 
to the protocol establishing the Court have made the declaration allowing individuals and 
NGOs to submit cases directly to the Court. Of the 27 States that have ratified the Protocol 
establishing the court, only 5 States (namely Burkina Faso, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Malawi, Mali 
and Tanzania) had made a declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol accepting the 
jurisdiction of the Court to examine applications lodged directly by individuals and NGOs. 
The Court thus lacks the jurisdiction to receive cases directly from individuals and NGOs 
from the majority of African States. Pending the universal ratification of the Protocols of the 
African Court, sub-regional courts can continue to play a complementary role by continuing 
to address human rights problems. 
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To further enhance the ECOWAS human rights regime, it is important that public action 
provisions are institutionalized. This is a major omission in the protocol of the ECCJ. 
Considering that most of the victims of human rights abuses are indigent and lack the 
resources to access the court in timely fashion, it is important that the Protocol of the Court 
empowers NGOs and civil society to bring actions on behalf of human rights victims. This 
approach also enhances the wide reach of the Court. Jurisprudence of the ECCJ reveals an 
inconsistent approach to NGOs standing. The Court granted access to in 2010 (SERAP 
Education and Environment cases) but subsequently refused access in 2011 (Mrakpror,
966
 
Ggagbo v. Cote d’Ivoire967 and CDD v Niger968) and granted access again in 2012 (RADDHO 
v Senegal).
969
  
 
        6.3.2    RATIONALIZATION OF RECs 
The first step towards enhancing the economic integration in Africa is to address the 
crowded integration landscape.  As far back as 1976, Ajomo had identified the ‘mercurial 
proliferation and disappearance’ of regional economic institutions in Africa as a 
problem.
970
 As already demonstrated in Chapter 2, the crowded integration landscape is 
an indicator of the failure of African states to genuinely commit to a single, well-though-
out and implementable programme.
971
 This phenomenon is equally prevalent in the West 
African Sub-region where ECOWAS was anticipated as the ‘sole economic community 
for regional integration in West Africa’972, but 13 ECOWAS Member States except Cape 
Verde and Ghana belong to at least two regional organizations. Multiple memberships of 
regional integration arrangements have adversely affected the implementation of key 
integration objectives. For example, ECOWAS has set the adoption of a single currency 
for the year 2020, although the currency is going to take effect five years earlier in 
Anglophone Member States.
973
 It is expected that Francophone countries currently 
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operating the CFA Francs under UEOMA will eventually adopt the ECO by the year 
2020. 
This phenomenon is exacerbated by the uncertainty over the relationship between RECs, 
the AEC and the AU. Unlike other regional trade agreements in other parts of the world, 
international regime complexity on economic integration in Africa is modestly regulated 
by the AEC. The Protocol on Relations which was established to harmonise and 
coordinate the activities of the RECs is mute on the issue. The Protocol expects RECs to 
ultimately merge or be absorbed to form the AEC.
974
 The simplicity of this provision 
masks the complexity of the engagement of merging or absorbing international 
organizations such as RECs. To date the only successful merger of RECs has been the 
merger of the European Community with the European Free Trade Area to form the 
European Economic Area.   
Any attempt at addressing the problems resulting from multiple memberships and the 
relational issues between the RECs and the AEC requires legal imagination, economic 
thought and strong institutional and political will.
975
 While the 2006 AU moratorium on 
the establishment and recognition of more RECs is an important first step, some more 
options are open to the AU. The AEC can adopt a protocol founded on the principle of 
‘one country, one community’ of the eight AU recognized RECs.976  By liaison with 
national institutions and commissioned experts, countries should be guided to decide 
which RECs best suits their needs taking into account the fact that the ultimate realisation 
of the vision of an African Economic Community may help address some of their needs. 
It is also important that the decision on which REC to join should be made predominantly 
by economic criteria. It is important that Member States shed the long held suspicions 
over sovereignty for this approach to succeed. This should be viewed as a measure 
necessary to pool state sovereignty effectively for the common good.
977
 
To give effect to this approach at rationalization, African states ultimately must show 
commitment to the realisation of the vision of the AEC beyond the usual attitude of 
platitudes and political rhetoric that suggest support. To compel obedience, non-
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complying states may be expelled from the AEC and all but one of the RECs to which 
they belong.  The expelled states may retain membership of the AU which is a political 
body. As correctly argued by Frimpong, the AEC is only realisable if founded on a 
different notion other than Pan-Africanism. There is no reason why the AEC cannot 
consist of something less than the whole of Africa. An African Economic Community 
which consists of a few states can extend the benefits of integration to other countries that 
need not necessarily be members.
978
 
 If historical lessons in African integration have been learnt, the collapse of OAU would 
serve as a useful lesson that waiting for every African country to join the boat can be 
detrimental to the actualisation of key organizational goals. Kufour observes, in relation 
to the OAU regime, that ‘unrestricted access in the form of virtually no entry 
requirements led to the tragedy of the regional commons’.979 Applying the same logic to 
the AEC, only States that share the vision of a Leviathan economic community and are 
willing to commit the necessary resources towards achieving it should contribute. 
Africa’s economic integration is being devalued, delayed and diluted by the fact that there 
are no entry requirements for continental programmes, and strict commitment to 
implementation 
.  
6.3.3 HARMONIZATION OF LAWS 
In regional organizations faced with the mandate to integrate the markets of Member States, a 
crucial step towards increasing trade is the reduction of legal uncertainty and generating 
greater legal predictability and security. Legal harmonization is a mode of legal integration 
which consists of modifying existing laws in Member States to attain substantial congruence 
among them.
980
 Legal harmonization is often associated with economic and commercial law 
due to the fact that regional economic organizations are the main driving forces behind legal 
harmonization at the regional level. The most well-known example is the EU which, since its 
establishment as a common market, has branched out to cover different areas including the 
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judicial field. In Africa, RECS have been slow in implementing serious policies capable of 
eventually reaching their widely heralded integration goals.
981
 Harmonization in the African 
context is therefore some way from being achieved.     
Amongst the eight recognized RECs, references to legal harmonisation in founding treaties 
are far-fetched. The ECOWAS Treaty only makes reference to the harmonisation of 
legislation with regard to labour laws and social security, transport and communications.
982
 
The EAC treaty provides for harmonised laws with regard to labour legislation, transport, 
communications, traffic, banking and legislation pertaining to the community.
983
 The 
Constitutive Act of the AU establishes that the Union shall coordinate and harmonise the 
policies of the regional economic communities and gives the AU Assembly the power to 
determine the common policies of the Union.
984
  However, as earlier mentioned, the problem 
with legal harmonization is the dichotomy between monist and dualist states. In ECOWAS, 
most member states require national implementing legislation for international law to take 
effect in national law. National implementing legislations are rare in Africa impeding 
community law from taking direct effect or be directly applicable in African states. 
In the context of the EU, the purpose of harmonization is to eliminate differences in the laws 
of Member States so far as they constitute an impediment to the free movement of people, 
goods and services.
985
  However, the formulations of harmonisation provisions in the various 
instruments of regional economic organizations add uncertainty on how to achieve 
harmonization. EU practice shows that the uncertainties related to harmonization can be dealt 
away with. In this regard, Foster classifies EU practice into total or complete harmonization, 
minimum harmonization, and optional harmonization.
986
 According to him, total 
harmonization connotes where a rule is enacted for the whole community and precludes 
member states from legislating in the same area.
987
 Minimum harmonization refers to the 
establishment of minimum standards in Community legislation but member states are 
permitted to apply a higher standard domestically.
988
 Optional harmonization is limited to 
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member states where they need to apply a harmonized rule for the purpose of cross-border 
trading.
989
 
Some African integration scholars have waded in on the most suitable approach for legal 
harmonization at the regional level. Thomas maintains that harmonisation is not a form of 
unification but should, therefore, recognize the diversity within a framework set up by 
communal principles.
990
  However, a caveat ought to be placed on his definition. Depending 
on the scope of harmonisation intended by State parties, legal integration may come close to 
unification in the sense that different legal norms are replaced by a single (supranational) 
norm.  Thomas proposed harmonisation that limits African states to primary fields of the law 
dealing with economic transactions necessary for creating common markets at the regional 
level.
991
 
At sub-regional level, the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Laws in Africa 
(OHADA)
992
 calls the tune for the harmonization of law from a private international law 
perspective. OHADA was formed by the adoption of the treaty on October 1993. The 
organisation is built around the existing economic and political relations among francophone 
African countries. The treaty which is essentially pro-development and business inclined,
993
 
aims to accelerate economic development and foreign investments in member states through 
the provision of a secure judicial environment. The Treaty regulates – through the Uniform 
Acts – the following areas: company law, general commercial law, securities, enforcement 
measures, insolvency law, arbitration, accounting law and transport.
994
 At present there are 
seventeen member states spread across west and central Africa.
995
 Since the majority of 
member states are francophone countries, the OHADA laws are largely based on the French 
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legal system. The Treaty seeks to promote continental integration by leaving membership 
open to all member states of the AU.
996
 
Currently, there are nine OHADA statutes. Because the treaty limits OHADA’s jurisdiction 
to business matters, these statutes, called Uniform Acts, focus exclusively on business 
matters. These uniform acts govern the formation, operation and dissolution of business 
entities and the formation, performance and enforcement of business transactions. An 
important supranational feature of the OHADA regime is the provision which stipulates that 
the Uniform Acts are immediately applicable in the domestic laws of each Member State and 
shall have direct effect.
997
   To further its supranational goals, the OHADA Treaty establishes 
four principal institutions namely: the Common Court of Justice and Arbitrage (CCJA), the 
Council of Ministers, the Permanent Secretariat, a regional school devoted to training judges 
and lawyers.
998
 
In the light of Africa’s movement towards greater economic integration, there is an 
overarching need to facilitate internal trade as well as foreign investment by creating a 
unified system of business laws. The growth of private international law on the continent is 
slow. But this gap is not a deterrent to doing business in and with Africa. However, the 
volume of trade lost and lack of confidence engendered in the existing legal frameworks on 
the continent as a result of this deficiency can only be left to the imagination. The expected 
consequence of increased economic co-operation on the continent is an increase in business 
ventures between private parties cutting across national boundaries. Thus, the creation of 
strong legal framework to facilitate the envisaged growth in commercial activity should be 
paramount in African regional organizations. The creation of organizations such as OHADA 
is timely. The Institute for Private International Law in Southern Africa is also doing a lot in 
the area of harmonization, particularly in the Southern African sub-region.
999
  It was 
established in 2000 under the auspices of the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. The 
main aim of the institute is to draft a code of private international law of contract for the 
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Southern African development Community and/or the AU.  This is a laudable effort by 
academics to develop the subject on the continent.  
 
6.3.4 SECURING COMPLIANCE WITH AFRICAN INTEGRATION COMMITMENTS: 
EXPLORING NEPAD AND APRM INITIATIVES. 
As earlier demonstrated non-compliance with key integration initiative remains one of the 
illegitimate features of African integration initiatives. To briefly reiterate earlier arguments, 
non-compliance denies an organization its effectiveness. Non-compliance with treaty 
obligations would often amount in failure to reach reasonable outcomes. In constitutionalist 
language, the organization is lacking in ‘outcome legitimacy’.1000 The question remains, what 
are the available mechanisms, if any, at the continental or sub-regional levels that can 
potentially improve the level of compliance of African states with integration commitments? 
The AU has adopted two initiatives, namely, the African Peer Review Mechanism 
(APRM)
1001
 and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)1002 to improve the 
governance performance of African states and to collectively attempt to build institutional, 
human and infrastructural capacity. The following sections explore the potential of these 
initiatives to compel obedience with AU integration initiatives. 
 
6.3.4.1 NEPAD 
As part of the AU’s goal of improving the quality of life of African peoples, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) was launched on 23 October 2001. NEPAD 
is an African economic programme of action under the AU framework. The primary goal of 
NEPAD is the eradication of poverty by placing Africa on the path of sustainable growth and 
development in order to participate actively in the world economy.
1003
 To achieve its goals, 
the NEPAD framework sets out a programme of action which identifies key conditions for 
sustainable development in Africa. These conditions include peace, security, democracy, 
good governance, human rights and sound economic management. Most importantly, 
capacity building is the key strategy for combating underdevelopment under the NEPAD 
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framework. The strategy underlines the incapacity of African states to meet the conditions 
necessary for sustainable development. 
Consequently, the NEPAD document emphasizes capacity building in various sectors of 
African economies. Priority is given to bridging the existing gaps in infrastructure, education, 
information technology, agriculture and science and technology.
1004
 NEPAD also outlines a 
strategy for enhancing capital flows in African economies. In this regard, NEPAD advocates 
an increase in domestic resource mobilisation and debt relief, increased flows of Overseas 
Development Assistance (ODA), and private capital flows.
1005
 Pertaining to market access, 
NEPAD advocates the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, diversifying production, 
promoting private sector participation, promoting African exports, and boosting the capacity 
of states in the services sector.
1006
 
The NEPAD framework recognizes the capacity constraints of most African states. This 
deficiency is an effect of the non-compliance conundrum in African integration 
arrangements. In African states, capacity constraints are present in various sectors, and these 
constrain national institutions leading to failure to effective implementation of integration 
obligations.  An essential component of the NEPAD agenda that can enhance compliance 
with integration treaties, particularly aspects of intra-regional trade integration, is its 
emphasis on improving regional infrastructures. Infrastructure affects economic development 
in terms of both intermediate and final products. With respect to intermediate products or 
goods, sound infrastructure such as transnational highways, good seaports and efficient 
railway networks facilitates the mobility of the means of production (labour, goods and 
finance), thus improving productivity and reducing the cost of production. Infrastructure also 
increases the flow of information, opening new opportunities and reducing asymmetries and 
other market imperfections.
1007
 African countries are particularly lacking infrastructure in 
transport, communication and energy.  
 
Research shows that, despite a decrease in tariff levels in recent years, transport costs still 
remain a restrictive trade barrier in Africa.
1008
  Statistically, poor infrastructure accounts for 
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40 per cent of predicted transport costs for coastal African countries and up to 60 per cent for 
landlocked countries.
1009
 Inevitably, this inflates market prices and creates low levels of intra-
African trade. The link between transportation costs and the incumbent restrictions on intra-
African trade means that even in the event of a reduction of tariffs, compliance with trade 
rules is insufficient to the actualisation of trade integration in Africa. NEPAD presents a 
holistic governance framework to bridge this gap. 
 
The capacity-building mechanism of the NEPAD framework makes it an essential tool for 
securing compliance with integration treaties. One of the notable NEPAD projects in 
infrastructural development is the north-south corridor project linking Durban in South Africa 
to Dar-es-salaam in Tanzania. This elephant project has yielded in 157 infrastructural projects 
including 59 road projects, 38 rail projects and 6 bridge projects.
1010
 As part of the larger 
Cape-to-Cairo project, a 350 km road between Dar-es-salaam and Cairo is currently 
undergoing construction to be completed in 2015.
1011
 These efforts, while not completely 
filling the infrastructure deficit on the continent, represent a substantial move in the quest to 
connect African markets.  At sub-regional level, although not connected to the NEPAD 
initiative, ECOWAS Member States have embarked on several infrastructural projects such 
as the trans-West African highway
1012
 and the West African Power Pool.
1013
 Projects of this 
size are decisive in the move to merge existing RECs into the AEC in the future. 
  
NEPAD has been criticized by African scholars for various reasons.
1014
 Gathii, summarises 
his critique of NEPAD under three headings: (a) NEPAD’s failure to engage with the Bretton 
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1010
 Jacob Zuma Address delivered at the 27
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link Ghana, Benin Republic and Togo. See more at, http://www.thisdaylive.com/articles/ecowas-leaders-
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Washington International Law Review (2003) 55; See also N. Udombana, ‘A harmony or a cacophony? The 
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Woods-sponsored market-centred view of development, and thereby treating it as a non-
negotiable development framework; (b) using the acquisition of foreign capital and donor aid 
as a pre-condition for NEPAD’s success; and (c) NEPAD’s failure to engage with the 
unfairness and injustice of the international trading rules.
1015
  Gathii’s appreciation of the fact 
that the NEPAD initiative arguably lacks the potential to rescue Africa from its dependence 
on Western capital is valid. NEPAD’s approach rests whole-heartedly on market-oriented 
economic approach which is dependent on foreign aid and capital and thus will struggle to 
remedy the failings of the existing structures that sustain ‘inequality, poverty, and hierarchy, 
both within and without the African state’.1016 NEPAD’s blueprint for Africa’s development 
is faulty in this regard. 
Rather than provide a much required internal economic self-sustenance system that seeks to 
address the current unfavourable position of African economies in the global market, the 
NEPAD framework relies heavily on Western aid and capital.
1017
 It is not rocket science that 
lifting Africa out of poverty and underdevelopment, African leaders must in consonance with 
NGOs and civil society redraw a roadmap for Africa’s development. This roadmap should be 
void of notions of over-reliance on foreign capital, donor funding, foreign aid and the 
exaggerated benefits of market access liberalisation.
1018
  However, NEPAD’s emphasis on 
cross-border infrastructure as vital to Africa’s development is equally valid.  
Africa’s underdevelopment and exclusion from the globalised economy1019 is also ascribable 
to the inefficient and corrupt leadership that has plagued post-colonial Africa, and is still 
prevalent on the continent.
1020
 As part of NEPAD’s strategy to resolve the leadership 
deficiencies that have contributed, in no small part, to Africa’s underdevelopment, under the 
African leaders have adopted a self-monitoring mechanism to frequently assess their 
governance performance in key sectors. As a self-monitoring mechanism, the African Peer 
Review Mechanism (APRM) could be used to address the ‘elephant in the room’ which is 
good governance in Africa. This would eventually improve the question of leadership which 
has frustrated the economic and political performance of African states in recent times. 
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6.3.4.2 THE APRM 
As earlier highlighted, governance issues have come to the fore of African integration due to 
the unbridled and unchecked use of executive power by heads of states. It is against this 
background, and to give effect to the principles of NEPAD, that African governments 
invented the peer review mechanism in 2002. The APRM is modelled on both donor-
prescribed criteria and a broad-based methodology. The APRM has been described as ‘the 
most ambitious piece of innovation to have come out of Africa since decolonization’.1021 The 
APRM Base Document defines the mechanism as ‘an instrument voluntarily acceded to by 
Member States of the African Union as an African self-monitoring mechanism’.1022 
The APRM ensures implementation of agreed integration policies by providing an 
institutionalized platform for reviewing the steps taken by African states. A country that 
expresses interest in belonging to the peer-review process signs a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) which stipulates the conditions for review.
1023
 The benefit of the 
APRM is that it arguably indicates a change of attitude by African leaders, to commit to 
agreed collective standards. To further concretize their commitment to better governance 
standards, African Heads of State adopted a Declaration Democracy, Political, Economic and 
Corporate Governance.
1024
  The Declaration outlines four broad themes upon which states are 
reviewed: democracy and political governance, economic governance and management. 
These four broad themes constitute the standards upon which States are reviewed under the 
APRM. These four broad areas broadly cover the areas in which African States have 
committed to integrate and foster development under the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union, the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community, and the constituent treaties 
establishing the RECs.
1025
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At an organisational level, the APRM is made up of the Committee of Participating Heads of 
State and Government (APR Forum) which constitutes the APRM’s highest decision making 
body. It meets about twice a year, often on the margins of AU Summits, to discuss APRM 
Country Review Reports of countries that have completed the exercise. The APR Panel of 
Eminent Persons (APR) Panel consists of seven distinguished Africans, appointed to five 
year terms.
1026
 It exercises oversight over the APRM. Each of the Panel members is 
responsible for overseeing designated country review process.  The APRM Secretariat is the 
main organ of the APRM process. It is responsible for preparing the background research 
report on the countries to be reviewed. It is also charged with providing logistic and 
administrative support for country missions. 
The APRM process, although voluntary,
1027
 helps to ensure that states implement norms 
agreed at regional level nationally. This is a realisation that Africa does not necessarily lack 
ideas, but struggle to implement principles necessary for development.
1028
  While NEPAD 
provides the normative platform for development in Africa, APRM monitors the practical 
application of these norms. Member States have therefore adopted standards, criteria and 
indicators for monitoring and assessing individual performance.
1029
  Through a five stage 
review process, these standards and indicators are used as a benchmark for evaluating a 
state’s performance. The peer review process is a broad-based one. It allows performance of 
Member States to be assessed under the various themes covered by African integration 
documents, particularly as classified under the Declaration on Democracy.
1030
 The APRM 
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base document stipulates four types of review.
1031
 Each of the review has five complex and 
time consuming stages. The five stage process is set out below. 
Stage 1: Countries launch the process (with the help of the APR Secretariat and Strategic 
Partners through the Country Support Mission) and undergo a comprehensive national self-
assessment exercise involving all relevant constituencies. The Self-assessment Report and 
Programme of Action are then sent to the APR Secretariat and the APR Panel.
1032
 
Stage 2: The APR Secretariat and the Strategic Partners (Country Review Team) undertake a 
country review visit for widespread stakeholder consultation. 
Stage 3: The Country Review Team prepares a draft report on the basis of the background 
document and the Issue Paper prepared by the APR Secretariat, which is then reviewed by the 
panel of Eminent Persons 
Stage 4: The Chairperson of the Panel of Eminent Persons communicates recommendations to 
the head of State and Government of the country under review and subsequently submits the final 
Country Review report and Programme of Action to the Forum of heads of States of the APRM 
for the peer review itself. 
Stage 5: After 6 months of discussion by the Forum, the report is tabled before the relevant 
institutions: the PAP, RECs, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, AU, PSC 
and ECOSOCC. 
So far, only seventeen out of the thirty-three which have acceded to the APRM document, 
have successfully completed the five stages review process : Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia.
1033
 As apparent in the outlined stages, the APRM is 
designed to be an all-inclusive process. By including the civil society in the process, the APRM 
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presents an alternative and viable platform for discussing national matters, strengthening national 
institutions and also highlighting the importance of public participation in national matters.
1034
 
To get the APRM closer to national institutions, participating countries are expected to establish 
two main institutions: the National Focal point and the National Governing Council. The APR 
focal point should be at ministerial level or a high-level official reporting directly to the Head of 
State or Government with the necessary technical committees supporting it.
1035
 The National 
Governing Council (NGC) is responsible for the implementation of the APRM at the national 
level by overseeing the production of the Country Self-Assessment Report and Programme of 
action. Unlike the APR focal point, the composition of the NGC is more broad-based. This body 
must contain upstanding citizens who command the respect of the general public.
1036
 The 
Country Guideline stipulates that the council should include representatives of civil society 
(women, youth, trade unions, peoples with disability and business organization) and 
government.
1037
 
In assessing a country’s status under the four thematic areas of the APRM review process, the 
review team mainly considers the level of ratification of regional instruments by the country 
under the review. In instances where the regional instruments have been ratified, the team 
determines whether the norms created under these instruments are being implemented and 
also checks the availability of domestic institutions vested with the responsibility of ensuring 
adherence to the norms. The review team also evaluates the effectiveness of these norms on 
the country in review. In essence, the review goes beyond determining the level of ratification 
by a state, but also how these various norms influence a state’s behaviour.1038 
Under the theme of democracy and political governance, the objective of the team is to assess 
how a country is performing in the area of democracy, the rule of law, separation of powers, 
and respect for human rights.  In assessing a country under this theme, its performance is 
benchmarked against the standards created under various international and African regional 
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instruments.
1039
 Fundamentally, the review process must reveal whether these instruments 
have been implemented and if citizens benefit from the resulting norms. Ghana was the first 
country to undergo the peer review process in 2005. In reviewing Ghana’s performance, it 
was discovered that while Ghana had ratified some AU conventions, a significant number of 
conventions had not been ratified.
1040
 In order to strengthen its democracy, and the rule of 
law, the Ghanaian Government was advised to ratify and domesticate these documents in 
order to make them part of its own enforceable standards.
1041
  
Subsequent reviews in other countries revealed a recurring theme. There exists a gap between 
the signing or ratification of treaties at the international level and their domestication in 
national legal systems. As highlighted in earlier parts of this study, this is a constant feature 
in the domestic law of African states that impede regional integration in the continent. Failure 
to domesticate these treaties means that norms contained in them are unenforceable in 
national courts. States like Ghana and Nigeria have so far indicated their willingness to ratify 
and domesticate all outstanding instruments.
1042
 Reviews in other thematic areas, economic 
governance management, corporate governance, and socio-economic governance all reveal a 
general implementation problem, particularly, regional obligations of member states. 
The APRM has faced criticisms because it lacks ‘legal teeth’1043 and as such lacks the 
capacity to compel obedience from African states. While this view is plausible, it can equally 
be argued that the APRM unlike other legal instruments ratified by African state is more 
realistic in that it adopts a different approach and serves a different purpose. The APRM 
enhances compliance with African integration treaties and other agreements and as such need 
not be in the same form. By providing for methods  such as information sharing, performance 
reporting, policy assessment, persuasion, and data collection, the APRM potentially 
facilitates compliance with treaty obligations. The APRM adopts the managerial approach to 
securing compliance, which can be more effective in some instances. It would be recalled that 
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despite the softness (failure to bind) factor in soft law mechanisms, international actors still 
chose these mechanisms where they offer ‘superior institutional solutions’.1044 Soft law may 
still offer the advantages of hard law, avoid some of the costs of hard law, and have certain 
independent advantages of its own. 1045    
The APRM can serve as a soft law tool for enhancing greater responsible governance in 
African states and enhancing compliance. This is achievable because the various stages of 
country review bring about information sharing among states, provide a platform for 
reporting and data collection, evaluate the implementation and effectiveness of regional 
norms, involve non-governmental organizations in the assessment process, provide an 
opportunity for technical assistance to be given to states in areas where needed, encourage 
peer dialogue and persuasion from other states. Most importantly, these processes scrutinize 
every aspect of governance in a state, bringing its reputation under increased scrutiny. This in 
turn motivates compliance by the state.
1046
 
This reputational pull of the APRM process is crucial to securing compliance with treaty 
obligations. Reputation is an indispensable tool in securing compliance because it increases 
credibility and makes future cooperation easier.
1047
 Greater emphasis is now being placed on 
a state’s reputation and how it affects the decision to comply with treaty obligations. 
Rationalists argue that states comply with treaty obligations based on the calculation of long 
and short term interests. Often present in these calculations is the willingness to make future 
credible commitments with other states.
1048
 Consequently, reputation is a determining factor 
for the perception of a state and its legitimacy in the community of states. Therefore a state 
would be willing to comply with its obligations because it would be perceived as a reliable 
partner who upholds their end of the bargain. In the case of African States, which are in need 
of foreign investment, it is pertinent that this is the image they seek to portray. By abiding by 
the norms under the APRM, African States can potentially enhance their reputation, and also 
attract greater trade and investments. 
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The reputational effect of the APRM is twofold (internal and external). Internally, the APRM 
is essential because the government wants to build an internal reputation among its citizens in 
order to entrench its descriptive legitimacy. Thus, the APRM helps the government appear 
transparent and committed to good governance. Externally, the process of defending Country 
Review Report at the level, fellow heads of state will highlight the gaps in the country’s 
governance structure, giving suggestions about the steps that could be taken to bridge those 
gaps.
1049
  The APRM inevitably identifies the breaching of rules, and this invariably has 
political and reputational consequences.
1050
 
Overall, the APRM is an innovative way of securing compliance with African integration 
treaties. However, its concrete effect is yet to materialize as statistics on the development of 
African states are far from impressive. For example, all the 17 states that has fully undergone 
the APRM review process since its creation, are still off –track in meeting the MDG goal 1 to 
eradicate extreme poverty and hunger by 2015.
1051
 However, this does not disparage the 
potential impact of the process, if African states continue to submit themselves genuinely to 
the NEPAD framework and the APRM. The APRM may not be the perfect solution to 
Africa’s governance problem, but it is an organic process capable of developing into a viable 
mechanism for addressing the normative and practical issues plaguing African integration. 
 
6.4 THE WAY FORWARD 
The preceding sections have explored possible legal and institutional ideas that would plug 
some of the gaps earlier identified in the study, plaguing the ECOWAS regime. It is 
noteworthy that some of these solutions are not limited to ECOWAS but widely apply to 
sister RECs and by implication continental institutions.  The ideas explored above are not 
exhaustive but have been identified as the minimum standard of changes that must be made 
to move the community forward. Since international organizations are primarily creations of 
state, and the decisions are made by states, the effectiveness of these entities is dependent on 
the political will of Member States. In African regional organizations, there appears a 
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reluctance to make the transition from power-based to rule-oriented regimes. In the case of 
ECOWAS the legal framework is incomplete and coupled with the inaction of states to make 
the necessary amendments, the organization would continue to suffer. Member states must 
match political rhetoric often bandied about at community events with urgent action to move 
the organization a step forward. 
ECOWAS is taking steps to ensure that it has a wider reach. This is consistent with the 
concept of a community which the revised treaty refers to. There are various programmes of 
ECOWAS organs worthy of mention. One of such programmes is the sensitization 
programme of the ECCJ. The programme is part of efforts that began in 2004 to sensitize 
Community citizens across the sub-region about the competence and functions of the Court. 
During the 2012 sensitization programme in Nigeria the Court held interactive sessions with 
the Members of the Nigerian Bar Association, the Nigerian law School, the Market Women 
Association, the police, Customs and Immigration Services among others. By doing this, the 
Court works for the good of the entire organization, impacting every aspect of the 
organization’s objectives.  
Another important step taken by the organization is the introduction of ECOWAS related 
courses in higher institutions of Member States. For ECOWAS to achieve a rule-based 
regime, community citizens will generally need a better understanding of the body of law, 
particularly students of the legal profession. ECOWAS has so far attempted to introduce 
peace studies in Member States. The Council of Ministers recently adopted a report of the 
Ministers of Education that will ensure the introduction of peace studies in the school 
curriculum in the sub-region.
1052
 The objective of this initiative is to use education to 
‘promote peace, human rights, citizenship, democracy and regional integration’.1053 This is an 
encouraging sign, even though a regulation of this nature is long overdue. In the EU, Member 
States include EU law in the curriculum of higher institutions and award advanced degrees in 
the subject area. An introduction of courses such as ECOWAS law and AU law in law 
schools around the continent would enlighten community citizens and create a sense of 
belonging which will further deepen African integration. 
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There is a feeling that ECOWAS has overachieved in the face of the conflicts that have 
occurred in the sub-region, and which continue to plague the operationalization of the 
organization.
1054
 This optimism seems to find some justification in recent projections that six 
Member States may meet the MDGs.
1055
 However, the non-implementation of key objectives 
that would boost trade among Member States might stultify the realisation of the MDGs in 
less privileged Member States. Currently, Member States are working towards the 
finalisation of the details for the adoption of a common external tariff regime. These efforts 
towards meeting regional integration objectives are laudable, but all actors must act with 
alacrity and show more verve if development is to be realised in the sub-region and by 
implication the African continent.  
Intellectual inquiry has covered a fair amount of legal and institutional aspects of the current 
ECOWAS regime. However, there are some areas that are arguably in the shadow of the 
more established topics. There appears to be a paucity of academic material, at least to the 
knowledge of this author, on the administrative aspects of ECOWAS as an organization. It is 
important that scholars continue to probe the effectiveness of community institutions drawing 
from other disciplines. For example, a public-administration approach to the organizational 
practices of ECOWAS organs would help elucidate more on the weak spots of these 
institutions and proffer practicable solutions on how to further strengthen them. Furthermore, 
inquiry of this nature not only reduces the opaqueness of the decision-making processes in 
community organs but also sheds more light on the governance practices of these institutions.   
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